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On December 19, 1987 Quad Cities Unit One was in the SHUTDOWN mode at O percent power and Unit Two was in the RUN mode at 100 percent power. At 1950 hours, it was determined that the Unit One and Two Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) instrument sensing line supports were inadequate and did not meet Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) design criteria. The Unit One ATWS piping supports were modified prior to restart from its refuel outage. Unit Two ATWS piping supports were evaluated to meet operability requirements and continued operation was justified. NRC notification was completed at 2030 hours per 10CFR50.72.

The cause for this condition is cognitive personnel error and inadequate design. The initial hanger support design was deemed inadequate and temporary supports were installed until the design problem was resolved. A new design was not issued and proper supports were not installed.

Unit One ATWS piping supports have been modified and Unit Two ATWS piping supports will be modified after further engineering is completed. Station Technical Staff will walkdown other modifications to ensure proper supports are installed. The new modification program should prevent recurrence. This report is provided per 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(ii)(B).

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Unit One ATWS piping supports have been modified and Unit Two ATWS piping supports will be modified after further engineering is completed. Station Technical Staff will walkdown other modifications to ensure proper supports are installed. The new modification program should prevent recurrence. This report is provided per 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(ii)(B).

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PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor - 2511 MWt rated core thermal power. Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].

EVENT IDENTIFICATION: Unit One and Two ATWS instrument sensing lines were not adequately supported due to personnel error and inadequate design.

A. CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT:

Unit: One	Event Date: December 19, 1987	Event Time: 1950
Reactor Mode: 1	Mode Name: Shutdown	Power Level: 00%

This report was initiated by Deviation Report D-4-1-87-116

Shutdown Mode(1) - In this position, a reactor scram is initiated, power to the control rod drives is removed, and the reactor protection trip systems have been deenergized for 10 seconds prior to permissive for manual reset.

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

On December 19, 1987 Quad Cities Unit One was in the Shutdown mode for a refueling outage and Unit Two was in the Run mode at 100 percent thermal power.

Previously on December 1, 1987 it was observed by operating personnel that a stanchion hanger [H] supporting an Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS)[JC] instrument sensing line coming from level transmitters [LT] 1-263-23B&D was not bolted to the floor.

On Wednesday, December 16, 1987, the Mechanical Maintenance Analyst began to prepare the work package to repair the hanger. At this time it was discovered that the hanger was a temporary support and was not designed for this application.

On December 17, 1987 Sargent and Lundy (S&L) was contacted to perform an engineering evaluation of the ATWS sensing line supports for both Units One and Two.

On December 18, 1987, the Station initiated Modification M4-1(2)-87-72 in anticipation that it would be necessary to install some type of supports to the ATWS instrument piping.

On December 19, 1987, at 1950 hours, after further evaluation as to what type of support modifications were required, it was determined that these ATWS instrument sensing lines located near the 2201(2)-5&6 racks [RK] did not meet Quad Cities Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) design requirements. In addition, as a result of this evaluation, BWRED identified that these lines needed to be seismically supported. NRC notification of this condition on Units One and Two was completed at 2030 hours on December 19, 1987 to satisfy the requirements of 10CFR50.72.

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S&L performed an operability assessment study of Unit Two ATWS sensing lines located near the 2202-5&6 rack using a computer piping model made from walkdown sketches which reflected the as-built conditions. Using the computer model, S&L was able to perform a dead weight and seismic response spectrum using Pressure Vessel Research Committee (PVRC) seismic damping and span length criteria. As a result, fault piping stress limits were considered acceptable for these loads. Therefore Unit Two was determined to meet operability requirements on December 19, 1987 and continued Unit Two operation was justified.

On December 22, 1987, Modification M 4-1-87-72 installation was completed and made operational prior to Unit One startup from the refuel outage. Completion of this modification brings the Unit One ATWS piping in compliance with the FSAR design requirements.

Further engineering is required to determine what repairs are needed to ensure the Unit Two ATWS sensing lines are within FSAR design limits. The engineering will be performed at the next available period where Unit Two is shutdown. Modification M 4-2-87-72 will then be completed during the next scheduled Unit Two refuel outage.

This condition has existed since the ATWS Modification M 4-1(2)-79-002 was completed. The Unit One ATWS system has been authorized for operation since August 6, 1984 and Unit Two since February 14, 1984.

C. APPARENT CAUSE OF EVENT:

This report is provided to satisfy the requirements of IOCFR50.73 (a)(2)(ii)(B), which requires the reporting of any event or condition that resulted in the condition of the nuclear power plant being in a condition that was outside the design basis of the plant.

The cause for this event can be attributed to cognitive personnel error and inadequate design. Modification M 4-1(2)-79-002 was initiated to electrically and mechanically install the ATWS recirculation pump trip (RPT) and the alternate rod insertion (ARI) systems. The modification included the installation of Rosemount pressure and level transmitters [PT] and associated piping, valves and tubing; analog trip system [JC] and units; and recirculation motor-generator field breaker trip coils [AD, CL]. The modification also included installation of hangers to support the instrument piping near the 2201(2)-5 and 6 racks. The original design was to support the lines from the ceiling using a simple rod and clamp configuration, taking only dead weight load into consideration as shown on drawings M-953, 954, 956 & 957. However, after further evaluation, it was determined by the Station (in a letter dated August 4, 1981) that the preferred means of restraint would be to use floor and/or wall mounted supports, because of easier installation. Since the original hanger support design was inadequate, temporary supports were installed until the design problem was resolved. However due to a personnel error, the modification test was signed off without having the supports installed. As a result, a new design was not issued and the proper supports were not installed prior to declaring the modifications operational.

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D. SAFETY ANALYSIS OF EVENT:

The ATWS system is designed to act as a backup to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) [JC]. Initiating signals for the ATWS system are reactor low low water level (-59 inches) or reactor high pressure (1250 psig). The ATWS system automatically trips both A and B recirculation motor generator (MG) field breakers (RPT) and initiates the opening of six Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI) [JC] valves to insert control rods [AA]. These actions reduce the reactor power level to mitigate the consequences of this type of transient.

The Reactor Protection System was operable or in its tripped condition for both Units One and Two while the ATWS sensing lines were in this condition and would have shutdown the reactor if required. In addition, the Standby Liquid Control (SBLC) [BR] system was available to shutdown the reactor if necessary. Therefore, the safety consequences of this event are minimized.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Immediately after it was discovered that the ATWS sensing lines required the installation of supports in order to make the system meet FSAR requirements, Modification M 4-1(2)-87-72 was initiated. The Unit One modification involved the installation of supports per Nuclear Work Requests (NWR) and Engineering Change Notices (ECN) as listed below.

- NWR Q62779 Preparation work to supports.
- NWR Q62792 Drill holes and install wedge bolts near 1-2201-5 rack, per ECN #QC-875-33.
- NWR 062794 Install supports near 1-2201-5 racks, per ECN #QC-87S-31.
- NWR Q62795 Drill holes and install wedge bolts near 1-2201-6 rack per ECN #QC-875-34.
- NWR Q62796 Install supports near 1-2201-6 rack per ECN #QC-875-35.
- NWR Q62797 Install hanger supports to existing floor stands 2251-75A, B, C & D per ECN #QC-87S-38.
- NWR Q62798 Install support frame for ATWS sensing lines near 1-2201-6 rack per ECN #QC-875-32.
- NWR Q62799 Install ATWS supports per ECN #QC-875-37.

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The Unit Two modification is still under design and is expected to be installed during the next refueling outage.

Technical Staff personnel will be performing a walkdown of the following modifications that deal with hanger installation as a measure to assure that other systems are not operating without the proper hanger supports installed.

- Modification Description
- M 4-1(2)-76-023 Atmospheric Containment Atmosphere Dilution (ACAD)/Continuous Air Monitor (CAM)[IK]
- M 4-1-80-003 Installation of seismic supports for Target Rock safety relief valve [SB] air line
- M 4-2-80-004 Modification of Moisture Separator Drain Tank drain line hangers 2-3510-H25 and 2-3511-H35
- M 4-1(2)-80-012 High Radiation Sample System [IL]
- M 4-1(2)-80-022 Installation and upgrade of supports for various safety related motor control centers (MCC) [EF], instrument racks and switchgear [EB]
- M 4-1-81-017 Installation of additional supports on the Control Rod Drive (CRD) [AA] insert and withdraw lines
- M 4-2-82-001 Modification of the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) [EG] system pipe hanger 2-1202-H7
- M 4-1-82-043 Addition of RWCU valve (1-1201-173)
- M 4-1-82-048 Suppression Chamber [NH] level sensing lines

This effort by the Technical Staff will be tracked with Nuclear Tracking System (NTS) number 2542008711601.

To prevent recurrence of this event, BWRED now requires a dimensional verification be performed by a certified quality control inspector for all Safety Related modifications involving the installation or modification of Safety Related load carrying members. Resolution of deficiencies will be accomplished before the modification test may be signed off as completed. This is part of the new modification program which was implemented in April 1987.

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F. PREVIOUS EVENTS:

LER NUMBER	TITLE
254/86-022	Containment Atmospheric Monitoring Line does not meet code allowable stress limits.
254/86-024	U-1 and U-2 Residual Heat Removal Service Water Piping Supports exceed code stress allowable limits.
254/86-025	Torus Attached Small Bore Piping does not meet code allowable limits.
254/87-008	IC Residual Hert Removal Service Water Pump piping in excess of allowable stress due to sheared anchor bolts.
254/87-011	Residual Heat Removal Support Embedment Plate in excess of allowable stress due to improper anchor strap spacing.
254/86-033	Control Room Panels - Inadequate Mounting.
265/87-019	Piping Supports Outside With Safety Analysis Report due to Design Error.

254/87-026 Piping Supports Outside Compliance with Safety Analysis Report due to Design/Construction Error.

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:

There was no component failure involved in this event, therefore a Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System (NPRDS) search was not performed.

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DEVIATION REPORT Commonwealth Edison OVR NO. 4 - 1 - 87 - 116 SUPP. 1 STA UNIT YEAR NO. PART TITLE OF DEVIATION OCCURRED 12/10/87 1950 11-2 ATWS SUPPORT HANGERS DO NOT MEET DESIGN REQUIREMENTS BATE TIME SYSTEM AFFECTED PLANT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT TESTING ATWS (263) DESCRIPTION OF EVENT MODE RUN POWER (%) 100 ---X WORK REQUEST NO. 1 788 ENGINEERING DETERMINED THAT THE U=2 ATWS INSTRUMENT SUPPORTING HANGERS DO NOT MEET ASME SEC. 3, DESIGN REQUIREMENTS. THEY ALSO DETERMINED THAT THE ATWS REGUIREMENTS PIPING DID MEET OPERABILITY IKEM 1/19/88 POTENTIALLY SIGNIFICANT EVENT PER NSD DIRECTIVE 4-07 X NO YE3 FOCFRED. 72 NRC RED PHONE NOTIFICATION MADE 4 HOUR 2030 50.72 -b-ii F. P. S. P. D. G. CLARK 12/19/87 PERATING ENGINEER NEW HANGERS WILL BE INSTALLED DURING THE NEXT REFUELING OUTAGE. NON REPORTABLE EVENT NOTIFICATION _____ 30 DAY REPORTABLE / TOCER 50.73(a) REGION 131 5 DAY REPORT PER IDCFR21 (11)(B) ANNUAL/SPECIAL REPORT REQUIRED GECO CORPORATE NOTIFICATION MADE IF ABOVE NOTIFICATION IS PER 100FR21 A.L.R. # LINELINGS TÉLECOPY _ LER * 87-030 CECO CORPORATE DEFICER DATE TINE PRELIMINARY REPORT J. SWALES 12/21/87 COMPLETED AND REVIEWED OPERATING ENGINEER DATE ACCEPTED BY STATION REVIEW 9 RESOLUTION APPROVED AND AUTHORIZED FOR DISTRIBUTION 88+5178 11+85 (FORM 15+52+1)



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Commonwealth Edison Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station 22710 206 Avenue North Cordova, Ulinois 61242 Telephone 309/654-2241

RLB-88-013

January 13, 1988

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Reference: Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station Docket Number 50-254, DPR-29, Unit One

Enclosed please find Licensee Event Report (LER) 87-030, Revision 00, for Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station.

This report is submitted in accordance with the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), which requires the reporting of any event or condition that resulted in the nuclear power plant being in a condition that was outside the design basis of the plant.

Respectfully,

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY QUAD-CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION

R. L. Bax Station Manager

RLB/MSK/clr

Enclosure

cc: I. Johnson R. Higgins INPO Records Center NRC Region III

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