PRECURSOR DESCRIPTION AND DATA

NSIC Accession Number: 145209

Date: December 20, 1978

Title: Both Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) Open During Troubleshooting at

Fort Calhoun 1

The failure sequence was:

- During a heatup from cold shutdown, one of the two PORV channels failed to respond
 to system pressure changes.
- 2. A technician, while troubleshooting the problem, pulled recorder fuses.
- 3. This caused both PORVs to open.
- 4. The operator closed both PORV isolation valves.

Corrective action:

- Since the PORVs were being used for NDT overpressure protection, additional administrative controls were established to ensure an overpressure condition could not occur.
- 2. System modifications to prevent reoccurrence were being considered.

Design purpose of failed system or component:

- During normal operation, the PORVs provide relief protection for the RCS and prevent lifting the pressurizer safety valves during pressure transients.
- 2. During cold shutdown, the PORVs provide NDT overpressure protection.

Unavailability of system per WASH 1400:* _


Unavailability of component per WASH 1400:* relief valve, inadvertant opening: $1 \times 10^{-5}/hr$

Unavailabilities are in units of per demand D^{-1} . Failure rates are in units of per hour HR^{-1} .

Reactor Heating Up from Cold Shutdown	PORV Pressure Channel Fails to Respond	Technician Pulls Recorder Fuses During Trouble- shooting of PORV Pressure Channel	Both PORVs Fail Open Due to Pulled Recorder Fuses	Operator Closes Both PORV Isolation Valves	Potential Severe Core Damage
					— No
	<u>۽</u>	<u> </u>			-No - reactor in cold shutdown
	£				No
					No

NSIC 145209 — Actual Occurrence for Both Power Operated Relief Valves Open During Troubleshooting at Fort Calhoun 1

Small LOCA	Reactor Trip	Auxiliary Feedwater and Secondary Heat Removal	High Pressure Injection	Low Pressure Recirculation and LPR/HPI Cross-Connect	Potential Severe Core Damage	Sequence No.
					No Yes	1 2



 $\,$ NSIC 145209 — Sequence of Interest for Both Power Operated Relief Valves Open During Troubleshooting at Fort Calhoun 1

 $^{^{}f *}$ initiating event requires operator failure to close PORV isolation valves.

CATEGORIZATION OF ACCIDENT SEQUENCE PRECURSORS

NSIC ACCESSION NUMBER: 145209

DATE OF LER: January 2, 1979

DATE OF EVENT: December 20, 1978

SYSTEM INVOLVED: reactor coolant

COMPONENT INVOLVED: power operated relief valves

CAUSE: Technician error in pulling recorder fuses during troubleshooting resulted in

both PORVs failing open, human error SEQUENCE OF INTEREST: two stuck open PORVs

ACTUAL OCCURRENCE: two stuck open PORVs during cold shutdown

REACTOR NAME: Fort Calhoun 1

DOCKET NUMBER: 50-285

REACTOR TYPE: PWR

DESIGN ELECTRICAL RATING: 457 MWe

REACTOR AGE: 5.5 yr

VENDOR: CE

ARCHITECT-ENGINEERS: Gibbs & Hill, Inc.

OPERATORS: Omaha Public Power District

LOCATION: 19 miles north of Omaha, Nebraska

DURATION: N/A

PLANT OPERATING CONDITION: Cold shutdown

SAFETY FEATURE TYPE OF FAILURE: (a) inadequate performance; (b) failed to start;

(c) made inoperable; (d) failed open

DISCOVERY METHOD: During operation

COMMENT: -