NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
EDWIN I. HATCH, UNIT 1	0 5 0 0 0 3 2 1	1 OF 0 4

TITLE (4)

PERSONNEL ERRORS CAUSE LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
										0 5 0 0 0
0 4	1 5	8 6	8 6	0 1 7	0 0	0 4	1 5	8 6		0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)											
5		20.402(b)		20.405(c)	X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)				
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)				
0 1 0 0		20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)				
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X	50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)						
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)						
		20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)						

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE
Raymond D. Baker, Nuclear Licensing Manager - Hatch	4 0 4 — 5 2 6 - 1 7 0 6

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At approximately 0400 CST on 04/15/86, the Unit was in cold shutdown for a refueling outage with the vessel completely loaded with fuel, the vessel head installed, and the "A" loop of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system out of service for maintenance. Operations personnel noted that the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) outboard primary containment isolation valve E11-F015B was isolated. From 0100 CST (when two fuses were blown) until 0145 CST (when the fuses were replaced), the Unit did not have shutdown cooling capability. At 0400 CST, operations personnel restored shutdown cooling by opening isolation valve E11-F015B.

An investigation revealed that a non-licensed utility employee performing a surveillance procedure inadvertantly blew two power supply fuses resulting in the isolation of valve E11-F015B.

RHR pump operability and Inservice Inspection (ISI) tests were performed satisfactorily. Affected procedures will be reviewed and revised as necessary. Appropriate instructions have been provided to engineering personnel and will be provided to licensed and non-licensed operations personnel to preclude recurrence.

The isolation valve could have been manually opened for decay heat removal. Therefore, this event had no effect on plant safety.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT

This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), because an unplanned ESF actuation occurred (i.e., E11-F015B isolated). Additionally, this event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), because the Unit operated in a condition prohibited by Technical Specification 3.5.3.1.b (i.e., shutdown cooling was not operable).

B. UNIT(s) STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT

At approximately 0400 CST on 04/15/86, the Unit was in cold shutdown for a refueling outage with fuel in the vessel. The vessel head was installed, and the "B" loop of RHR was in the shutdown cooling mode of operation with the "D" RHR pump (E11-C001D) in operation. Prior to the event, the "A" loop of RHR was out of service for maintenance until 04/19/86.

C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

At approximately 0400 CST, while non-licensed operations personnel were performing the "DAILY INSIDE ROUNDS" procedure (34GO-OPS-030-1), they noted that RHR pump E11-C002D was not operating as expected and, upon investigation they determined that the RHR outboard primary containment isolation valve E11-F015B was closed. Consequently, the RHR pump was running without discharging through the shutdown cooling flow path. Upon the realization that the "B" loop of RHR was isolated, operations personnel immediately restored shutdown cooling capability by opening isolation valve E11-F015B.

A subsequent investigation determined that at approximately 0100 CST, two fuses had blown causing the isolation. At approximately 0145 CST, the fuses were replaced. During this period of time, the Unit was without shutdown cooling capability, because isolation valve E11-F015B could not have been opened remotely due to the blown fuses.

D. CAUSE OF EVENT

The event was the result of personnel errors as detailed below:

1) A non-licensed utility employee performed the "MECHANICAL VACUUM PUMP AND GLAND SEAL EXHAUSTER ISOLATION LSFT" procedure (42SV-N62-002-1) which requires that certain relay contacts be blocked open. While blocking the relay contacts open, the employee inadvertantly shorted out contacts on the relay. The shorted contacts blew two fuses which resulted in the closing of valve E11-F015B. Additionally, the employee did not notify operations personnel of the event when it occurred.

2) Licensed utility personnel did not observe by the isolation valve's (E11-F015B) "closed" indication light or by system operation that the valve had isolated.

E. ANALYSIS OF EVENT

A review of the recorder chart from reactor water temperature recorder E41-R605 showed no increase in reactor coolant temperature during this event. The occurrence of this type event is not possible during power operation since procedure 42SV-N62-002-1 is not performed and shutdown cooling is not in service at power.

If RHR isolation valve E11-F015B had isolated when residual heat was high, the isolation valve could have been manually opened since it is outside primary containment. Therefore, this event had no adverse effect on plant safety.

F. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. Shutdown cooling capability was restored by opening valve E11-F015B (with its control room switch) at approximately 0400 CST on 04/15/86.

2. This event and its consequences were discussed with the non-licensed utility employee responsible for blowing the control panel fuses. He was cautioned to use greater care and to pay attention to detail while working inside electrically energized control panels. This event was discussed with the non-licensed employee's entire section (i.e., the engineers in the "BALANCE OF PLANT" section of the Engineering Department).

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

3. The Unit 2 mechanical vacuum pump isolation LSFT procedure (42SV-N62-002-2) will be reviewed and revised, if necessary, to preclude recurrence of this type of event. If a procedure revision is necessary, it will be in place prior to the next Unit 2 refueling outage.

   Additionally, the Unit 1 mechanical vacuum pump isolation LSFT procedure (42SV-N62-002-1) will be reviewed and revised as necessary, prior to the next scheduled Unit 1 refueling outage.

4. The Operations Manager will issue a memo directing licensed and non-licensed operations personnel to pay more attention to main control room panels.

5. An operability test (including Inservice Inspection per ASME Code, Section XI) was satisfactorily performed on RHR pump 1E11-C002D, per the "RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP OPERABILITY" procedure (34SV-E11-001-1S), at approximately 1944 CDT on 05/01/86.

G. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

   1. FAILED COMPONENT(s) IDENTIFICATION

      N/A

   2. PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

      There have been no past previous reportable events where the RHR pump's outboard isolation valves (E11-F015A or E11-F015B) isolated because of inadvertently blown fuses.

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Georgia Power
the southern electric system

L. T. Gucwa
Manager Nuclear Safety
and Licensing

SL-754
0166C

May 15, 1986

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report 50-321/1986-017. This report meets the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv) and 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B).

Sincerely,

LT Gucwa/lw

L. T. Gucwa

EBS/lc

Enclosure

c: Georgia Power Company
Mr. J. P. O'Reilly
Mr. J. T. Beckham, Jr.
Mr. H. C. Nix, Jr.
GO-NORMS

Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Dr. J. N. Grace, Regional Administrator
Senior Resident Inspector

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