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SANTA BARBARA · SANTA CRUZ

SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING AND APPLIED SCIENCE
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024

January 20, 1977

Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Docket 50-142

Due to the sensitive nature of the contents of this letter, we request that this document be withheld from public disclosure pursuant to Section 2.790 of 10 CFR Part 2.

The physical security plan for the Nuclear Energy Laboratory at the University of California, Los Angeles as required by 10 CFR Part 73.40 is as follows:

Introduction

The Nuclear Energy Laboratory is located in the UCLA School of Engineering and Applied Science with the principal access via room 2567, Boelter Hall. Activities within the laboratory are varied and include (1) the operation of a 100 kw Argonaut nuclear Reactor, (2) undergraduate laboratory classes, (3) graduate student projects that are often NRC or DOE supported by contract arrangements, (4) a major DOE sponsored fusion research program, and (5) functions performed in machine and electronics shops.

The various activities engage a staff of approximately 25, a number of faculty members with research and/or educational interests within the laboratory, a number of graduate students conducting research, and closely supervised and scheduled undergraduate student classes.

The Nuclear Energy Laboratory presently has in its possession 8.3 kg of Special Nuclear Material in the form of 93% enriched uranium (fuel plates, fuel scraps, and uranyl nitrate) and two 32 gm Pu-Be neutron sources. SNM in the exempt form, 3.6 kgs of U-235, is in the reactor, and 4.7 kgs of SNM, U-235 and Pu-239, in the non-exempt form are stored in the radioactive storage room. The safeguarding of the reactor and these materials is the dominant consideration in providing a security plan.

Amendment #4

I. Design Features

A. Essential Equipment

The materials described in the preceeding paragraph and the nuclear reactor comprise the essential equipment of the laboratory. The essential equipment is described in pages 1 through 5 of the Appendix. The reactor console is considered non-essential equipment since its loss or damage would not pose a threat to the health and safety of the general public. This is due to the fact that there is essentially no decay heat because of the low core power density and the limited hours of reactor operation and due to the fact that the safety checks in the startup procedure are such that any damage or sabotage to the console would not allow the reactor to either reach criticality or operate above 1 watt. In addition it is not possible to operate the reactor entirely from the console unless the alarm system has been deactivated.

B. Security Areas

1. Security Areas (A-level)

Security areas require A-level access or higher. These areas, the reactor high bay (room 1000), the radioactive storage room (within room 1540), and the control room during non-university working hours, are identified in figures 6 through 8 of the Appendix. The alarm system is shown with the ultrasonic transmitter and receiver transducers identified by a "X", the magnetic door switches by a "Y", and the master control units by a "Z". Security areas are protected by an intrusion alarm system (except the control room and offices), hence permit limited access, and present well defined physical boundaries to both innocent and overt intrusion.

The radioactive storage room is located below ground level so that the outside walls are backed by earth fill. The inside walls are two-foot-thick concrete block with the exception of the inner door to the room and the area above eight feet on the south side of the room (see Fig. 8). These areas are covered with steel mesh and either 3/8 inch particle board or plaster. The stairwell beyond the south wall is alarmed and tied to the same circuit as the radioactive storage room. Two steel doors provide the only access to the room. The inner door, #1, is a double-plated door and has two locks. One of the locks is keyed to "A" level, the Master level, and the other lock is a Sargent and Greenleaf combination padlock No. 8077A, which meets the specifications outlined in NRC Regulatory Guide 5.12. The steel mesh outer door, #2, is keyed to "A" level. The fuel plates and fuel scraps are stored in an Insulated Record Safe, Model T-20, Serial No. 48727, made by Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Company. It is secured to the north concrete wall and floor by 1x1x1/8 inch angle iron. A separate key and combination are required to open it. One fuel bundle with attached thermocouples is stored in a 8 foot long, 6 inch diameter steel schedule 40 pipe with a steel lid hinged and locked with a Sargent and Greenleaf combination padlock. The pipe is welded to the north concrete wall. All the bolts securing the safe and schedule 40 pipe are welded to the angle iron to prevent easy removal. The two Pu-Be neutron sources are kept in steel drums filled with paraffin, chained to the east wall, and secured with the same type of Sargent and Greenleaf Combination padlocks. The uranyl nitrate (250 gms) is stored in padlocked steel lockers at the south end of the room.

For the purpose of radiological control and personnel safety, the subcritical facility of room 1540 requires A-level access. Upon occasion, encapsulated neutron sources may be left in the subcritical facility or the reactor high bay (room 1000) for class

Amendment #4

demonstration purposes or for instrument calibrations. The subcritical facility houses two natural uranium subcritical assemblies (graphite and heavy water), and a Kaman 1001-A neutron generator. Permissive entry by A-level access provides a prudent means of radiological control, but the security implications are regarded as negligible.

The fuel storage pits in the reactor high bay contain a 4 curie Co-60 radioisotope source. Other radioactive materials may be stored within these pits as demanded by special circumstances. The storage pits are composed of cylindrical holes, 6.5 feet deep, set into the concrete floor. The cylinders are secured with a 4 foot long, 10 inch diameter, 380 pound steel-lined concrete plug. The plug can be removed with a special handling device and the reactor room crane. The concrete plug handling device and the crane are both secured with a Sargent and Greenleaf padlock.

The remainder of the enriched uranium is kept in the reactor. Due to its power history, the fuel is too hot to handle without cumbersome shielding. The crane, the handling cask, shielding and a great deal of time are required in order to remove it from the reactor and then from the facility.

2. Controlled Areas (B-level)

Controlled areas require B-level access or higher. These areas include the reactor control room (day time only), a classroom, and laboratory space. The classroom is used primarily for undergraduate instruction, the laboratory areas for undergraduate experiments and graduate or contract research.

These areas, because of physical and administrative controls, serve as a buffer region or perimeter of the security areas.

3. Non-Security Areas (C-level)

Non-security areas require C-level access or higher. These areas are peripheral areas of the laboratory and include the reception room, adjacent offices, a transformer vault, and the third floor penthouse.

The areas denoted C-level are not within the scope of the security plan presented here. Figures 6 and 7 delineate these areas as parts of the laboratory without implying that they constitute a part of the plan. These areas are controlled only for the purpose of preventing theft of office equipment, books, and vandalism.

1.c. Reactor Operation Tamper Alarms

In order to prevent unauthorized operation of the reactor during off hours and to make the reactor console non-essential equipment, two reactor controls have been tied to the alarm system. From the console, the actuation of the dump valve switch (allows water to pass through the reactor core) closes the contact switch attached to the dump valve which is tied to the alarm circuit. In addition, the control rod up-drive relays are connected to the master control unit day/nite switch. Hence operation of the reactor during off hours would require tampering with the dump valve and with the control rod up drive relays, both of which are located in the reactor high bay; or deactivating the alarm system.

1.d. Alarm Transmission from the NEL to the UCLA Police Station

The alarm lines within NEL are relatively tamper-proof. All junction boxes and frames both within and outside the alarmed areas of NEL have microtamper switches tied to the tamper alarm circuits of the alarm system. The alarm lines enter into a telephone terminal board and are hidden spliced directly into a 200 pair telephone cable. The door to the terminal board is keyed to A level and also "bugged" with two magnetic switches tied into the radioactive storage alarm system tamper circuit.

2. Communications

In the event of a security violation, the following communication system is used. The alarm system registers a security violation. A signal is sent along a private telephone line to the 24 hour manned Honeywell Alarm Receiver (W840B,D) located at the UCLA Police Station. At the station there is also a recorder which prints out the status on each and every alarm. The status categories are normal, alarm, and trouble. Trouble means tampering with the system and the appropriate action is to assume that there is an intrusion.

An officer on duty then calls the patrol units on a two-way radio. If the officers are not in their cars, they still would have direct voice contact since they carry portable radios. The officer on duty then telephones the laboratory personnel listed in order on the Nuclear Energy Laboratory Emergency Procedure list until one is contacted. The contacted individual then proceeds to the laboratory to assist and to advise the police on the situation.

C. Surveillance

1. Working Hours

There are two separate alarm systems and each alarm system can be activated only by specified individuals.

Two individuals appointed by the Director of the Laboratory are authorized to deactivate the alarm system of the radioactive storage room. Their names and an entry code are on file with the UCLA Police Department. Legal entry can only be effected between the hours of 0800 and 1700 on University working days. The normal sequence of events for entry into the radioactive storage room is for one of the above two individuals to call the police, wait for recognition, state his name, his intent, and the entry code. Upon recognition, he estimates the probable duration of the entry. Upon entry, he deactivates the alarm at the master control, and at least one of the four authorized individuals will remain in this room during the entire period that the alarm is deactivated. Upon departure, he reactivates the alarm, secures the door, calls the police department, gives his name, states that the area is secured, and asks for confirmation of the alarm system reactivation and condition of non-alarm. This alarm system is rarely deactivated, so normally, surveillance of this area is accomplished by the working personnel, the lock and key system and the ultrasonic alarm system. Backing up these systems are the UCLA Police Department and the West Los Angeles Police Department.

All A level personnel are authorized to deactivate the alarm system of the reactor high bay. Their names are on file with the UCLA Police Department. Legal entry can be effected at any time but is normally done between the hours of 0700 and 0800 on University working days. The normal sequence of events for entry is to telephone the University Police Department, state his name, wait for recognition and permission, and then properly deactivate the system at the master control unit. While the system is deactivated, the surveillance is done by A-level and B-level personnel who are in the facility, the lock and key system, and the UCLA Police Department. All A-level personnel are authorized to reactivate the system by first telephoning the University Police Department, stating his name and intention, reactivating the alarm system at the master control unit, and then again telephoning the University Police Department to see if the alarm system has cleared and that the system is functioning properly again. This is normally done between the hours of 1700 and 1800 on University working days.

2. Non-Working Hours

During non-working hours, the lock and key system and the alarm system provide the surveillance of the security areas. In addition, there are on-site inspections (physical checks) randomly every four hours on a twenty-four hour basis. The on-site inspection includes a check on the outer doors of the facility and, at the officer's discretion, entrance and patrol of the controlled areas and the perimeter of the Security Areas. The West Los Angeles Police Department backs up these systems.

4. Acts of Civil Disorder

For acts of civil disorder, the emergency procedures would be followed and the UCLA Police Department contacted.

5. Miscellaneous Procedures

Procedures of the following nature are also on file with the Laboratory Security Officer.

a. Key request and approval

b. Police or emergency call in of NEL employees during off hours

c. Security violations and corrective actions

d. Lost or compromised keys

e. Ultrasonic alarm sensitivity

E. Security Program Review

The security program will be reviewed at least every twelve months by the Laboratory Security Officer. A review consists of a detailed examination of the Security Plan and is done during the filing of an amendment. He will also conduct a key inventory and I.D. check on an annual basis and a door/lock check on all A and B level doors on a monthly basis.

We hope that his security plan meets with your approval.

Sincerely,

Ivan Catton, Director
Nuclear Energy Laboratory

IC/CEA/NCO/li

Enclosures: Appendix

cc: LeRoy R. Norderhaugh - NRC Region V
John Evraets - Environmental Health & Safety
Chief John Barber - Campus Community Safety (UCLA Police Department)
C. E. Ashbaugh - Laboratory Security Officer



FIRST FLOOR
Figure 6



SECOND FLOOR
Figure 7

Amendment #4

EQUIPMENT LIST

1. 10 Omnidirectional transmitters

   Model TR - 90, Part Number 511252

2. 11 Omnidirectional receivers

   Model RC - 91, Part Number 511253

3. 2 High Security Magnetic Switches for doors in radioactive storage room and 2nd floor stairwell door.

   Model DR 850, Part Number 630802

4. Two Master Control Units

   Model KD3, Part Number 630162

   Manufacturer: Walter Kidde & Co., Inc.
   Belleville, New Jersey 07109

5. 1 Safeguard 70 R deadbolt alarm panic lock in reactor high bay

6. Westinghouse VD-101 contact microswitches tied to tamper circuits.

7. 6 Ademco No. 39-2 Magnetic contact switches for doors

8. Triple pole, double throw day/night switch in reactor high bay

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OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND SAFETY
THE CENTER FOR THE HEALTH SCIENCES
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024

January 19, 1979

Mr. L. R. Norderhaug, Chief
Safeguards Branch
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region V
Suite 202, Walnut Creek Plaza
1990 North California Boulevard
Walnut Creek, California 94596

Dear Mr. Norderhaug:

Attached is reply to your letter of 18 December 1978 on inspection of 30-31 October 1978 of Reactor license R-71 University of California, Los Angeles.

Very truly yours,

John C. Evraets
Radiological Safety Officer

JCE/ap
att.

SPS 79-45
Copy 2 of 3 copies
4 pages

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E/30 36

uary 18, 1979

Staff Response to NRC Notice of Deviations Dated December 18, 1978

1. Alarm Sensitivity Procedure

The original and continuing intent is to implement the alarm sensitivity testing procedure recommended and described by the vendor (Kidde). At the present time, implementation of the procedure has been inhibited by apparent fluctuations or drifts in alarm sensitivity and a high false alarm rate. Lack of staff training in the sensitivity and balance adjustments and insufficient knowledge of perturbing factors have percluded analysis of the apparently random behavior.

During the past year, the alarm system has been subject to several revisions by the addition of tamper circuits and other devices. Further, it operates in a changing physical and electromagnetic environment. False alarms have been variously attributed to (a) intrinsic instability of the system, (b) overload of the tamper circuit power supply, (c) electromagnetic pulses associated with other laboratory operations (Tokamak and welding), (d) relocation of equipment in the reactor room, and (e) telephone company operations (the search for cable pairs by installers).

The alarm system is off during normal working hours, and alarms in that state are interpreted as tamper alarms triggered by telephone company operations. The relative contributions, and even existence, of the other hypothetical factors remain unassessed. The most troublesome alarms are those which do not reset and clear. The staff member responding to such an alarm is instructed to (a) seek evidence of intrusion, and if none exists to (b) reduce the alarm sensitivity by one unit. The staff lacks the expertise to otherwise analyze and correct the cause. The problem is referred to Mr. Phil Arnold of the UCLA Facilities Division. Mr. Arnold is the alarm system specialist for UCLA.

The situation is regarded as unsatisfactory by the laboratory staff and by Mr. Arnold. In a meeting with Mr. Arnold on January 5, 1979 it was agreed that:

1. Mr. Arnold would provide training in the procedures for adjusting sensitivity and balance.
2. Mr. Arnold and the NEL staff will jointly examine the adequacy of the tamper power supply and, if necessary, design a replacement power supply of greater capacity.
3. Mr. Arnold, with the staff, will explore the use of diagnostic instrumentation to indicate critical voltages, currents, or pulses for the determination of drifts or other symptoms of malfunction.

As a result of a staff meeting with Mr. Arnold on January 18, 1979, it can be reported that:

Item 1 has been accomplished. Two staff members (Messrs. Ashbaugh and Zane) have been trained in the adjustment and balancing procedure. During the training, several areas of excessive sensitivity were identified. When rebalanced, the system appeared to be completely normal.

Items 2 and 3 are now viewed as contingency plans to be implemented if or when, a high false alarm rate reappears.

A performance test of the reactor room system will be made weekly. A specification test of the reactor room will be made quarterly.

The radioactive storage room is entered infrequently, the only routine entries are semi-annual. The staff will conduct performance tests and specification tests of that area on a quarterly basis.

The laboratory security officer will be responsible for observation of the test schedule.

2. Failure of Dead Lock Mechanisms on Door Hardware

Significant difficulties with the dead locking mechanisms are acknowledged. We have reviewed this matter with the representatives of the UCLA Facilities Division who are responsible for lock maintenance and door hardware. They state that the mortise type panic hardware of our installation is not designed for frequent usage. The dead lock component is fragile and prone to malfunction. Maintenance requirements are severe with a high probability of failure between periodic inspections. The conversion to more reliable rim hardware would require door, frame, and hardware replacement costing an estimated $1400 per opening for materials alone. There are 13 openings to the reactor and control rooms.

The dead lock mechanism is designed to prevent manipulation of the door bolt by insertion of devices in the crevice between the door and the jam. We propose to:

(a) Install full length astragals on all nine doors not already so equipped. The astragals are to be 2" wide by 1/8" thick (minimum dimensions) steel strap and are to be approximately centered over the crevice between the door and jam.
(b) Abandon dependence upon the unreliable dead lock feature of the existing hardware.

We note that the nine doors to be treated in this proposal all carry short astragals. Some of these will be retained because of their superior design. In these cases, full length coverage will be provided by supplementary astragal strips of the specified minimum width and thickness.

We note that our Security Plan makes no direct reference to the existence of the dead lock devices, and that the proposed modification should not require a Security Plan Amendment. The proposed modification can be completed within 30 days of our notification that Region V has accepted the proposal.

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2567 Boelter Hall
SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING AND APPLIED SCIENCE
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024

August 29, 1979

10 CFR 2.790

Robert W. Reid, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #4
Division of Operating Reactors
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

License R-71

Subject: Safeguards Upgrade Rule
Reference: Letter of 7/30/79 to all nonpower reactor licensees

Dear Mr. Reid:

Due to the sensitive nature of the contents of this letter, we request that this document be withheld from public disclosure pursuant to Section 2.790 of 10 CFR Part 2.

New physical security plans will be submitted with our license renewal application, due in February 1980, and hence within the 120 day interval following November 21, 1979.

In response to your specific questions regarding our needs for SNM, we submit the following:

1) we require a total of approximately 9.0 kg of SNM;
2) we require approximately 3.6 kg of SNM in the reactor core;
3) we require approximately 4.7 kg of cold SNM in storage, we possess a further 0.7 kg of irradiated SNM in our fuel storage pits awaiting shipment; and
4) none of the above mentioned material can be exempted by the 100 rem/hr at 3 feet criterion.

We note that the reactor site and the storage site are geographically distinct, non-contiguous, and separated physically by walls and intervening activities unrelated to our reactor operations. The two sites are separately alarmed with distinct circuitry to the responding units. The alarm at the responding unit location clearly identifies that particular site which is in the alarm mode. Because the sites are non-contiguous, it is not possible to pass continuously from one site to another. Instead, one must exit one site and enter the second, passing through distinct physical barriers of non-identical structure and access codes.

Under the above circumstances, we do not possess SNM in excess of the formula quantity at any individual site under our license. Accordingly, our physical security plan(s) will be geared to the two non-contiguous sites containing SNM of moderate strategic significance.

NUCLEAR ENERGY LABORATORY IVAN CATTON, Director

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LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024

August 29, 1979

10 CFR 2.790

License R-71

Remotely related to the foregoing, we submitted Amendment 4 to our Security Plan under the assumption that 0.7 kg of SNM irradiated fuel was shortly to be shipped to ICRP, Idaho Falls. Delays by the recipient, now Exxon Nuclear Idaho Co., Inc., prohibited the schedule. Our current target shipping date is December 15, 1979.

Sincerely,

I. Catton, Director
Nuclear Energy Laboratory

IC/jb

cc: J. Evraets, Radiation Safety Officer
C. Ashbaugh, Nuclear Energy Laboratory

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OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND SAFETY
THE CENTER FOR THE HEALTH SCIENCES
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024

August 15, 1979
EHS: C1251

Docket 50-142

James R. Miller
Acting Assistant Director for
Site and Safeguards
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Miller:

Due to the sensitive nature of the contents of this letter, we request that this document be withheld from public disclosure pursuant to Section 2.790 of 10 CFR Part 2. This letter is our response to your letter dated July 30, 1979.

It is not our intention to possess greater than a formula quantity of non-exempt SSNM because greater amounts would entail financial costs, manpower requirements, and restrictions which could not be met at this facility. Our Argonaut Reactor contains approximately 3.6 Kgs of SSNM. We also have 0.7 Kg of irradiated SSNM in the process of being shipped to the Idaho Chemical Reprocessing Plant and another 4.6 Kg of non-irradiated fuel in storage. We have three alternatives.

a. Ask for a variance on the 3.6 Kgs of SSNM in the core of the reactor due to the difficulty in retrieving it from the reactor.

b. Store the 4.6 Kgs of non-irradiated SSNM elsewhere off-site.

c. Remove all the irradiated fuel from the reactor and send it to ICRP for reprocessing and place the non-irradiated fuel in the reactor.

With the above comments in mind, the following are our responses to your sixteen questions answered in the same order as submitted in your letter:

1. None planned.

2. None except change of locks, keys, and combinations in the near future.

3. Uncertain, depends upon alternatives.

4. Approximately $500,000 to $1,000,000.

5. Approximately $25,000 to $35,000.

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6. Uncertain, but would result in a reduction in the number of graduate nuclear engineers entering industry. Our reactor also supports uranium assay work related to the search for uranium resources.

7. None.

8. None planned.

9. Yes, conditionally.

10. The reactor serves as a major part of five laboratory courses offered by the School of Engineering and Applied Science. Closing the facility will cost UCLA at least three job openings, five classes, and several research programs here and at other Universities. Closure would diminish not only our total educational program, but would diminish educational programs at other schools because our reactor is a part of the Reactor Sharing Program of DOE.

11. Seven. Yes. We will have to cut approximately three people.

12. Approximately 30 per quarter. Yes.

13. Approximately a dozen. Reactor shutdown would not directly affect them.

14. $120,000.

15. It does not seem possible to meet the 100 r/m at 3' at all times for the reactor fuel. The impact of the upgrade rule would result in prohibitive costs if unfavorably interpreted in our case.

16. There are five courses which utilize the reactor, and two courses on reactor licensing (on a one-time-only basis) are beginning this fall.

We hope that the answers to these questions meet with your approval.

Sincerely,

Harold V. Brown

Harold. V. Brown, Dr. P.H.
Environmental Health and
Safety Officer

HVB/jao

cc: Charles E. Ashbaugh
Ivan Catton
John Evraets

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

AUG 17 1979

Mr. Harold B. Brown
Environmental Health and Safety Officer
University of California at Los Angeles
Los Angeles, California 90024

Gentlemen:

This letter is being sent to all licensees authorized to possess special nuclear material (SMN) of the types and amounts that exceed the "threshold" quantity defined by 10 CFR Part 73, §73.1(b).

As noted in my letter of July 30, 1979, a meeting of all affected nonpower reactor licensees is scheduled to commence at 10:00 a.m., at the NRC Region III Office at 799 Roosevelt Road; Glen Ellyn, Illinois (phone 312-858-2660). The agenda for this meeting and a registration form are attached. Please complete the registration form and forward it attention to Mr. James Donahue, NRC, Region III Office, as soon as possible. If mail service will not preceed your arrival, bring the form with you. Travel and hotel arrangements are the responsibility of each attendee.

For further information please contact Mr. Steve Ramos (301-492-7846).

Sincerely,

for James R. Miller, Acting Assistant Director
for Site and Safeguards
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosures:
1. Meeting Agenda
2. Registration Form

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E/33

MEETING AGENDA

Monday August 27, 1979

IMPACT OF THE SAFEGUARDS UPGRADE

ON

NONPOWER REACTOR LICENSEES

9:30 AM - 10:00 AM	REGISTRATION
10:00 AM - 10:05 AM	WELCOME BY REGIONAL DIRECTOR
10:05 AM - 10:15 AM	OPENING REMARKS - J. R. MILLER
10:15 AM - 10:30 AM	OVERVIEW OF TRANSFER OF REACTOR SAFEGUARDS FUNCTIONS FROM NRR TO NMSS. INTRODUCTION OF NMSS REPRESENTATIVE- - J. R. MILLER
10:30 AM - 10:45 AM	NMSS REPRESENTATIVE REMARKS
10:45 AM - 11:00 AM	OVERVIEW OF REQUIREMENTS FOR EMERGENCY PLANS FOR NONPOWER REACTORS - J. R. MILLER
11:00 AM - 11:15 AM	BREAK
11:15 AM - 11:30 AM	DISCUSSION-UPGRADE RULE AND NRR PROPOSAL TO COMMISSION - S. RAMOS
11:30 AM - 12:00 PM	REQUIREMENTS OF §73.60 IN CONJUNCTION WITH §73.47 - D. M. CARLSON
12:00 PM - 1:00 PM	LUNCH
1:00 PM - 3:00 PM	DISCUSSION OF IMPACT OF UPGRADE RULE
3:00 PM - 3:15 PM	BREAK
3:15 PM - 3:30 PM	SUMMATION - S. RAMOS
3:30 PM - 3:45 PM	CLOSING REMARKS - J. R. MILLER

REGISTRATION FORM

MEETING ON IMPACT OF THE SAFEGUARDS UPGRADE RULE ON NONPOWER REACTOR LICENSEES

✓

NAME/TITLE: NEILLE C. OSTRANDER, MANAGER, NUCLEAR ENERGY LABORATORY
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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA @ LOS ANGELES 90024
PHONE: (213) 825-2040

NAME/TITLE: WILLIAM R. MOWRY, LICENSING ADMINISTRATOR
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PHONE: (714) 455-3000

NAME/TITLE: JOHN R. SHORTHUEH, JR., ASSISTANT MANAGER - TRIC
COMPANY/UNIVERSITY: GENERAL ATOMIC CO.
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NAME/TITLE: R. J. CASHWELL, REACTOR MANAGER
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