

### LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 0 3 9 1 7	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 1 2
--	--	------------------------

TITLE (4) Reactor Protective Trip  
Due to Improper Installation of RPS Shorting Links During Refueling Outage

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 4	2 1	8 6	8 6	0 0 6	0 0 0	5	2 1	8 6			0 5 0 0 0 0
DOCKET NUMBER(S) 0 5 0 0 0 0											

OPERATIVE MODE (9) 5

POWER LEVEL (10) 0 1 0 0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

<input type="checkbox"/> 26.402(a)	<input type="checkbox"/> 26.402(d)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 26.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 26.71(a)
<input type="checkbox"/> 26.402(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 26.30(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 26.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 26.71(a)
<input type="checkbox"/> 26.402(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 26.30(a)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 26.73(a)(2)(iii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 305A)
<input type="checkbox"/> 26.402(a)(1)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 26.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 26.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	
<input type="checkbox"/> 26.402(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 26.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 26.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	
<input type="checkbox"/> 26.402(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 26.73(a)(2)(vi)	<input type="checkbox"/> 26.73(a)(2)(vi)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
W. S. Davison, Compliance Engineer	AREA CODE: 5 1 0 1 9 3 1 7 1 7 1 - 1 2 1 5 1 0 1 1 Ext 2726

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THE REPORT (13) Ext 2726

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)  NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 words, i.e., approximately 17 lines single-space typewritten text) (16)

On April 21, 1986, at 1143 hours with the Plant shutdown in Refueling Mode 5, a reactor protective trip occurred. While installing the shorting links for the Reactor Protective System (RPS), the link for RPS subchannel B1 was inadvertently placed on the wrong terminal. This resulted in a short circuit between RPS Bus A and Bus B causing a full RPS protective trip. The shorting link was reinstalled properly and the RPS system was restored to normal shutdown status. The root cause of the Reactor Protective trip was determined to be a cognitive personnel error by a licensed utility operator in that the operator did not place the shorting link on the correct terminals as directed by the Control Room Supervisor. The RPS System Operating Procedure will be modified to include additional guidance concerning shorting link installation.

*JEZZ  
y*

8605280430 860521  
PDR ADOCK 05000397  
S PDR

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)  Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0500039786	LER NUMBER (4)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
		86	006	000	2	OF 02

TEXT (9) more space is required, use additional NRC Form 388A's (17)

Plant Conditions

- a) Power Level - 0%
- b) Plant Mode - 5

Event

On April 21, 1986, at 1143 hours with the Plant shutdown in Refueling Mode 5, a reactor protective trip occurred. While installing the shorting links for the Reactor Protective System (RPS), the link for RPS subchannel B1 was inadvertently placed on the wrong terminal. This caused a short circuit between subchannel A1 and subchannel B1 reactor manual trip circuits resulting in blown power supply fuses in both channels. The loss of power to the A1 and B1 Reactor Manual Trip relays resulted in a full RPS Protective Trip.

The root cause of the Reactor Protective trip was determined to be a cognitive personnel error by a licensed utility operator in that the operator did not place the shorting link on the correct terminals as directed by the Control Room Supervisor.

Immediate Corrective Action

The shorting link was installed properly and the RPS system was restored to normal shutdown status.

Further Corrective Action

- o The operator involved was counseled concerning the importance of attentive action during performance of these types of activities.
- o The RPS System Operating Procedure will be modified to include additional guidance concerning shorting link installation.
- o Affected RPS circuitry will be checked for possible damage during routine surveillance activity prior to the next plant startup.

Similar Events

None

Safety Significance

The RPS system functioned as designed to cause a full protective trip. There was no threat to the safety of the public or plant personnel as a result of this event.

EIIS Information

Text Reference

RPS

EIIS Reference

System	Component
JC	57

## Washington Public Power Supply System

3000 George Washington Way P.O. Box 968 Richland, Washington 99352-0968 (509)372-5000

Docket No. 50-397

May 21, 1986

Document Control Desk  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555


Subject: NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2  
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 86-006

Dear Sir:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 86-006 for WNP-2 Plant. This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR50.73 and discusses the item of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.

This is the follow-up report to the verbal notification given at 1143 hours on April 21, 1986.

Very truly yours,



C.M. Powers (M/D 927M)  
WNP-2 Plant Manager

CMP:mt

Enclosure:  
Licensee Event Report No. 86-006

cc: Mr. John B. Martin, NRC - Region V  
Mr. R.T. Dodds, NRC - Site (901A)  
Ms. Dottie Sherman, ANI  
INPO Records Center - Atlanta, GA  
Mr. C.R. Bryant, BPA (M/D 399)

IE22  
1/1