LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Facility Name (1)	Docket Number (2)	Page (3)
Braidwood, Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 4 5 6	1 of 0 1

Title (4) 1A Diesel Generator Start on a Safety Injection Signal Instead of an Undervoltage Signal During Testing Due to Operator Miscommunication

Event Date (5)			LER Number (6)				Report Date (7)			Other Facilities Involved (8)	
Month	Day	Year	Year	///	Sequential Number	Revision Number	Month	Day	Year	Facility Names	Docket Number(s)
										NONE	0 5 0 0 0
0 2	0 4	8 8	8 8	---	0 0 5	0 0	0 2	2 3	8 8		0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11)					
	5	___ 20.402(b)	___ 20.405(c)	X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	___ 73.71(b)		
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 0	___ 20.405(a)(1)(i)	___ 50.36(c)(1)	___ 50.73(a)(2)(v)	___ 73.71(c)		
		___ 20.405(a)(1)(ii)	___ 50.36(c)(2)	___ 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	___ Other (Specify in Abstract below and in Text)		
		___ 20.405(a)(1)(iii)	___ 50.73(a)(2)(i)	___ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)			
		___ 20.405(a)(1)(iv)	___ 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	___ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)			
		___ 20.405(a)(1)(v)	___ 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	___ 50.73(a)(2)(x)			

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

Name	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE
Randall A. Smith, Technical Staff Engineer Ext. 2482	8 1 5 4 5 8 -2 8 0 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		Expected Submission Date (15)	Month	Day	Year
___ Yes (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	___ X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e, approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At 1352 on February 4, 1988, during the performance of surveillance 1BwVS 8.1.1.2.f-13, the 1A Diesel Generator auto-started on a safety injection signal instead of an undervoltage as a result of a miscommunication between the two licensed operators conducting the surveillance. The miscommunication occurred while the operators were practicing the sequence that would be used for the test. Corrective action included securing the diesel generator, and counseling the individuals involved in the test stressing the importance of effective communications.

There have been no previous occurrences of inadvertent diesel generator actuations during surveillance testing.

IE22
1/1

A. PLANT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT:

Unit: Braidwood 1 ; Event Date: February 4,1988 ; Event Time: 1352
MODE: 5 - Cold Shutdown ; Rx Power: 0% ; RCS [AB] Temperature/Pressure: 100°F/30 psig

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

There were no inoperable systems or components at the beginning of the event which contributed to the severity of the event.

At 1352 on February 4, 1988, during the performance of the load sequencing portion of Technical Staff Surveillance 1BwVS 8.1.1.2.f-13, 1A Diesel Generator 24 Hour Load Test and ECCS Surveillance, a Nuclear Station Operator (NSO), located in the Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room (AEER), inadvertently actuated the Diesel Generator (DG) [EK] Safety Injection (SI) [BQ] start relay prior to another NSO located in the Main Control Room (MCR) opening the 4KV Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) [JE] Bus 141 Station Auxiliary Transformer (SAT) feed breaker. As a result of this action, the 1A DG auto-started on an SI signal instead of an undervoltage (UV) signal as required in the BwVS.

The surveillance simulates a loss of ESF bus voltage in conjunction with an ESF actuation test signal per Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.2.f-6. In order to accomplish this, Bus 141 SAT feed breaker is opened 2 seconds prior to the initiation of the SI signal.

Initial conditions were re-established, and the surveillance was successfully completed at 1412 on February 4, 1988.

All Engineered Safety Feature pumps associated with Train A were operating in accordance with the surveillance. Stable plant conditions were maintained throughout the event.

The appropriate NRC notification via the ENS phone system was made at 1622 on February 4, 1988, pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii).

This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) - any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature, including the Reactor Protection System.

C. CAUSE OF EVENT:

The root cause of this event was a miscommunication between the licensed NSO at the SI start relay located in the AEER and the licensed NSO located at the Bus 141 SAT feed breaker hand switch located in the MCR. While verbally practicing the sequence on headsets several times, the NSO at the SI start relay thought the sequence for relay actuation was real, while the NSO at the Bus 141 SAT feed breaker was still practicing the actuation sequence. Hence, the 1A DG was started on an SI signal instead of a UV signal as required by the surveillance.

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS:

There were no safety consequences as a result of this event as all systems operated as designed. The 1A DG started on the SI signal, which was given out of sequence. This event is considered to be the worst case condition, as this test is only performed in Mode 5 or Mode 6. The redundant train was operable throughout the event.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Immediate corrective action was to secure the Diesel Generator. Additionally, the individuals involved were counseled on the event, with special emphasis placed on the importance of correct communications. The test was later performed correctly without error.

F. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES:

There have been no previous occurrences of inadvertent Diesel Generator starting during surveillance testing.

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:

This event was not the result of component failure, nor did any components fail as a result of this event.

Commonwealth Edison
Braidwood Nuclear Power Station
Route #1, Box 84
Braceville, Illinois 60407
Telephone 815/458-2801

EEF/88-375

March 3, 1988

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

The enclosed Licensee Event Report from Braidwood Generating Station is being transmitted to you in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2) (iv) which requires a 30 day written report.

This report is number 88-005-00; Docket No. 50-456.

Very truly yours,

E. E. Fitzpatrick
Station Manager
Braidwood Nuclear Station

EEF/PMB/jab
(6720z)

Enclosure: Licensee Event Report No. 88-005-00

cc: NRC Region III Administrator
T. Tongue, NRC Resident Inspector
INPO Record Center
CECo Distribution List

IE22
/1