URC-Form 386 (9-83) LICENSEE EVI:NT REPORT (LER)							U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 8/31/86						
FACILITY NAME (1)						D	OCKET NUMBER	(2)	F	PAGE (3)			
Nine Mile P	oint Unit	I					0 5 0 0	0 2 2	10 1	OF 01			
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MODE (9) N 20.4 2(b)			20.405(c) X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)					73.710	12				
POWER 21	0.40% (#31%)1.13	-	50.36(c)(1)		-	50.73(a)(2)(v)		73,71(c)					
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20.406(a)(1)(a)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(8	1						
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		L	ICENSEE CONTACT	FOR THIS	LER (12)		-						
NAME							AREA CODE	TELEPHONE	NUMBER	4 A E			
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YES /// yes, complete EXPECTED	SUBMISSION DATE	0	V NO				DATE (1	5)					
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e.	approximately lifteen	single space type	written lines/ (16)										
ABSTRACT On April 22 Building Em dition on t monitor on this monito Bus 130, Re The undervo main transf by powerboa fast transf decayed. I 13B. No of The correct an engineen problem. I Additional rective act	2, 1986, w mergency V the Instru this bus or in the eactor Bui oltage con former fro ard 12 pro fer to off owerboard ther plant tive actio ring evalu initial te work is u	ith Nine entilati ment and tripped "refuel" lding Em dition W m the pl tective site pow 12 feed safety ns taken ation to sts have be taken	e Mile Poi ion System l Control off due t ' position mergency V was a resu lant 345Kv relaying wer of pow ds Instrum systems w h have inco investig e been per and, upon h.	nt Un was Bus 1 o the , cou entil lt of swit as a erboa ert a erboa ert a luded ate t forme disc	it I initi 30. unde pled ation the chyar loss rd 12 nd Co ffect the he ba d but overy	in a refu ated due The Refue rvoltage. with the initiate loss of t d. This of normal did not ntrol Bus ed. initiatio ckfeed tr the resu of the c	eling ou to an un 1 Floor With t loss of d as des he backf loss of feed. operate 130 thr n of wor ip and f lts are auses, a	tage, t dervolt High Ra he swit power t igned. eed thr power w However and bus ough Po k reque ast tra inconcl ppropri	he Rea age co diation ch fo o I&C ough as see , the volta werboard ests an nsfer usive ate co	actor on- on r the en age ard nd or-			

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LICENSEE EVENT	REPORT (LER)) TEXT CONTINUATION	
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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TEXT

C Form 366A

On April 22, 1986, with the mode switch in shutdown and Nine Mile Point Unit I in a refueling outage, the Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation System was initiated due to loss of power on the Instrument and Control Bus 130. This loss of power tripped the Refuel Floor High Radiation monitor and with the keylock switch for this monitor in the "refuel" position Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation initiated as designed.

The undervoltage condition was a direct result of the loss of the backfeed through the main transformer from the plant 345 Kv switchyard. This loss of the backfeed was initiated by normal outage maintenance on plant protective relaying. With the plant in the backfeed mode through the 345 Kv switchyard, the generator links are removed and the generator grounded. The backfeed mode is not seen as a reverse power condition by the reverse power relay as the generator links are removed from the circuit. Thus the conditions were not met for both current magnitude and phase angle to trip the switchyard in a reverse power condition. When the 21 (distance relay) device was removed from the circuit for testing, the impedance characteristics of the protective relaying circuit were changed. This change was enough to allow circuit induced currents to trip the reverse power relay. This relay tripped the backfeed.

The tripping of the backfeed was seen by powerboard 12 protective relaying as a loss of normal feed. However, the fast transfer to reserve power did not function and bus voltage decayed. Powerboard 12 feeds Powerboard 13B which in turn feeds Instrument and Control Bus 130. The Refuel Floor High Radiation Monitor, which is fed through this bus, tripped off due to loss of power. Because the keylock switch for this monitor was in "refuel" not "bypass" because of the refueling outage, this loss of power resulted in a Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation initiation. Although Instrument and Control Bus 130 may be fed through other power sources, the transfer to these sources must be by operator action. In this situation, power was manually restored to powerboard 12 by the operators and Instrument and Control Bus 130 was reenergized.

ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL SAFETY CONSEQUENCES

There were no potential safety consequences associated with this incident since the Engineered Safety Features (ESF) functioned as designed. The keactor Building Emergency Ventilation System received an initiation signal and actuated. No other ESF Systems were affected by this incident. The tripping of the backfeed and failure of Powerboard 12 to fast transfer posed an operational concern during the refueling outage but not a safety concern, because Powerboard 12 is not safety related. During power operations, the failure to fast transfer would only pose an operational concern since Powerboard 11 provides power to redundant components. Since the ESF systems required for safe shutdown are powered from safety related Powerboards 102 and 103, no potential safety consequences result from this event. LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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CORRECTIVE ACTION

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Work requests were initiated to investigate the cause for the backfeed trip upon removing the 21 (distance relay) device from the circuit and to investigate the reason for powerboard 12 failing to transfer to offsite power. Engineering investigated the testing conditions, circuit load and impedance characteristics, and setpoints of the reverse power relay to determine methodology to prevent a recurrence of the backfeed trip. Presently, the current magnitude trip setpoint of the reverse power relay has been raised from 10 milliamps to 15 milliamps. In addition for future backfeed conditions, the plant protective relaying in the circuit with the reverse power relay will be disabled. With respect to the failure to transfer, simulation of the conditions that initiated the backfeed trip did not produce a recurrence of the failure of powerboard 12 to transfer to reserve power. Chart recorders were in place at the time of this testing. The test results are being sent to engineering for analysis. Also, these chart recorders will be reinstalled to determine the cause of the failure to transfer should this situation happen again. Depending on the results of these investigations, appropriate corrective actions will be taken.

NMP-18659

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NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

NIAGARA 🍯 MOHAWK

300 ERIE BOULEVARD WEST SYRACUSE, N.Y. 13202

THOMAS E. LEMPGES

May 21, 1986

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

RE: Docket No. 50-220 LER 86-08

Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73. we hereby submit the following Licensee Event Report:

LER 86-08

Which is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv), "Any event or conditon that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), including the Reactor Protection System (RPS). However, actuation of an ESF, including the RPS, that resulted from and was part of the preplanned sequence during testing or reactor operation need not be reported".

Telephone notification per 10 CFR 50.72 was made at 0940 hours on April 22, 1986.

This report was completed in the format designated in NUREG-1022 dated September 1983.

Very truly yours,

empges

Thomas E. Lempges Vice President Nuclear Generation

TEL/tg Attachments cc: Dr. TE Murley Regional Administrator