B.34-1

B.34 LER No. 335/82-040

Event Description: Reactor Trip and Loss of Grid Synchronization Due to Shorting of Generator Relay During Testing

Date of Event: September 2, 1982

Plant: St. Lucie 1

B.34.1 Summary

On September 2, 1982, personnel conducting a test of a generator trip relay short circuited it, which caused the generator breakers to open and a reactor/turbine trip. The spurious operation of the generator breakers allowed the unit to slip out of synchronization with the grid. Transfer of the vital buses to startup power did not occur and the emergency power system was actuated. The conditional core damage probability estimated for this event is 3.1×10^{-5} .

B.34.2 Event Description

During full power operation, a generator trip relay was briefly shorted while being tested. This caused the generator breakers to open and a synchronizing inhibit timer to start. By the time the reactor tripped due to a turbine overspeed trip, the timer had cycled, so transfer of the vital buses to startup power did not occur. The diesel generators started automatically and loaded properly. Offsite power and normal plant status were restored about 28 minutes after the short circuit occurred.

B.34.3 Additional Event-Related Information

A similar bus loss was reported in LER 335/79-028.

B.34.4 Modelling Assumptions

Since this event, in effect, isolated the plant from offsite power, it was modeled as a plant-centered loss of offsite power (LOOP). However, this is probably conservative since the event involved a failure to transfer only the vital buses. Changes to LOOP-related branch probabilities to reflect the plant-centered LOOP are shown in the following table:


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Branch	Description	Probability
SEAL.LOCA	Probability that an RCP seal LOCA will occur.	4.0 x 10 ⁻²
OFFSITE.PWR.REC/ -EP.AND-AFW	Probability of failing to recover offsite power within 2 hours given that EP and AFW are successful.	1.4 x 10 ⁻¹
OFFSITE.PWR.REC/ -EP.AND.AFW	Probability of failing to recover offsite power within 6 hours given that EP is successful but AFW fails.	9.9 x 10 ⁻⁴
OFFSITE.PWR.REC/ SEAL.LOCA	Probability of failing to recover offsite power given the occurrence of an RCP seal LOCA.	4.8 x 10 ⁻¹
OFFSITE.PWR.REC/ -SEAL.LOCA	Probability of failing to recover offsite power given that there is no RCP seal LOCA.	2.2 x 10 ⁻⁵

EP - emergency power AFW - auxiliary feedwater RCP - reactor coolant pump

B.34.5 Analysis Results

The conditional core damage probability (CCDP) estimated for this event is 3.1×10^{-5} . The dominant core damage sequence, shown in Figure. B.34.1, involves the effective LOOP, successful reactor trip, failure of emergency power (EP), success of AFW, power-operated relief valve (PORV) challenge, and failure of the PORVs to reseat.



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CONDITIONAL CORE DAMAGE PROBABILITY CALCULATIONS

Event Identifier: 335/82-040 Event Description: Reactor trip due to shorted generator relay 9/2/82 Event Date: St. Lucie 1 Plant:

INITIATING EVENT

NON-RECOVERABLE INITIATING EVENT PROBABILITIES

LOOP	2.1E-01
SEQUENCE CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY SUMS	
End State/Initiator	Probability
ĊD	
LOOP	3.1E-05

SEQUENCE CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES (PROBABILITY ORDER)

	Sequence	End State	Prob	N Rec**
231	<pre>loop -rt(loop) ep -afw/ep porv.chall/sbo porv.reseat/ep loop -rt(loop) ep -afw/ep porv.chall/sbo -porv.reseat/ep SEAL .LOCA OFFSITE.PWR.REC/SEAL.LOCA</pre>	CD	1.0E-05	1.8E-01
228		CD	9.9E-06	1.8E-01
241	<pre>loop -rt(loop) ep afw/ep loop -rt(loop) -ep afw -OFFSITE.PWR.REC/-EP.AND.AFW feed.bleed</pre>	CD	9.1E-06	6.4E-02
216		CD	1.1E-06	9.4E-02

****** non-recovery credit for edited case

SEQUENCE CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES (SEQUENCE ORDER)

	Sequence	End State	Prob	N Rec**
216 228	<pre>loop -rt(loop) -ep afw -OFFSITE.PWR.REC/-EP.AND.AFW feed.bleed loop -rt(loop) ep -afw/ep porv.chall/sbo -porv.reseat/ep SEAL .LOCA OFFSITE.PWR.REC/SEAL.LOCA</pre>	CD CD	1.1E-06 9.9E-06	9.4E-02 1.8E-01
231 241	loop -rt(loop) ep -afw/ep porv.chall/sbo porv.reseat/ep loop -rt(loop) ep afw/ep	CD CD	1.0E-05 9.1E-06	1.8E-01 6.4E-02

****** non-recovery credit for edited case

SEQUENCE MODEL:	c:\asp\models\pwrg8283.cmp
BRANCH MODEL :	c:\asp\models\sluciel.82
PROBABILITY FILE:	c:\asp\models\pwr8283.pro

No Recovery Limit

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BRANCH FREQUENCIES/PROBABILITIES

Branch	System	Non-Recov	Opr Fail
trans	7.2E-04	1.0E+00	
loop	6.7E-05	2.1E-01	
loca	2.4E-06	5.4E-01	
sgtr	1.6E-06	1.0E+00	
rt	2.8E-04	1.0E-01	
rt(loop)	0.0E+00	1.0E+00	
afw	3.8E-04	4.5E-01	
afw/atws	4.3E-03	1.0E+00	
afw/ep	5.0E-02	3.4E-01	
nfw	1.9E-01	3.4E-01	
porv.chall	4.0E-02	1.0E+00	
•	1.0E+02	1.0E+00 1.0E+00	
porv.chall/afw porv.chall/loop	1.0E+00 1.0E-01		
		1.0E+00	
porv.chall/sbo	1.0E+00	1.0E+00	
porv.reseat	2.0E-02	1.1E-02	
porv.reseat/ep	2.0E-02	1.0E+00	
srv.reseat(atws)	1.0E-01	1.0E+00	
hpi food blood	3.0E-04	8.9E-01	1 05 00
feed.bleed	2.0E-02	1.0E+00	1.0E-02
emrg.boration	0.0E+00	1.0E+00	1.0E-02
recov.sec.cool	2.0E-01	1.0E+00	
recov.sec.cool/offsite.pwr	3.4E-01	1.0E+00	1 05 00
rcs.cooldown	3.0E-03	1.0E+00	1.0E-03
rhr	8.0E-03	7.0E-02	1.0E-03
csr	4.0E-03	1.0E+00	1.0E-03
hpr	1.5E-04	1.0E+00	
ep	2.9E-03	8.9E-01	
SEAL LOCA	4.8E-02 > 4.0E-02	1.0E+00	
Branch Model: 1.0F.1			
Train 1 Cond Prob:	4.8E-02 > 4.0E-02	1 05 00	
OFFSITE.PWR.REC/-EP.ANDAFW	2.5E-01 > 1.4E-01	1.0E+00	
Branch Model: 1.0F.1			
Train 1 Cond Prob:	2.5E-01 > 1.4E-01		
OFFSITE.PWR.REC/-EP.AND.AFW	5.7E-02 > 9.9E-04	1.0E+00	
Branch Model: 1.0F.1			
Train 1 Cond Prob:	5.7E-02 > 9.9E-04		
OFFSITE . PWR. REC/SEAL . LOCA	6.0E-01 > 4.8E-01	1.0E+00	
Branch Model: 1.0F.1			
Train 1 Cond Prob:	6.0E-01 > 4.8E-01		
OFFSITE.PWR.REC/-SEAL.LOCA	1.1E-02 > 2.2E-05	1.0E+00	
Branch Model: 1.0F.1			
Train 1 Cond Prob:	1.1E-02 > 2.2E-05		
sg.iso.and.rcs.cooldown	1.0E-02	1.0E-01	
rcs.cool.below.rhr	3.0E-03	1.0E+00	3.0E-03
prim.press.limited	8.8E-03	1.0E+00	

* branch model file

** forced

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