



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS FIELD OFFICE REGION IV U.S. NRC  
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February 5, 1985

MEMORANDUM TO: Ted Gilbert  
Office of Investigations

FROM: Richard K. Herr, Director *RKH*  
OI Field Office

SUBJECT: MONITORING OF LP&L's DRUG INVESTIGATION OF REACTOR  
OPERATORS THAT WAS SUSPENDED IN JULY 1983

On January 10, 1985, I met with Wally Friloux, LP&L Corporate Security Director, in his office in New Orleans, Louisiana. Mr. Friloux explained that LP&L reinitiated the subject drug investigation in December 1984, which was divided into two investigations. He stated that he was conducting one investigation regarding drug use by operators and interviewed all reactor operators, and identified Dan F. Cooksey, Deputy Director of Corporate Security, as investigating the other investigation regarding the issue of improper management involvement concerning the question of cooperation between the Waterford 3 nuclear site personnel and the Corporate Security office.

Mr. Friloux stated he has interviewed about 65 additional operators and supervisors concerning drug use. He explained that about 10-15 percent admitted previous marijuana use in high school and or military service. He said that none admitted use of marijuana since being employed by LP&L. Mr. Friloux also stated that about 60-70 urinalyses have been conducted on employees at the Waterford 3 site, including operators, and all have been negative. He stated that he is getting "300 percent" cooperation from upper-management, both from the corporate headquarters staff level and the Waterford 3 site management staff.

Mr. Cooksey (supra) stated he has interviewed supervisory personnel at the Waterford 3 site and was about 80 percent complete. Cooksey explained that there was confusion among the supervisors about the LP&L policy regarding the off site use of marijuana. Some supervisor believed that LP&L policy did not address "off site activity" and held the position that "what you do on your own time is your own business, not LP&L's." Mr. Cooksey explained that it appears that the supervisors were taking a position they perceived to be that of the plant manager's, Mr. Barkhurst's. Cooksey stated it appears that the lack of LP&L policy/position in this area caused confusion and misunderstanding on the part of the supervisors.

On January 23, 1985, Mr. Dan F. Cooksey was again interviewed in his office in New Orleans, Louisiana. Mr. Cooksey stated that Mr. Friloux was out of the office but that his (Friloux's) investigation has been completed and was in typing. Mr. Cooksey stated that no further

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evidence of drug use was identified, and the final report should be complete in 2-3 weeks.

Mr. Cooksey stated his investigation was essentially complete and was also in typing which should be complete in 2-3 weeks. Mr. Cooksey stated that his investigation reflects that the plant manager, Mr. Barkhurst, admitted there was "poor communication" and "misunderstanding" between himself and the corporate security department in the spring of 1983, and this situation may have resulted in a negative impact or impression on Mr. Barkhurst's subordinates (reactor operator supervisors).

cc: File