



May 30, 1986

Public Service of New Hampshire

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NEW HAMPSHIRE YANKEE DIVISION

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region I  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Attention: Mr. Edward C. Wenzinger, Chief Projects Branch 3  
Division of Reactor Projects

References: (a) Construction Permits CPPR-135 and CPPR-136,  
Docket Nos. 50-443 and 50-444  
(b) USNRC Letter, dated April 29, 1986, "Inspection  
Report No. 50-443/86-12", E. C. Wenzinger to  
R. J. Harrison

Subject: Response to Inspection Report No. 50-443/86-12

Dear Sir:

Our response to the violations reported in the subject inspection is provided in Attachment 1, included herewith. The corrective action was completed during the week of May 12, 1986.

Very truly yours,

John DeVincentis  
Director of Engineering

Attachment

cc: Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Service List

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ATTACHMENT 1NRC Notice of Violation (43/86-12-01)

10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion III and the Seabrook Station FSAR, Section 17.1.1.3, require that measures be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis for safety-related structures, systems, and components are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. FSAR Section 6.2.3 states that the Containment Enclosure Emergency Cleanup System "is capable of reducing the containment enclosure pressure to negative 0.25 inches (wc)" and of "processing the atmosphere of the containment enclosure space". It further states that the containment boundary welds of the main steam, feedwater, and steam generator blow-down lines are included within the containment enclosure. UE&C Specification 236-11 states, in part, that the Containment Enclosure Emergency Exhaust Units "serve to exhaust radioactively-contaminated air from the containment enclosure area during emergency conditions and to remove particulate material and radioactive iodine gas from the air prior to it being exhausted to the atmosphere". UE&C drawings F-805052 and 101453 and Foreign Prints 18032 and 18033 (P.O. 12-04/5) identify pressure seal plates in both the East and West Main Steam and Feedwater Chases as extensions of the containment enclosure.

Contrary to the above, as of February 3, 1986, no design document translated the requirement that the air space behind the pressure seal plate be made part of the containment enclosure. This design failure resulted in the construction of a space within the containment enclosure (as defined by the above UE&C drawings and foreign prints), which would not be reduced to a negative 0.25 inches (wc) pressure during emergency conditions and which would not be vented through the Containment Enclosure Emergency Exhaust Units. Thus, the inspector observed on February 19, 1986 the installation of the pressure seal plates in both steam and feedwater chases with no provision for venting the air space behind them so that their atmosphere would be processed by the Containment Enclosure Emergency Air Handling System.

This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement II).

Response

We concur that, as of February 3, 1986, the subject areas had been constructed such that they could not be processed by the Containment Enclosure Emergency Air Handling System.

This violation is the result of an oversight between interfacing engineering disciplines in not detailing all of the required information in the installation details. The potential for similar unique containment enclosure volumes has been evaluated for similar circumstances. None were found to exist. This is considered an isolated occurrence. To preclude recurrence, an appropriate management directive was issued to emphasize the importance of the interdisciplinary review.

ATTACHMENT 1  
(continued)

Corrective Action

In addition to the actions described in the response, ECAs have been issued to provide vent paths (i.e., core bores in walls) between the subject areas and the containment enclosure. As a result, the subject areas can now be reduced to a negative 0.25 inches (wc) pressure during emergency conditions and can be vented through the Containment Enclosure Emergency Exhaust Units.

Corrective action was completed during the week of May 12, 1986.