

Item 21
of FOIA 88-165

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~~2. Meeting~~
76

MAR 09 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: A. Bert Davis, Regional Administrator, RIII
FROM: Edward G. Greenman, Director, Division of Reactor Projects
SUBJECT: TOPIC FOR SENIOR MANAGEMENT MEETING

One of the topics suggested by DRP for the subject meeting was the NRCs role in obtaining vendor support to solve equipment problems. In response to our suggestion you asked DRP to provide background information and examples where Region III plants have had vendor support problems and suggestions for addressing the issues.

The following is a partial listing of facilities where vendor support has been a problem, the vendor involved and the component/issue of interest:

<u>Facility</u>	<u>Vendor</u>	<u>Issue</u>
Fermi	Fairbanks Morse	Accelerated Failure of Diesel Generator bearings. Vendor reluctant to acknowledge problem. Problem potentially impacts Prairie Island and Duane Arnold.
Perry LaSalle	ASCO	Solenoid malfunctions impacted equipment operability. The vendor was initially slow in responding with information.
LaSalle	Static-O-Ring	Pressure and differential pressure switch malfunctions/failures. The switch materials were not compatible with required service conditions.
Point Beach	Westinghouse	Vibration-induced S/G tube failure. The vendor did not submit a Part 21 Report following the North Anna event and was reluctant to share information with the NRC.
Kewaunee	ASCO	Non-interchangeability of solenoid valves and parts. Resulted in inoperable containment isolation valves.

Jim -
held mgmt mtg - June 1
4/28 - EG + ASD meet with NRR to
prepare for June mtg.

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<u>Facility</u>	<u>Vendor</u>	<u>Issue</u>
D. C. Cook	Foxboro	Transmitter drift in harsh environments could mislead operators.
Davis Besse	Cyberex	Electrical component quality on circuit boards was deficient. The vendor did not conform with licensee purchase specifications.
Palisades	Rosemount	Transmitter drift in harsh environments could mislead operators.

These issues, in many cases arise from incomplete communications between licensees and vendors regarding the capabilities of supplied equipment. At times it has appeared that vendors have been reluctant to share information on performance problems with other licensees or the NRC. Typical of this situation are the recurring debates between licensees and vendors regarding who has responsibility for filing reports pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21. Contributing to this problem is an apparent lack of understanding on the part of many vendors for equipment service conditions such that, for example, qualification testing does not match service conditions or equipment designed for and suitable for laboratory-type use fails in an industrial environment.

Another area of concern has related to AE firms who provide engineering service to licensees. While such firms develop QA Programs for their activities, NRC inspections which have extended back through the licensee programs and into the engineering efforts of such firms, have often found that supporting information for engineering decisions is lacking, and in some cases wrong.

A third general problem area which is now emerging is that of replacement parts. As plants age and vendors go out of business or change product lines, qualified replacement parts will become a matter of increasing concern. While this can be viewed as an industry problem related to reliability of operations, it is also of regulatory concern if unreliable parts cause increased challenges to safety systems.

Possible solutions to these problems include increased accountability of vendors to the NRC and the industry, strengthening the information feedback loop on equipment performance through more aggressive and expansive use of such systems as NPRDS, and better communications between vendors and the NRC on NRC expectations regarding equipment performance. The first alternative may involve rulemaking. The second could likely be accommodated by increased NRC emphasis

to industry groups on the value of shared information. The third alternative could involve NRC sponsored workshops for vendors on such topics as environmental qualification, instrument reliability, or general design criteria.

In summary, a number of specific problems have been identified regarding vendor support of licensees. The key to minimizing this problem would appear to lie with a strengthened industry-NRC-vendor interface.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY E. G. GREENMAN

Edward G. Greenman, Director
Division of Reactor Projects

RIII
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Goldmond/cs
3/3/88

RIII
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Greenman
3/8/88

RIII
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Miller
3/07/88

RIII
[Signature]
Murelius
3/7/88

PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED

MORNING REPORT - REGION III

OCTOBER 30, 1987

LICENSEE/FACILITY

CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO./
PERRY UNIT 1

NOTIFICATION/SUBJECT

SRI-PC/
EXCESSIVE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE
(MSIV) STROKE TIMES

EVENT

EVENT NO.

AT 8:37 P.M. ON OCTOBER 29, 1987 WHILE OPERATING AT 76% POWER, THE LICENSEE PERFORMED A FAST CLOSURE OF THE INBOARD MSIV ON THE "D" STEAMLINE, 1B21-F022D, IN ACCORDANCE WITH STARTUP TEST INSTRUCTION (STI) 1B21-025A, SECTION B 4, "FULL CLOSURE OF THE FASTEST MSIV AT MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE POWER." THE VALVE DID NOT BEGIN TO STROKE CLOSED UNTIL APPROXIMATELY 18 SECONDS AFTER IT'S CONTROL SWITCH WAS PLACED IN THE "CLOSED" POSITION. THE VALVE THEN STROKED CLOSED IN LESS THAN 3 SECONDS. THE LICENSEE DECLARED THE VALVE INOPERABLE AND IMMEDIATELY BEGAN TO REDUCE REACTOR POWER TO BELOW 75%. SUBSEQUENTLY, AT APPROXIMATELY 9:03 P.M., THE VALVE WAS RESTROKED TWICE WITH SATISFACTORY STROKE TIMES. BASED UPON THE INITIAL FAILURE, THE LICENSEE PERFORMED FAST CLOSURE TESTING OF THE REMAINING MSIVS. AT 9:44 P.M., MSIV 1B21-F028D WAS STROKED CLOSED WITH AN UNSATISFACTORY STROKE TIME OF 1 MINUTE AND 17 SECONDS AND AT 9:52 P.M. WAS RESTROKED WITH AN ACCEPTABLE STROKE TIME. AT 10:16 P.M., MSIV 1B21-F028B WAS STROKED CLOSED WITH AN UNSATISFACTORY STROKE TIME OF 11.9 SECONDS AND AT 10:18 P.M. WAS RESTROKED WITH AN ACCEPTABLE STROKE TIME. VALVES 1B21-F028D AND 1B21-F028B WERE ALSO DECLARED INOPERABLE PENDING EVALUATION. THE REMAINING VALVES STROKED ACCEPTABLY. THE EXCESSIVE INITIAL CLOSURE TIMES OF VALVES 1B21F022D AND 2B21F028D (BOTH ON THE "D" STEAMLINE) WERE DETERMINED BY THE LICENSEE TO BE REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iii). DURING ALL MSIV CLOSURES, THE PILOT SOLENOID STATUS LIGHTS WERE OBSERVED TO EXTINGUISH, INDICATING THAT THE MSIV PILOT VALVE SOLENOIDS DEENERGIZED. THE LICENSEE CURRENTLY BELIEVES THAT DURING INITIAL CLOSURE TESTS, MSIV PILOT VALVES ASSOCIATED WITH VALVES 1B21-F022D, 1B21-F028D, AND 1B21-F028B DID NOT FREELY STROKE OPEN UPON PILOT SOLENOID DEENERGIZATION. BASED UPON THE INABILITY TO RECREATE THE FAILURES AND SUBSEQUENT SATISFACTORY MSIV PERFORMANCE, THE LICENSEE DECLARED THE MSIVS OPERABLE AT 10:40 P.M.. THE LICENSEE IS CONTINUING TO EVALUATE THE EXCESSIVE MSIV STROKE TIMES IN CONSULTATION WITH GENERAL ELECTRIC AND IS CONSIDERING INCREASING MSIV SURVEILLANCE TEST FREQUENCY TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL ASSURANCES OF MSIV OPERABILITY.

REGIONAL FOLLOWUP: THE RESIDENT INSPECTORS EVALUATE THE LICENSEE'S ROOT CAUSE DETERMINATION AND WILL MONITOR MSIV PERFORMANCE DURING FUTURE MSIV SURVEILLANCE TESTING.

D-77

PRIORITY ATTENTION REQUIRED MORNING REPORT - REGION III NOVEMBER 2, 1987

LICENSEE/FACILITY
CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO. /
PERRY UNIT 1

NOTIFICATION/SUBJECT
SENIOR RESIDENT INSPECTOR
EXCESSIVE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE
(MSIV) STROKE TIMES

EVENT NO. 10515 (UPDATE) 1

ON OCTOBER 29, 1987, WHILE OPERATING AT APPROXIMATELY 75X POWER, THE MSIVS WERE INDIVIDUALLY FAST-CLOSURE TESTED. VALVES 1B21-F0220, 1B21-F028D, AND 1B21-F028B EXHIBITED EXCESSIVE STROKE TIMES. SUBSEQUENT FAST-CLOSURE TESTS WERE PERFORMED AND THE VALVES PERFORMED SATISFACTORILY. THE VALVES WERE DECLARED OPERABLE FOLLOWING THE SUCCESSFUL FAST-CLOSURE TESTS. THE LICENSEE BELIEVES THAT THE EXCESSIVE INITIAL STROKE TIMES MAY HAVE BEEN DUE TO IMPURITIES IN THE VALVE ACTUATOR PILOT AIR SYSTEM AND THAT THE IMPURITIES WERE DISLODGED DURING VALVE OPERATION. BASED UPON DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN LICENSEE, MRC REGION III AND MRR MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL HELD ON OCTOBER 30, 1987, THE LICENSEE WILL PERFORM ADDITIONAL INDIVIDUAL FAST-CLOSURE TESTS ON THE FULL VALVES TO CONFIRM THEIR OPERABILITY SHORTLY BEFORE THE PERFORMANCE OF THE FULL REACTOR ISOLATION STARTUP TEST. THE FULL REACTOR ISOLATION STARTUP TEST IS CURRENTLY SCHEDULED TO BE PERFORMED ON NOVEMBER 6, 1987. THE FULL REACTOR ISOLATION IS THE LAST TEST IN THE LICENSEE'S STARTUP TEST PROGRAM. WHILE SHUT DOWN FOLLOWING THE STARTUP TEST THE LICENSEE WILL EXAMINE THE MSIVS AND MSIV ACTUATORS TO FURTHER ESTABLISH THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE EXCESSIVE STROKE TIMES EXPERIENCED ON OCTOBER 29, 1987.

REGIONAL FOLLOWUP: THE RESIDENT INSPECTORS WILL WITNESS MSIV FAST-CLOSURE TESTING TO BE CONDUCTED PRIOR TO THE FULL REACTOR ISOLATION STARTUP TEST AND WILL INFORM MRC REGION III AND MRR MANAGEMENT OF THE TEST RESULTS.

DAILY REPORT REGION III

DATE: 10-30-87

K. A. CONNAUGHTON

OCT 31 1987

LICENSEE/FACILITY

NOTIFICATION/SUBJECT

CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO./
PERRY UNIT 1SRI-PC/
EXCESSIVE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE
(MSIV) STROKE TIMES

EVENT

EVENT NO. 10515

AT 6:37 P.M. ON OCTOBER 29, 1987 WHILE OPERATING AT 76% POWER, THE LICENSEE PERFORMED A FAST CLOSURE OF THE INBOARD MSIV ON THE "D" STEAMLINE, 1B21-F022D, IN ACCORDANCE WITH STARTUP TEST INSTRUCTION (STI) 1B21-025A, SECTION 8.4, "FULL CLOSURE OF THE FASTEST MSIV AT MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE POWER." THE VALVE DID NOT BEGIN TO STROKE CLOSED UNTIL APPROXIMATELY 18 SECONDS AFTER IT'S CONTROL SWITCH WAS PLACED IN THE "CLOSED" POSITION. THE VALVE THEN STROKED CLOSED IN LESS THAN 3 SECONDS. THE LICENSEE DECLARED THE VALVE INOPERABLE AND IMMEDIATELY BEGAN TO REDUCE REACTOR POWER TO BELOW 75%. SUBSEQUENTLY, AT APPROXIMATELY 9:03 P.M., THE VALVE WAS RESTROKED TWICE WITH SATISFACTORY STROKE TIMES. BASED UPON THE INITIAL FAILURE, THE LICENSEE PERFORMED FAST CLOSURE TESTING OF THE REMAINING MSIVs. AT 9:44 P.M., MSIV 1B21-F028D WAS STROKED CLOSED WITH AN UNSATISFACTORY STROKE TIME OF 1 MINUTE AND 17 SECONDS AND AT 9:52 P.M. WAS RESTROKED WITH AN ACCEPTABLE STROKE TIME. AT 10:16 P.M., MSIV 1B21-F028B WAS STROKED CLOSED WITH AN UNSATISFACTORY STROKE TIME OF 11.9 SECONDS AND AT 10:18 P.M. WAS RESTROKED WITH AN ACCEPTABLE STROKE TIME. VALVES 1B21-F028D AND 1B21-F028B WERE ALSO DECLARED INOPERABLE PENDING EVALUATION. THE REMAINING VALVES STROKED ACCEPTABLY. THE EXCESSIVE INITIAL CLOSURE TIMES OF VALVES 1B21F022D AND 2B21F028D (BOTH ON THE "D" STEAMLINE) WERE DETERMINED BY THE LICENSEE TO BE REPORTABLE IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10 CFR 50.72 (b) (2) (iii). DURING ALL MSIV CLOSURES, THE PILOT SOLENOID STATUS LIGHTS WERE OBSERVED TO EXTINGUISH, INDICATING THAT THE MSIV PILOT VALVE SOLENOIDS DEENERGIZED. THE LICENSEE CURRENTLY BELIEVES THAT DURING INITIAL CLOSURE TESTS, MSIV PILOT VALVES ASSOCIATED WITH VALVES 1B21-F022D, 1B21-F028D, AND 1B21-F028B DID NOT FREELY STROKE OPEN UPON PILOT SOLENOID DEENERGIZATION, BASED UPON THE INABILITY TO RECREATE THE FAILURES AND SUBSEQUENT SATISFACTORY MSIV PERFORMANCE, THE LICENSEE DECLARED THE MSIVs OPERABLE AT 10:40 P.M.. THE LICENSEE IS CONTINUING TO EVALUATE THE EXCESSIVE MSIV STROKE TIMES IN CONSULTATION WITH GENERAL ELECTRIC AND IS CONSIDERING INCREASING MSIV SURVEILLANCE TEST FREQUENCY TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL ASSURANCES OF MSIV OPERABILITY.

REGIONAL FOLLOWUP: THE RESIDENT INSPECTORS EVALUATE THE LICENSEE'S ROOT CAUSE DETERMINATION AND WILL MONITOR MSIV PERFORMANCE DURING FUTURE MSIV SURVEILLANCE TESTING.

D-78

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Reportable Event number 10515 .

Facility : PERRY
Unit : 1
Region : 3
Vendor : GE,GE
Operations Officer : Don Marksberry
NRC Notified By : ROGER STIFFLER
Rad Release : No
Cause : Unknown
Component :

Date Notified : 10/30/87
Time Notified : 00:10
Date of Event : 10/30/87
Time of Event : 21:44
Classification : 10 CFR 50.72
Category 1 : LCO Action Statement
Category 2 :
Category 3 :
Category 4 :

EVENT DESCRIPTION :

WITH THE REACTOR AT 62%, FULL CLOSURE TESTS ON MSIVs FOUND THREE VALVES WITH CLOSURE TIMES EXCEEDING THE 5 SECOND LIMIT. THE FIRST MSIV, FO22-D (INBOARD) CLOSED 22 SECONDS. AFTER FURTHER TESTS THE CLOSURE TIMES WERE WITHIN 3-5 SECONDS. AS THE RESULT OF THE TEST, THE OUTBOARD MSIV, FO-28-D, WAS TESTED WITH A CLOSURE TIME OF 77 SECONDS. THE VALVE WAS CYCLED SEVERAL TIMES WITH STROKE TIMES WITHIN 3-5 SECONDS. ALL OTHER MSIVs WERE TESTED WITH ONLY ONE OTHER VALVE, FO-28-B, CLOSING AT 12 SECONDS AND FURTHER TESTS RESULTED IN CLOSURE TIMES WITHIN 3-5 SECONDS. AFTER THE FIRST TEST ON THE THREE VALVES THE SLOW CLOSURE TIMES COULD NOT BE REPEATED. SUSPECT WATER IN AIR SUPPLY AFFECTING THE PNEUMATIC SOLENOIDS WHERE THE CYCLING FREED THE SOLENOIDS. CONSIDERING SHORTENING THE SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY FOR FULL CLOSURE TEST WHICH IS NOW 92 DAYS. NOTIFIED RDO(SNELL).

D-79

DAILY REPORT REGION III

DATE: 11-02-87

LICENSEE/FACILITY	NOTIFICATION/SUBJECT
CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO./ PERRY UNIT 1	SRI-PC/ EXCESSIVE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE (MSIV) STROKE TIMES

EVENT	EVENT NO. 10515 (UPDATE)
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ON OCTOBER 29, 1987, WHILE OPERATING AT APPROXIMATELY 75% POWER, THE MSIVs WERE INDIVIDUALLY FAST-CLOSURE TESTED. VALVES 1B21-F022D, 1B21-F028D, AND 1B21-F028B EXHIBITED EXCESSIVE STROKE TIMES. SUBSEQUENT FAST-CLOSURE TESTS WERE PERFORMED AND THE VALVES PERFORMED SATISFACTORILY. THE VALVES WERE DECLARED OPERABLE FOLLOWING THE SUCCESSFUL FAST-CLOSURE TESTS. THE LICENSEE BELIEVES THAT THE EXCESSIVE INITIAL STROKE TIMES MAY HAVE BEEN DUE TO IMPURITIES IN THE VALVE ACTUATOR PILOT AIR SYSTEM AND THAT THE IMPURITIES WERE DISLODGED DURING VALVE OPERATION. BASED UPON DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN LICENSEE, NRC REGION III, AND NRR MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL HELD ON OCTOBER 30, 1987, THE LICENSEE WILL PERFORM ADDITIONAL FAST-CLOSURE TESTS ON THE SUBJECT VALVES TO CONFIRM THEIR OPERABILITY SHORTLY BEFORE THE PERFORMANCE OF THE FULL REACTOR ISOLATION STARTUP TEST. THE FULL REACTOR ISOLATION STARTUP TEST IS CURRENTLY SCHEDULED TO BE PERFORMED ON NOVEMBER 6, 1987. THE FULL REACTOR ISOLATION IS THE LAST TEST IN THE LICENSEE'S STARTUP TEST PROGRAM. WHILE SHUT DOWN FOLLOWING THE STARTUP TEST THE LICENSEE WILL EXAMINE THE MSIVs AND MSIV ACTUATORS TO FURTHER ESTABLISH THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE EXCESSIVE STROKE TIMES EXPERIENCED ON OCTOBER 29, 1987.

REGIONAL FOLLOWUP: THE RESIDENT INSPECTORS WILL WITNESS MSIV FAST-CLOSURE TESTING TO BE CONDUCTED PRIOR TO THE FULL REACTOR ISOLATION STARTUP TEST AND WILL INFORM NRC REGION III AND NRR MANAGEMENT OF THE TEST RESULTS.

D-80

Reportable Event Number 10560

Utility : PERRY
Unit : 1
Region : 3
Vendor : GE,GE
Operations Officer : Ron Young
NRC Notified By : ALLEN OKORN
Rad Release : No
Cause : UNDER INVESTIGATION
Component :

Date Notified : 11/03/87
Time Notified : 21:30
Date of Event : 11/03/87
Time of Event : 18:20
Classification : 10 CFR 50.72
Category 1 : ESF Actuation
Category 2 : SCRAM
Category 3 :
Category 4 :

WITH REACTOR AT ABOUT 23% POWER WHILE A CONTROLLED UNIT S/D WAS IN PROGRESS (SEE EVENT #10555), OPERATORS WERE FOLLOWING THE CONTROL ROD "PULL SHEET" USED FOR ROD WITHDRAWAL/INSERTION TO DETERMINE THE SEQUENCE FOR CONTROL ROD INSERTION WHEN REACTOR POWER DECREASED BELOW THE LOW POWER SETPOINT (i.e., POWER SETPOINT BELOW WHICH THE CONTROL ROD SEQUENCE AND CONFIGURATION MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ROD PATTERN CONTROLLER). SINCE THE CONTROL ROD SEQUENCE AND CONFIGURATION WERE DIFFERENT FROM THOSE REQUIRED BY THE ROD PATTERN CONTROLLER WITH REACTOR POWER BELOW THE LOW POWER SETPOINT, ROD BLOCKS WERE RECEIVED AND OPERATORS COULD NOT CONTINUE INSERTING CONTROL RODS. THEREFORE, OPERATORS MANUALLY SCRAMMED THE REACTOR TO COMPLETE THE S/D. Type a New Line to continue : FP2717FP0016
LICENSEE SUSPECTS THAT THE REACTOR POWER DROPPED BELOW THE LOW POWER SETPOINT WHEN RECIRC PUMPS WERE SHIFTED FROM FAST TO SLOW SPEED AS PART OF THE NORMAL S/D PROCEDURE. THE LOW POWER SETPOINT VARIES BETWEEN 20% AND 35%, AND IS BASED ON TURBINE FIRST STAGE PRESSURE. UNIT IS STABLE IN THE HOT S/D. LICENSEE INVESTIGATING HOW FOLLOWING THE PULL SHEET ALLOWED A CONTROL SEQUENCE AND CONFIGURATION THAT RESULTED IN ROD BLOCKS. NRC RESIDENT WAS INFORMED. (NOTIFIED ASDO, HARRISON)

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ENTER ESCAPE TO QUIT, ANY OTHER CHARACTER TO CONTINUE.

D-81

EVENT FOLLOWUP REPORT 87-172
50.72 EVENT #10515, OCTOBER 30, 1987
PLANT-PERRY 1
PROJECT MANAGER- T. COLBURN
COGNIZANT ENGINEER- J. CARTER

NOV 2 0 1987

PROBLEM

MSIVs did not close within the time allowed by Technical Specifications.

CAUSE

Initially unknown but subsequently determined that a higher than anticipated ambient temperature caused the main pilot control (solenoid valve) to hangup.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

Reactor isolation or containment integrity may not be possible in the event of an accident or transient.

DISCUSSION

During full closure tests of individual MSIVs, three valves exceeded the 5 second closure time of the technical specifications. Times were 22, 12, and 77 seconds with the two slowest valves being in the "D" steam line. Subsequent testing of these valves resulted in closure times of 3-5 seconds.

The licensee initially suspected that dirt in the air system caused the solenoid valve to hangup, thereby delaying the on-set of valve closure. Since there had been no previous instances of slow MSIV closure, the licensee continued power operation while reviewing maintenance records and preparing for their last pre-operational test, full MSIV isolation. The licensee and NRC regional and headquarters staff agreed with this approach.

Prior to running the full MSIV isolation test, the licensee again tested individual MSIVs for closure. Slow valve closure was observed again. The licensee shut down the reactor without performing their full MSIV isolation test.

NRC dispatched an AIT to the site to be present during disassembly of the solenoid valves and to evaluate the problem. Initial conclusions were that steam leaks in the vicinity of the MSIVs and the control circuit valves (includes the solenoid valves) had caused ambient temperatures in the vicinity of 300° F at the highest temperature location which also was the location of the "D" isolation valve. The elastomer seal in the solenoid valve had hardened and was believed to have held the solenoid in the closed position thereby preventing air from being vented, thereby keeping the MSIV open.

FOLLOWUP

The AIT will document their findings and present any followup to be done, plant specific or generic. No further action by EAB is necessary.

Jerry Carter
Jerry Carter
BWR Section
Events Assessment Branch

cc: T. Colburn
E. Rossi

0-90

Reportable Event number 10515 .

Facility : PERRY

Unit : 1

Region : 3

Vendor : GE,GE

Operations Office :

NRC Notified :

Rad Release :

Cause : Unknown

Component :

Don Marksberry

STIFFLER

Date Notified : 10/30/87

Time Notified : 00:10

Date of Event : 10/30/87

Time of Event : 21:44

Classification : 10 CFR 50.72

Category 1 : LCO Action Statement

Category 2 :

Category 3 :

Category 4 :

EVENT DESCRIPTION :

WITH THE REACTOR AT 62%, FULL CLOSURE TESTS ON MSIVs FOUND THREE VALVES WITH CLOSURE TIMES EXCEEDING THE 5 SECOND LIMIT. THE FIRST MSIV, FO22-D (INBOARD), CLOSED 22 SECONDS. AFTER FURTHER TESTS THE CLOSURE TIMES WERE WITHIN 3-5 SECONDS. AS THE RESULT OF THE TEST, THE OUTBOARD MSIV, FO-28-D, WAS TESTED WITH A CLOSURE TIME OF 77 SECONDS. THE VALVE WAS CYCLED SEVERAL TIMES WITH STROKE TIMES WITHIN 3-5 SECONDS. ALL OTHER MSIVs WERE TESTED WITH ONLY ONE OTHER VALVE, FO-28-B, CLOSING AT 12 SECONDS AND FURTHER TESTS RESULTED IN CLOSURE TIMES WITHIN 3-5 SECONDS. AFTER THE FIRST TEST ON THE THREE VALVES THE SLOW CLOSURE TIMES COULD NOT BE REPEATED. SUSPECT WATER IN AIR SUPPLY AFFECTING THE PNEUMATIC SOLENOIDS WHERE THE CYCLING FREED THE SOLENOIDS. CONSIDERING SHORTENING THE SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY FOR FULL CLOSURE TEST WHICH LOW 92 DAYS. NOTIFIED RDO(SNELL).

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