

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Browns Ferry Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 1 5 1 9	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 3
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TITLE (4)
Loss of Secondary Containment in Refuel Zone

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)												
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)										
0	4	2	8	6	8	6	0	1	3	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	2	1	6	1	0
0	4	2	8	6	8	6	0	1	3	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	2	1	9	1	6

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)

OPERATING MODE (9) N	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 1 0	20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vi)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)	
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)	
	20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Ronald R. Davis, Compliance Engineer	TELEPHONE NUMBER 2 0 5 7 2 9 - 1 3 7 8 8
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDPS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDPS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

During damper maintenance performed on April 22, 1986, Technical Specification requirements for secondary containment integrity in the refuel zone were not fully met. Two automatic dampers in series normally provide the isolation function for the secondary containment ventilation penetrations. Technical Specification definition (1.P.3.C.2) requires that if one refuel zone ventilation damper is not operable, then the remaining isolation damper for that penetration must be closed and deactivated. Maintenance was planned on a refuel zone exhaust damper which would cause one of the two air operated dampers to be inoperable for a short time. The air supply valve to the redundant damper was requested closed prior to the start of the maintenance. At the conclusion of the activity, it was discovered that the incorrect air supply valve had been isolated. (The redundant damper was not actually deactivated during the maintenance). This condition is contrary to Technical Specifications and existed for about five minutes.

Investigation of the event revealed that the air isolation valve identification tags were reversed on the two dampers which accounted for the error. The assistant unit operator responsible for the tagging error was counseled, and the tags have been corrected.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Units 1 and 2 were in refueling outages, and unit 3 was in an extended maintenance outage. No fuel handling was in progress.

On April 22, 1986, Technical Specification requirements relative to the integrity of secondary containment in the refuel zone (VA) were not fully met. Two air-operated automatic dampers in series provide the isolation function for this secondary containment ventilation penetration. Technical Specification definition (1.P.3.C.2) requires that if one refuel zone ventilation damper is not operable, then the remaining isolation damper for that penetration must be closed and deactivated.

Planned maintenance was required on FCO-64-10 (unit 1 refueling floor exhaust fan isolation damper), so the paired damper FCO-64-9 was requested to be closed and deactivated. Deactivation is accomplished by isolating the air supply valve to the damper operator. The maintenance required detaching the actuator to damper linkage, cycling the damper manually several times to verify vane integrity, and reinstalling the linkage. Upon completing the maintenance, FCO-64-10 was to be stroke-tested to demonstrate operability. The damper would not stroke. At this time, the cognizant engineer discovered that the air supply to FCO-64-10 had been closed rather than FCO-64-9 as had been intended. The time where secondary containment did not meet Technical Specification definitions lasted approximately five minutes while the linkage was removed from damper FCO-64-10. Though not deactivated, the isolation damper FCO-64-9 was closed for the entire duration of the maintenance.

The dampers FCO-64-9 and FCO-64-10 provide isolation for the appropriate ventilation penetration for the unit 1 pool areas. Six dampers serve to isolate the entire refuel zone on a secondary containment isolation signal.

Investigation of the incident discovered that the identification tags on the air isolation valves to the two dampers were reversed. The tagging problem was subsequently traced to tag hanging activity in December 1984. The air supply isolation valves and lines to FCO-64-10 and FCO-64-9 cannot be easily verified by eyesight. The air lines are ran through a common tray and routed behind ductwork. In addition, the dampers and actuators were not provided with identification tags. These factors may have contributed to the tagging errors.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

The refueling floor exhaust fans take suction from the following refuel zone areas:

- a. the refuel room area
- b. the dryer separator storage area
- c. the fuel storage pool
- d. the reactor cavity area

The failure to meet Technical Specification requirements for secondary containment for this short period of time is not considered to have significant safety implications on the availability of the containment isolation system, particularly since FCO-64-9 remained closed during the entire event.

The short-term corrective action was to change the air supply valve identification tags to correspond with the as-constructed drawings. Damper and actuator tags will also be hung. The assistant unit operator was also counseled on his error.

Responsible Plant Section - Operations

Previous Events - None

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
P.O. Box 2000
Decatur, Alabama 35602

May 21, 1986

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET
NO. 50-259 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-33 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT
BFRO-50-259/86013

The enclosed report provides details concerning the loss of secondary containment
in the refuel zone during ventilation damper maintenance. This report is
submitted in accordance to 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

Robert L. Lewis
Robert L. Lewis
Plant Manager
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

Enclosures

cc (Enclosures):

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region II
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Atlanta, Georgia 30303

INPO Records Center
Suite 1500
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

NRC Resident Inspector, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

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