# U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS

NRC Inspection Report: 50-445/88-34

50-446/88-30

Permits: CPPR-126 CPPR-127

Dockets: 50-445 50-446 Category: A2

Construction Permit Expiration Dates: Unit 1: August 1, 1988 Unit 2: Extension request submitted.

Applicant: TU Flectric Skyway Tower 400 North Olive Street Lock Box 81 Dallas, Texas 75201

Facility Name: Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES), Units 1 & 2

Inspection At: Comanche Peak Site, Glen Rose, Texas

Inspection Conducted: May 4 through June 7, 1988

Inspector:

AH XWERMORE H. S. Phillips, Senior Resident Inspector

6-17.88 Date

Construction

Reviewed by:

A Lurinor H. H. Livermore, Lead Selior Inspector

6-17-88 Date

### Inspection Summary:

# Inspection Conducted: May 4 through June 7, 1988 (Report 50-445/88-34; 50-446/88-30)

<u>Areas Inspected</u>: Unannounced, resident safety inspection of: (1) applicant's actions on IE Bulletins (IEBs), (2) applicant's action on construction deficiencies, (3) general plant inspections, (4) fire prevention/protection, (5) mechanical components, and (6) quality programs and administrative controls.

<u>Results</u>: Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations, were identified; however, two unresolved items involving site application of service water piping cotaing without QA/QC controls (paragraph 6.b.1) and removal of the coating without violating pipe minimum wall thickenss (paragraph 6.b.3) and five open items concerning the service water pipe coating work (paragraphs 6.b.1, 6.b.2, 6.b.3 (two items), and 6.b.4) were identified.

#### DETAILS

#### 1. Persons Contacted

\*W. 3. Counsil, Executive Vice President, TU Electric

- \*G. 3. Davis, Nuclear Operations Inspection Report Item Coordinator, TU Electric
- \*T. L. Heatherly, Licensing Compliance Engineer, TU Electric
- \*J. J. Kelley, Manager, Plant Operations, TU Electric
- \*L. D. Nace, Vice President, Engineerir & Construction, TU Electric

\*D. M. Reynerson, Director of Construction, TU Electric \*M. J. Riggs, Plant Evaluation Manager, Operations, TU Electric

\*A. B. Scott, Vice President, Nuclear Operations, TU Electric

\*J. C. Smith, Plant Operations Staff, TU Electric

The NRC inspectors also interviewed other applicant employees during this inspection period.

\*Denotes personnel present at the June 7, 1988, exit meeting.

# 2. Applicant Action on IE Bulletins (92701)

- (Closed) IEB 80-04, "Analysis of PWR Main Steam Line a. Break with Continued Feedwater Addition": This IEB was previously reviewed by the NRC inspector and the results of that review are documented in NRC Inspection Report (IR) 50-445/88-12; 50-446/88-10. It was held open pending the receipt of additional information. TU Electric supplemented the file with information from the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Sections 6.2.1.1.3, "Design Evaluation"; 6.2.1.4, "Mass and Energy Release Analysis for Postulated Secondary System Pipe Ruptures"; and 15.1.5, "Steam System Piping Failure." The data shows that the potential overpressure of the containment resulting from a main steam line break and increased reactivity was evaluated. The NRC inspector has no further questions.
- b. (Open) IEB 80-11, "Masonry Wall Design": This IEB concerned the structural integrity of concrete masonry walls with attached seismic Category I piping and the interaction between the two. The NRC inspector reviewed this item in NRC IR 50-445/88-12; 50-446/88-10 and a Notice of Violation (NOV) was issued because the Design Change Authorization (DCA) 23040, Revision 3, conflicted with the statements in FSAR Volume XVI (Response 130.36). The NRC inspector randomly selected two DCA files (35700 - 35719; 35720 - 35739) which contained 39 DCAs

concerning civil, electrical, or mechanical components. The purpose of the review was to determine if other DCAs were processed by the applicant without a determination if the change affected licensing documents. It appears that the issue with DCA 23040 is an isolated case. This item remains open pending the completion of the modification of masonry walls as described in the FSAR.

(Closed) IEB 80-18, "Maintenance of Adequate Minimum Flow C. Through Centrifugal Charging Pumps Following Secondary Side High Energy Line Ruptures": In May 1980, Westinghouse (W) reported that under certain conditions centrifugal charging pumps could be damaged due to a lack of minimum flow before applicable safety injection (SI) termination criteria are met. Specifically, it involves the unavailability of pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORVs) with the operation of one or more charging pumps repressurizing the reactor during SI following a secondary system high energy line break. The SI signal isolates the charging pump miniflow return line but at the same time flow through the charging pumps is determined by the pump characteristics (head vs. flow curve), pressurizer safety valve set point, and the flow resistance and pressure losses in the piping and in the reactor core. As a result, minimum flow may not ersure pump cooling and result in pump damage before SI termination. Westinghouse recommended that calculations be performed to ensure adequate cooling is present under all conditions.

The NRC IEB required operating plants and those near licensing to respond. NRC Region IV letter dated July 1980 transmitted this IEB to TU Electric and stated that it was furnished for information purposes only. This IEB was reviewed and closed in NRC Inspection Report 50-445/84-07 on the basis that no response was required.

During this inspection, the NRC inspector reviewed the technical aspects of this IEB to assure that TU Electric evaluated this condition. The file, which has been supplemented with information that was unavailable during the original NRC inspection, now contains correspondence dating back to 1980. Westinghouse letter (WPT-4662) provides Design Change Notices (DCNs) CVCS-1-6 and 515-1-6 and guidelines for charging pump alternate miniflow path. TU Electric letter (TSG-4357) and DCA 15226, Revisions 0-2, document the accomplishment of modifications recommended by W. This item is closed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

# 3. Action on 10 CFR Part 50.55(e) Deficiencies Identified by the Applicant (92700)

(Open for Unit 2, Closed for Unit 1) SDAR-CP-84-02, Defective Diesel Generator Push Rods: TU Electric reported that defective push rods were observed in the Unit 1 diesel generators. Specifically, linear indications were found between the "ball" and "rod" on two primary and one intermediate push rods. This deficiency was documented on nonconformance report (NCR) M84-00109S. Unit 1 and 2 replacements were requisitioned.

This item was inspected and closed out in NRC Inspection Report 50-445/85-03; 50-446/85-02. During a subsequent inspection, a NRC inspector noted that TU Electric's reports did not fully address construction deficiencies per 10 CFR Part 50.55(e) and this finding was documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-445/85-16; 50-446/85-13. Specifically, corrective action commitment dates were not met and initial, interim, and final 50.55(e) reports often omitted the corrective action for Unit 2 and subsequent tracking to completion.

TU Electric reviewed all of their 50.55(e) files to identify those cases where this type of deficiency was not filly addressed. TU Electric letter (TXX-6453) dated May 1987 identified 38 cases where the deficiency was not fully addressed. This was in addition to 20 cases where TU Electric reported (TXX-4508, July 1985) that their 50.55(e) reports had not stated whether the deficiency applied to Unit 1 or 2 or both. All of these incomplete reports covered the time frame from 1977 through 1986.

The NRC inspector reinspected TU Electric's file (SDAR-CP-84-02) and noted that the Final Report TXX-4108 dated February 1984 was incomplete because this report did not indicate whether the deficiency applied to Unit 2. The file has been supplemented to show that the deficiency applies to Unit 2. The final report was amended in report TXX-88361 dated April 1988 and was changed to read "Supplemental Report." The latest report now discusses Unit 2 and the schedule for corrective action. A licensing commitment form (LCR) was developed and is now being used to track Unit 2 commitments (or Unit 1). The future use of this form represents a tracking improvement.

The NRC inspector also reviewed the other documents in the file (requisitions, receiving reports, inspection reports, maintenance action reports, in-process quality checklist, and various correspondence). The file documented the completion of work on Unit 1. The work on Unit 2 is tracked by

TU Electric and is identified as LCR-88-403 with a completion due date of March 30, 1991.

The construction deficiency in the Unit 1 diesel generators is closed based on the rework documented in the file, but remains open for Unit 2 diesels pending the completion of commitment LCR-88-403.

No violations or deviations were identified.

#### 4. General Plant Inspections (50053, 50073, 51053, 51063, 52053)

At various times during the inspection period, the NRC inspector conducted general inspections of the Unit 1 reactor containment (RCB), safeguards (SGB), auxiliary (AB), electrical control (ECB), and diesel generator (DGB) buildings, the service water intake and the turbine buildings. Selected rooms in these buildings were inspected to observe current work activities with respect to major safety-related equipment, electrical cable/trays, mechanical components, piping, welding, coatings, and Hilti bolts. The housekeeping storage and handling conditions inside these buildings and various outside storage areas were also inspected.

Work activities that were selected for more detailed inspections are described in paragraphs 5, 6, and 7.

No violations or deviations were identified.

# 5. Fire Protection/Prevention (42051)

The NRC inspector observed plant conditions relative to material and heat source control in all areas described in paragraph 4 above. The plant was free of accumulated combustible materials and fire watch personnel were posted throughout the plant where welding was in process. In addition, the inspector reviewed the results of several TU Electric surveillances of plant conditions which included cleanliness and control of combustible materials.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Safety-Related Mechanical Components (50073)

### a. AFW Pump Overhaul

On May 24, 1988, the NRC inspector observed workers overhauling the steam driven auxiliary feedwater (*FW*) pump. The pump was being reoverhauled following a recent overhaul because the gap between the head and the block of the pump was excessive after torquing. Subsequent follow-up with results engineering revealed that a nonconformance report (NCR) was not written because the NEO Frocedure (3.05) allowed the pump to be reworked to meet the original gap per maintenance procedure/ instructions.

The NRC inspector stated that a nonconformance should have been written on the gasket when it was found to be unacceptable and also to address the improper material (spare part) supplied by the vendor. The material was too thick and prevented the proper gap between the head and block of the pump. At a subsequent meeting between the NRC and operations personnel, TU Electric personnel stated that they may issue a NCR. Answers to NRC quescions concerning procurement and receipt inspection were not available. Also, no information was available as to whether this gasket material was installed in other equipment.

The Senior Resident and Resident Inspectors of operations identified similar concerns during this inspection period. This issue was referred to NRC operations inspectors for further review and follow-up. This will be reported and tracked as an unresolved item in NRC Inspection Report 50-445/88-39; 50-446/88-33.

### b. Removal of Plasite Coating From Service Water System

On May 2, 1988, the NRC inspector observed work activity performed by Cannon Company which is removing the Plasite 7122 liner from the 4, 10, 24, and 30 inch service water system (SWS) piping. This system removes heat from the emergency diesel generators, and component cooling water system (CCWS) heat exchangers. The SWS also supplies cooling water to the safety injection, centrifugal charging pump lube oil coolers and the containment spray pump bearing oil coolers. The SWS also supplies cooling water during normal operations or after a postulated loss of coolant accident from the ultimate heat sink which has a 30 day supply of cooling water.

The SWS liner is an epoxy coating that was applied to the inside of the carbon steel piping, ASTM A106 Grade B. In the 1975-76 time frame, the specifications originally described the coating and application as safety-related. The vendor applied a "Q" coating at their shop prior to shipping the pipe to the site. The coating on field weld areas was applied by the site contractor without QA/QC program controls according to TWX No. 12523 from site engineering to Gibbs & Hill (G&H) engineering. The coating was specified to protect the piping from the slightly corrosive water supplied from the Squaw Creek Reservoir. The Unit 1 system has operated for about six years and about half of this time it was in wet lay up.

- (1, Evaluation of Coating Failures The NRC inspector reviewed the TU Electric files and actions. Construction deficiencies (CP-80-07 and CP-86-07) files were reviewed.
  - (a) Evaluation of CP-80-07

In September 1980, the NRC was notified concerning the coating failure. Site engineering requested an evaluation from the G&H, New York, Office relative to the safety significance per 10 CFR 50.55(e). In the request, the site engineer stated that ITT Grinnel procured "Q" coating materials (Belzona) and applied it under the controls of a QA/QC program but that the coating applied on site was not procured or applied under a QA/QC program. The request also asked for the impact of a coating failure on plant safety if the coating were to come off and plug the CCW heat exchanger tubes.

G&H provided a response on October 17, 1980, (telecopy 910-8908-660). After receiving the G&H evaluation TU Electric concluded on the basis of the evaluation that this deficiency had no safety significance.

The NRC inspector questions the G&H response and evaluation of CP-80-07 and feels that it did not adequately address (1) the lack of a site QA/QC program during coating application, (2) the basis for the conclusion that flaking or sheets of coating that might come off would breakup and not plug the CCW heat exchanger or other safety-related equipment (described in the beginning of this section). In the inspector's view, the failure to implement QA/QC controls over site applied coatings may have caused the failure. The NRC inspector feels that an inadequate evaluation resulted in an inappropriate engineering decision to downgrade the specified requirements.

Approximately the same time, two design change authorizations DCA 8809 and 8810 were processed to change G&H Specifications MS-43B and MS-100 to read: Plasite No. 7122 and its application are not safety related ('Q"). The justification was that the loss of the coatings is not detrimental to the safety of the plant. In May 1981, Section 9.2 of the final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) was changed to reflect the DCA decision to downgrade the coating.

The NRC inspector has been unable to find an adequate engineering basis for downgrading the application of the coating (even though the coating itself may not be safety-related). The effect of a non-quality item on safety-related piping and equipment in the system should have been considered. That is, the coating may have been applied for commercial considerations (premature replacement of the piping); however, the improper application of coating inside the piping could (1) introduce materials that are deletericus to the carbon steel (and other materials) and (2) should the coating fail and come off in sheets, it could stop up safety-related equipment and degrade plant safety. The design requirements described in Criteria 1 and 44 of Appendix A of 10 CFR50 require redundancy in the cooling system assuming a single failure. If applicable, TU Electric should also identify other cases and effects, if any, where non "Q" coatings have been applied without the controls of a QA/QC Program per 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. This item is unresolved pending the receipt and review of any additional information relative to the procurement and application of coatings (including Belzona) to the inside of the SWS or other American Society of Mechanical Engineering (ASME) piping, Class 1, 2, and 3, (445/8834-U-01; 446/8830-U-01).

# (b) SignificantEvent Report (SER) Evaluation

In 1983, TU Electric received Significant Event Report (SER) 6883 from the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO). It discussed the failure of Plasite 7122 at the Palo Verde Nuclear Plant. This issue was reviewed and dispositioned by Texas Utilities engineering and it appears that the disposition heavily relied on the G&H evaluation previously described. The construction deficiency (CP-80-07) evaluation which is referenced in the file was also considered in the basis for closing the SER. (c) Information Notice (IEN) Evaluation

In March 1985 NRC Information Notice (IEN) 85-24 was issued concerning the failure of Plasite 7122 pipe coating and the adverse effects in the SWS that occurred at the Palo Verde Plant. The IEN stated that the information should be reviewed and action taken, if applicable, to preclude the recurrence of the blockage of safety-related equipment.

Based on questions raised in regards to the original evaluation by G&H, the inspector feels a re-review of the SER and IEN by TU Electric should be considered. The generic implications, if any, should also be considered. This is an open item. (445/8834-0-02; 446/8830-0-02).

(d) Evaluation of CP-86-07

On September 23, 1985, a construction paint foreman reported that the subject pipe coating had deteriorated. Operations issued a problem report (PR) 85-532. In October a Work Request (1363) was issued to open the piping (24" and 30") from the SWS pump to the CCW heat exchangers and from the heat exchangers to the SWS discharge canal. A significant amount of deterioration was found. TU Electric notified the NRC of this deficiency on January 23, 1986.

It appears to the NRC inspector that the coating issue was not recognized as a significant construction deficiency as it was only reported after weld failures in the SWS piping were identified (described in PR 85-699 dated December 20, 1985). These weld deficiencies were reported along with the .oating deficiencies.

Nine interim 50.55(e) reports were made to the NRC on these subject deficiencies as of March 1988. One of these reports (TXX-4762 dated April 1986) stated that the plastic coating would be repaired using Belzona coating and stated that pipe coating failure or corrosion was not a safety issue as periodic inservice inspection would detect any loss of integrity of this piping. It was only considered reportable because of erosion-corrosion caused by cavitation across Valve 1SW-023.

SWEC Corrosion Report - The NRC inspector reviewed (2) SWEC Corrosion Contro. Report, SWTU-7749. Revision O was origin. 11y issued in November 1987. Revision 2, dated April 1988 was reviewed and it stated that the pipe coating in Unit 1 SWS failed because of poor application at field welds and in areas of high turbulence. The corrosion report described 1/16" to 1/8" diameter blisters uniformly distributed and spaced 3/8" apart and a few 1/2" to 3" apart. All of the blisters broke while scrapping a putty knife across them. Microbiologically induced corrosion (MIC) was found in the carbon and stainless steel piping which can cause pin holes and drips. The SWEC report identified cases of crevice corrosion between flanges and galvanic corrosion between different metals (stainless steel, carbon steel, and monel). Asiatic clam growth was also found in the copper nickel tubes of the CCW heat exchangers.

Page 5-5 of the report stated that the shop or vendor applied coating was adherent with small blisters, but the site applied coatings were degrading. A few pits were present in Unit 1 piping which had been repaired with Belzona. Appendix A, page A-3 of the SWEC report states, "Due to the Belzona coating repairs, measurement of pits which may have formed previously is not possible."

Recommendations for corrective action were also made to correct and control these problems. The report recommended the complete removal of the liner from the piping.

The NRC inspector contacted TU Electric Operations (the organization which wrote the 1985 problem report to describe the coating defects) to determine if all surface defects inside the piping were identified and measured, and whether the possible violation of minimum wall thickness was considered. Specifically, the inspector's question is whether there are pits under the Belzona coating in both accessible and inaccessible piping that were not measured, dispositioned and documented. TU Electric Procedure (NEO 3.05) does not require nonconformance reporting if the item can be restored to the original specification requirements by rework, repair, or scrapping the item. Because of this policy there is some question as to how these defects were documented and dispositioned. If surface pits were present and were not repaired or reworked, it appears that these defects should have been identified and documented on a nonconformance report to show that the defect did not violate minimum wall thickness. The disposition of the defects should have been described. TU Electric should determine if the mapping of these defects by visual and ultrasonic examination (UT) was adequate to identify, document, and disposition defects. If UT was used through the paint on the outside, the process should be described. This item is open pending the receipt and review of documentation of the defects a sample and visual inspection (by NRC) of the piping (445/8834-0-03; 446/8830-0-03).

(3) Observation of Coating Removal and Inspection - The NRC inspector observed Cannon personnel who were pulling a camera through the 10" piping to determine if all coating had been removed. Many spots were not removed by the flint grit sand blasting. The NRC inspector noted that the picture distorts the view of such spots and guestioned how they could be measured. The criteria for residual coating in Procedure EME 3.21-08 allows a residual of 10 spots, 1/4" diameter (maximum) per square foot and a 1/4" wide band (maximum) around the girth on the faces of the mating flanges at the pipe ends. This criteria was established by blasting prototype coating from piping to determine the amount of residue that would be left after an acceptably controlled sandblast operation. This is an open item pending NRC inspection of how the spots or flakes can be measured to assure that they do not exceed the criteria (445/8834-0-04; 446/8830-0-04).

In discussions with engineering, the NRC inspector found that no analysis (with calculations) was made to determine the maximum amount of coating residue that could be tolerated. Instead TU Electric will utilize surveillance and inservice inspections to prevent equipment blockage. This item is open pending receipt and review of information to show that such surveillance/inservice inspection will prevent blockage (445/8834-0-05; 446/8830-0-05).

The inspector also learned that the sandblasting apparatus cannot remain in one area for more than a minute or pipe wall thinning may occur. Since inspection occurs after sandblasting, it was observed that there would be no way for an Ebasco inspector to directly determine if the blaster thinned the wall unless the inspector timed the pull rate through the 10" piping or physically observed the blasting in the 24" and 30" piping. The wall thickness could be measured by ultrasonically testing/measuring the thickness after blasting. This item is unresolved pending the receipt of evidence that an adequate inspection was accomplished and that minimum wall thickness was not violated (445/8534-U-06; 446/8530-U-06).

Licensing Document Changes - Section 9.2 of the FSAR (4)was amended to reflect the DCAs and specification changes which stated that the coating was nonsafety related. The description of the coating and all references to the coating was deleted when Amendment 66 was submitted. Since a residual of coating will remain, it appears that it would be appropriate to recognize its presence and discuss in the FSAR how surveillances or inspections will monitor loose flakes to preclude blockage of filter/strainers. With no protective liner the surveillance/inservice inspection should be discussed in terms of the corrosive SWS water. TU Electric should review and address these issues. This item is open pending the receipt and NRC review of information concerning the need to submit an FSAR Amendment (445/8834-0-07; 446/8830-0-07).

# 7. Quality Programs and Administrative Controls Affecting Quality (92702, 57050, 57060, 57070, 57080, 57090)

#### a. Work Travelers

(Closed) Violation (446/8617-V-05c) QC inspector did not verify the surfaces of the concrete foundation to assure that they were free of oil, grease, and foreign materials. Brown & Root, Inc., (B&R) Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-39, Revision 4, required such verification prior to setting mechanical equipment. A review of work travelers ME79-260-5700 (for safety injection accumulator tank) revealed that QC had not verified that the surface was acceptable prior to locating the equipment. The findings were discussed with QA management during the inspection, at the management exit, and after the exit. They did not state their disagreement with this specific finding or present the additional information. Subsequently the TU Electric response to this part of the violation provided additional information.

The Notice of Violation was issue on March 30, 1987, and the response (TXX-6504) from TU Electric was dated July 13, 1987. The response provided additional information and NRC letter dated August 26, 1987, acknowledged that additional information showed that work activities were in compliance with Traveler Procedure CP-CPM-6.3 and Inspection Procedure QI-QAP-11.1-39. Accordingly, this portion of the violation (A.2.c.) was withdrawn. Specifically, the information showed that: (1) the setting of the nitrogen accumulator tank was a special case where TU Electric deemed that such inspection was not necessary, and (2) the inspection criteria was therefore not included in the procedure and was not required at the time the safety injection accumulator tank was set. In spite of the fact that the criteria was not in the procedure, additional information in an inspection report (TU Electric IR C-1840) documents the surface condition. This item is closed.

(Closed) Violation (446/8617-V-05d): QC inspector did not verify equipment position, orientation, and elevation by signing the form and sketch required by QI-QAP-11.1-39, Revision 4. The background concerning this violation is discussed in the paragraph above.

This part of the violation (A.2.d.) was also withdrawn because the nitrogen accumulator Tank 1 is a special case because it was set on top of another tank, that is, safety injection accumulator Tank 2. The location for Tank 2 was recorded and satisfied the requirement for Tank 1. This item is closed.

(Closed) Violation (446/8617-V-05e): Minimum clearance was not on Traveler ME82-2702-5700 for Tank 1. The background, additional information and withdrawal for this portion of the violation (A.2.e.) is discussed in the first two paragraphs above. This is also the basis for closing this item.

(Closed) Violation (446/8617-V-05f): QC inspector verification of anchor bolt condition/bolt-nut tightening was not on Traveler ME83-2702-5700. The background, additional information, and withdrawal of this portion of the violation is discussed in the first two paragraphs above. This is also the basis for closing this item.

# b. Work Packages

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In conjunction with the above follow-up inspection, the inspector observed work in progress and ASME work packages which included work instruction/travelers. It was learned that the ASME packages are to be reviewed and streamlined like the non-ASME packages. The goal is to simplify work instructions. TU Electric's construction management is aware of various problems in these packages and the sequencing of work and are taking action to improve the instructions.

# c. Nondestructive Examination (NDE) and Welding

In preparation for the site inspection by the NRC Region I NDE van, the NRC inspector reviewed selected NDE procedures (ACP-10.2, 10.3, 10.4, 10.5, 10.6) and welding procedures (CP-CPM-6.3 and ACP-11.1). These procedures were previously reviewed by NRC inspectors when these activities began. During this inspection, it was noted that procedures for ASME and non-ASME activities were separated. The ASME procedures control the work performed by B&R, the constructor which is responsible for ASME work. These procedures contain the same basic requirements relative to inspection acceptance criteria. The NRC inspector reviewed the NDE program to determine how past activities were controlled. Discussions were held with the current NDE Level III inspector. A review of past NRC inspection reports revealed the acceptability of NDE practices (50-445/83-08. 50-446/88-05; 50-446/87-29; 50-445/87-16, 50-446/87-13; 50-445/85-13, 50-446/85-09; and 50-445/83-15, 50-446/83-09).

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# 8. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or deviations. Two unresolved items disclosed during this inspection are discussed in paragraphs 6.h.1 and 6.0.3.

# 9. Open Items

Open items are matters which have been discussed with the applicant, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or applicant or both. Five open items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in paragraphs 6.b.1, 6.b.2, 6.b.3(two items), and 6.b.4.

# 10. Exit Meating (307)

An exit meeting was conducted June 7, 1988, wich the applicant's representatives identified in paragraph 1 of this report. No written material was provided to the applicant by the inspector during this reporting period. The applicant did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection. During this meeting, the NRC inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.

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