


Rev. 0 04/24/86

Effective Date 5/14/86



ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION

AI-704

FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION

CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3

REACTOR TRIP REVIEW AND ANALYSIS

THIS PROCEDURE ADDRESSES NON-SAFETY RELATED COMPONENTS

REVIEWED BY: Plant Review Committee

Mike Collins

Date 04/24/86

Meeting No. 86-16

APPROVED BY: Nuclear Plant Manager

Ed Hill & A. McKee

Date 5/2/86

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INTERPRETATION CONTACT: Nuclear Safety Supervisor

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>Section</u>		<u>Page</u>
1.0	<u>PURPOSE</u>	1
2.0	<u>REFERENCES</u>	1
3.0	<u>RESPONSIBILITY</u>	1
4.0	<u>IMPLEMENTATION</u>	2
4.1	INTRODUCTION	2
4.2	POST-TRIP REVIEW	3
4.3	RESTART DECISION.	5
4.4	INDEPENDENT REVIEW.	6
4.5	SUBSEQUENT EVALUATION	8

ENCLOSURES

Enclosure 1, Post-Trip Review and Restart Justification.	12
Enclosure 2, UOER Distribution	25
Enclosure 3, Unplanned Operating Event/Transient Assessment Report Flow Diagram	26

1.0 PURPOSE

The purpose of this procedure is to establish the administrative requirements following transient events for implementation of a Post-Trip Review program.

2.0 REFERENCES

- a. NRC Generic Letter 83-28, "Post-Trip Review" and FPC Responses
- b. CP-111, "Documenting, Reporting, and Reviewing Non-Conforming Operations Reports"
- c. CP-125, "Corrective Action Procedure"
- d. Babcock & Wilcox "Transient Assessment Program (TAP) Guidelines"

3.0 RESPONSIBILITY

The Nuclear Safety Supervisor is responsible for the content of this procedure and shall act as the interpretation contact for any questions regarding its content.

4.0 IMPLEMENTATION

4.1 INTRODUCTION

4.1.1 This procedure establishes guidelines for a systematic method of conducting the technical review and analysis of plant performance associated with reactor trips in order to:

- Determine the immediate, intermediate, and root causes of the trip.
- Identify unexpected or abnormal response to the trip by plant systems, equipment, or personnel.
- Assess the impact of identified abnormalities on nuclear safety, equipment reliability, system performance, and plant availability.
- Develop corrective action recommendations to prevent the recurrence of the trip and to mitigate abnormal responses.
- Satisfy reporting requirements.
- Document observed plant response for future study and comparison.

4.1.2 The reactor trip review program consists of four distinct phases:

- Post-Trip Review
- Restart Decision
- Independent Review
- Subsequent Evaluation

All unplanned reactor trips will be subject to full review and evaluation. Planned reactor trips with no identified abnormalities need not proceed to the subsequent evaluation phase unless it is deemed necessary by the Nuclear Safety Supervisor.

4.1.3 The Nuclear Plant Manager (NPM) or Man On Call (MOC) is the team leader in assessing and justifying reactor restart in accordance with Section 4.3.1 of this procedure.

4.2 POST-TRIP REVIEW

4.2.1 Immediately following plant stabilization after a reactor trip, the Shift Operations Technical Advisor (SOTA) will complete Enclosure 1, "Post-Trip Review and Restart Justification". This data collection effort should be completed as rapidly as possible following the event but should not interfere with performance of the SOTA's duties if subsequent events occur or further complications develop.

- 4.2.1.1 If the Recall System is unavailable or malfunctioning, obtain photographs or photocopies of pertinent plant parameters. Ensure that any such photographs or photocopies are clearly labeled with date, time, and tag number of the device, and are included in the restart package.
- 4.2.1.2 Following a reactor trip the Computer Alarm System printout switches to the line printer.
- 4.2.1.3 Any member of the Nuclear Safety Section may assist in the data collection effort as designated by the Nuclear Safety Supervisor. Additional personnel may assist in the data collection or analysis effort as designated by the NPM/MOC or Shift Supervisor on Duty (SSOD).
- 4.2.1.4 All times noted on Enclosure 1 should be clearly labeled with the source of that time (Annunciator, Recall, Computer Alarm, Nuclear Operator or Shift Supervisor log, etc.). This will assist in assembling a sequence of events for the transient.

4.2.1.5 When assembling the Sequence of Events, it is necessary to correct the various data collection system times to a common time reference. This time reference should be chosen on the basis of convenience (i.e., if most of the data is taken from the Annunciator printout, use the Annunciator system time as the reference; if most of the data is taken from the Computer Alarm system, use this time as the reference, etc.). Once a reference system is selected and noted, a data point common to all data collection systems (such as CRD Trip Confirm/Reactor Trip) will be found. Time corrections based on the reference time are determined and noted. The Sequence of Events can then be assembled into a single coherent chronology.

4.3 RESTART DECISION

4.3.1 When Sections I through V of Enclosure 1 are complete, the SOTA and NPM/MOC will review and discuss the document. This review should ensure that the root cause of the event has been determined (if possible) and should ensure that adequate corrective actions have been proposed to prevent recurrence of the event. Plant transient response should be compared to expected responses to verify proper system performance. In addition all identified performance anomalies should be assessed for impact on nuclear safety, equipment reliability, system performance, or plant availability.

4.3.2 The above review will be documented by completing Item A of Section VI. This section formally documents completion of the data review.

4.4 INDEPENDENT REVIEW

4.4.1 Upon completion of Item A of Section VI, the Plant Review Committee (PRC) shall be convened to review the restart evaluation. The PRC quorum shall include representatives from Licensing, Maintenance, Nuclear Safety and Reliability, Operations, and Engineering. The PRC Chairman will determine what additional representation from other departments is necessary.

4.4.2 The PRC shall review the restart evaluation with particular attention to Section IV, "Automatic System Challenges and Plant Response". The committee shall also review the corrective actions proposed for any significant equipment malfunctions. Primary consideration must be given to determining what troubleshooting and/or repairs need to be completed prior to restart.

4.4.3 The PRC Chairman will indicate the committee's recommendation to restart the reactor by signing Item B of Section VI. Any recommendations of the PRC should be attached to that enclosure for consideration by the NPM/MOC.

4.4.4 Upon completion of the Independent Review by the PRC, the NPM/MOC shall review all sections of Enclosure 1 and any PRC recommendations attached. When the NPM/MOC is satisfied that all corrective actions required prior to restart are complete and that no outstanding safety concerns remain, he shall sign Item C of Section VI. This signature authorizes restart of the reactor. Enclosure 1 will then be given to the SSOD for review and signature prior to restart of the reactor. The restart package, consisting of the completed Enclosure 1 of this procedure and all supporting documentation, should be forwarded to the Nuclear Safety Supervisor for further evaluation.

NOTE: In the interim between trip and approval for recovery, the Nuclear Shift Supervisor may authorize the withdrawal of Safety Group 1 provided a 1% delta-k/k shutdown margin is maintained and rod withdrawal is not prohibited by any RPS "Action Statements" of Standard Technical Specifications.

4.5 SUBSEQUENT EVALUATION

4.5.1 Overview

4.5.1.1 Further evaluation of reactor trip events will be conducted to satisfy reporting requirements, to inform other utilities of our experience and lessons learned from the event, and to document observed plant response for future study and comparison.

4.5.1.2 For reactor trips, a site visit by Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) personnel should be requested under the Transient Assessment Program. This visit, arranged by the Nuclear Safety Supervisor through the B&W Resident Engineer, will assist Nuclear Safety Group personnel in investigating the event and in preparing an initial written assessment of the event. The site visit, when requested, should begin within twenty-four hours of the event or on the first normal working day following the event if it occurs on a weekend or holiday.

4.5.1.3 The following reports are prepared in the course of subsequent evaluation of a reactor trip:

- Nuclear Network Entry
- Licensee Event Report
- Unplanned Operating Event Report
- Transient Assessment Program Report

Preparation of each report is described below.

4.5.2 Nuclear Network Entry

A Nuclear Network Entry should be made covering the reactor trip event. The entry should be made within one working day of the event and may be prepared by any member of the Nuclear Safety Group. The entry should be a brief summary of the event, including contributing unusual pre-trip lineups, cause(s) of the event if known, and significant post-trip abnormalities. The entry should be placed on Nuclear Network in the Operating Plant Experiences (OE) topic if the event is of interest to the entire nuclear community or in the B&W Owners Group (BW) topic if the event is of interest only to other B&W designed plants. Any entry concerning the event must have Nuclear Plant Manager or Man On Call approval prior to placing it on the Nuclear Network.

4.5.3 Licensee Event Report (LER)

As required by 10CFR50.73, any unplanned actuation of the Reactor Protection System (i.e., reactor trip) must be reported in writing to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission within thirty days of the event. This report is prepared in accordance with CP-111, "Documenting, Reporting, and Reviewing Non-Conforming Operations Reports", and NUREG-1022, "Licensee Event Report System", and its supplements.

4.5.4 Unplanned Operating Event Report (UOER)

- 4.5.4.1 Upon receipt of the restart package for a reactor trip event, the Nuclear Safety Supervisor will assign a UOER number by year and numerical sequence (e.g., UOER 85-3 for the third event of 1985). He will then assign responsibility for preparation of the UOER to a member of the Nuclear Safety Group and deliver the package to that person.
- 4.5.4.2 The Nuclear Safety Group member assigned responsibility for preparation of the UOER will fully investigate the event. If deemed necessary, Corrective Action Assignments (CAAs) may be made in accordance with CP-125, "Corrective Action Procedure". In order to preclude duplication, all CAAs assigned should carry the designation of the Non-Conforming Operations Report (NCOR) associated with the event rather than the LER or UOER designation. When investigation is complete, the responsible member will prepare the UOER using guidance from the Babcock & Wilcox "Transient Assessment Program (TAP) Guidelines".
- 4.5.4.3 When the UOER is complete, it will be reviewed and approved by the Nuclear Safety Supervisor, Nuclear Safety and Reliability Superintendent, Nuclear Plant Technical Support Manager, and Nuclear Plant Manager.
- 4.5.4.4 Upon approval by the Nuclear Plant Manager, the UOER will be distributed per Enclosure 2, "UOER Distribution".

4.5.4.5 The UOER preparation process is summarized in Enclosure 3, "Unplanned Operating Event/Transient Assessment Report Flow Diagram".

4.5.5 Transient Assessment Program Report (TAP)

Following approval of a UOER by the Nuclear Plant Manager, it may be forwarded to the Babcock & Wilcox Resident Engineer for inclusion in the Babcock and Wilcox Owners Group Transient Assessment Program.

ENCLOSURES

- Enclosure 1 Post-Trip Review and Restart Justification
- Enclosure 2 UOER Distribution
- Enclosure 3 Unplanned Operating Event/Transient Assessment Report Flow Diagram

POST-TRIP REVIEW AND RESTART JUSTIFICATION

Shutdown Report Number: _____
 (From AI-500 Enclosure 11)
 Trip Date: _____ Trip Time: _____
 SSOD During Trip: _____ NO During Trip: _____
 SOTA During Trip: _____ ANO During Trip: _____
 MOC During Trip: _____

I. DATA COLLECTION

A. Gather the following information as appropriate or available:

Annunciator Events	___	Logs:	___	Shift Relief Checklist:
Computer Alarms	___	NSS	___	NSS
Recall Tapes	___	NO	___	NO
Post-Trip Review	___	Other	___	Other
Shutdown Report	___	OOS/Links	___	RC Inventory Tracking:
STI (if applicable)	___	Clearance	___	Level
Operator Interviews	___			Voids

B. Determine which actuation(s) occurred:

1. RPS First, each actuation/trip must be identified and CRD trip response determined. Each RPS cabinet should be checked for 1) all RPS actuations, and 2) CRD Breaker Open light which indicates proper CRD breaker and electronic trip response. Second, the actuation times must be determined. The Main Control Board will indicate "first out". All data sources should be examined for times in the following priority: A(nnunciator), R(ecall), C(omputer). Indicate the data source used for time in the Time column.

Data Sources:

Annunciator Printout (A) Computer Alarms Printout (C)
 Recall Tapes (R) RPS Cabinet (RC)

Trip Parameter	Channel A		Channel B		Channel C		Channel D	
	Y	N Time	Y	N Time	Y	N Time	Y	N Time
RCPPM	---	_____	---	_____	---	_____	---	_____
ϕ/Δϕ/Flow	---	_____	---	_____	---	_____	---	_____
Hi Press RB	---	_____	---	_____	---	_____	---	_____
High ϕ	---	_____	---	_____	---	_____	---	_____
Hi Press RCS	---	_____	---	_____	---	_____	---	_____
Lo Press RCS	---	_____	---	_____	---	_____	---	_____
Var Lo Press	---	_____	---	_____	---	_____	---	_____
High Thot	---	_____	---	_____	---	_____	---	_____
ART MFWP	---	_____	---	_____	---	_____	---	_____
ART Turbine	---	_____	---	_____	---	_____	---	_____
Manual	---	_____	---	_____	---	_____	---	_____
CRD Bkr Open	---	_____	---	_____	---	_____	---	_____

2. ES As above for RPS, all ES actuations/trips and times must be determined using the available data sources.

Data sources:

Annunciator Printout (A) Computer Alarms Printout (C)
Recall Tapes (R) ES Panel/Cabinets (E)

<u>Channel</u>	<u>Train A</u>	<u>Train B</u>
	<u>Y N Time</u>	<u>Y N Time</u>
HPI RC1	__	__
RC2	__	__
RC3	__	__
LPI RC4	__	__
RC5	__	__
RC6	__	__
RBIC RB1	__	__
RB2	__	__
RB3	__	__
BS RB4	__	__
RB5	__	__
RB6	__	__

3. Other ESFAS As above, examine the available data sources to determine if and when any of the following systems actuated:

<u>ESFAS</u>	<u>Y N Time</u>	<u>Comments</u>
Rad Mon	__	_____
EFIC EFW	__	_____
EFIC MSLI	__	_____
EFIC MFWI	__	_____
EFIC Ovrfill	__	_____
CFT	__	_____

4. Other As above, examine available data sources to determine if and when any of the following systems actuated:

<u>Main Turb Trip</u>	<u>Y N Time</u>	<u>Comments</u>
Low Vacuum	__	_____
Low Cont Oil	__	_____
Thrust Brg OP	__	_____
Solenoid	__	_____
Manual	__	_____
ICS Runback	__	_____
RCS Flow	__	_____
MFWP's Trip	__	_____
MFWBP's Trip	__	_____
Assym Rods	__	_____

II. PRE-TRIP/EVENT REVIEW

A. Major plant parameter/component status:

Mode	_____	Main Turbine-Generator	
Rx Power	_____ MWth	Mode	MAN/AUTO/ICS AUTO
RCP's on	A B C D	Output Breakers	OPEN/CLOSED
MFWP's on	A B	Generated MW	_____ MWe
MUP on	A B C		

B. ICS and other control station status:

H = Hand A = Automatic

	H	A	MFW	*A*		*B*		Pressurizer	H	A	
ULD	—	—	MFWP	—	—	—	—	Level	—	—	
S/G Rx Master	—	—	MBV	—	—	—	—	Spray	—	—	
Rx Demand	—	—	LLBV	—	—	—	—	Heater	—	—	
Rx Diamond	—	—	LLCV	—	—	—	—				
Delta T-Cold	—	—	SUBV	—	—	—	—	PORV	Open	Clos	Auto
TBV	—	—	SUCV	—	—	—	—	PORV Block	Open	Clos	
ADV	—	—						Spray Control	Open	Clos	Auto
								Spray Block	Open	Clos	

C. Maintenance or testing in progress:

D. Equipment Availability:

A = Available D = Degraded N = Not Available

1. Safety-Related equipment/component degraded or out of service:

	A	D	N	Comments
RPS	—	—	—	_____
ES	—	—	—	_____
EFIC	—	—	—	_____
Elec Pwr	—	—	—	_____
Other	—	—	—	_____

2. Important non-safety related equipment/component degraded/OOS:

	A	D	N	Comments
ICS	—	—	—	_____
Turbine	—	—	—	_____
Other	—	—	—	_____

B. POTENTIAL CAUSES

In the spaces below, list all potential causes and/or contributing factors leading to the reactor trip. When all potential causes are listed, determine what testing needs to be performed to prove or disprove each cause or contributing factor. From the results of this testing, determine the degree of involvement of each cause (i.e., whether each cause/contributing factor is a root cause, intermediate cause, immediate cause, or not involved in the trip). Finally, list any corrective actions deemed necessary to preclude similar events in the future.

Root Cause = (R) Intermediate Cause = (IN)
 Immediate Cause = (IM) Not Involved = (N)

	<u>Cause or Contributing Factor</u>	<u>Test of Possible Cause</u>	<u>Degree Involved</u>	<u>Necessary Corrective Action</u>
1.	_____	_____	_____	_____
	_____	_____	_____	_____
	_____	_____	_____	_____
2.	_____	_____	_____	_____
	_____	_____	_____	_____
	_____	_____	_____	_____
3.	_____	_____	_____	_____
	_____	_____	_____	_____
	_____	_____	_____	_____
4.	_____	_____	_____	_____
	_____	_____	_____	_____
	_____	_____	_____	_____
5.	_____	_____	_____	_____
	_____	_____	_____	_____
	_____	_____	_____	_____
6.	_____	_____	_____	_____
	_____	_____	_____	_____
	_____	_____	_____	_____

Root Cause = underlying condition or factor which when corrected minimizes the probability of recurrence of the event or similar events.

Intermediate Cause = condition or factor which led from a root cause to an immediate cause.

Immediate Cause = condition or factor which directly led to the event.

NOTE: Refer to NUREG-1022 Supplement 2, Pages 8 through 11, for examples of the above definitions.

IV. AUTOMATIC SYSTEM CHALLENGES AND PLANT RESPONSE

A. SAFETY SYSTEM CHALLENGES AND RESPONSE

Using the data sources available, determine the maximum values, minimum values, and minimum margins that occurred throughout the event. Compare these values to the actuation setpoints, determine if the safety systems were challenged, and using the prior recorded actuations determine if the expected response was achieved.

Parameter	Value			Recall Pts (Note 1)	Setpoints RPS ES EFIC	Chall- Enged		Expected Response	
	Max	Min	Marq			Y	N	Y	N
RCPPM				129-132	2 Off				
$\phi/\Delta\phi$ /Flow (Note 2)				0-3, 31, 32 58-61	STS Figure 2.2.1				
Hi Press RB				82, 83	4 psig				
High Flux				0-3	104.9% or 79.92%				
High Press				4-6	2300 psig				
Low Press				4-6	1800 1500/500				
Var Lo Pres (Note 3)				6, 14, 15	(11.59 x Thot) - 5037.8 psig				
High Thot				14, 15	618 F				
ART MFWP				--	2 Off at >20%				
ART Turbine				170	Trip at >20%				
OTSG Press				104, 105	600 psig				
OTSG Level				90, 91	6 inches				

NOTE 1: The following Recall points can be put into User-Defined Groups 0 for ease in data collection:
Points 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 14, 15, and 170.
Points 82, 83, 90, 91, 104, 105, 129, 130, 131, and 132.
Points 31, 32, 58, 59, 60, and 61 (if $O/\Delta O$ /Flow plot is needed).

NOTE 2: If no loss of RCS flow occurs, this parameter may be checked by selecting the highest power and the largest (in absolute value) imbalance and comparing this point to STS Figure 2.2.1. If this point of maximum power and maximum imbalance lies within the region for acceptable operation, the margin may be noted as "Satisfactory". If the point of maximum power and maximum imbalance lies outside the region for acceptable operation, then a plot of power versus imbalance is required. If a loss of RCS flow occurs without a $O/\Delta O$ /Flow trip, then a plot of power, RCS flow, and imbalance is required.

NOTE 3: This parameter may be checked by visual inspection of the SPDS Post-Trip Display. If the trace did not cross the variable low pressure trip line, the margin may be noted as "Satisfactory". If the trace crossed the variable low pressure trip line, or if the SPDS Post-Trip Display was not available for visual inspection, then a plot of variable low pressure is required.

B. PLANT RESPONSE

1. Reactivity Control

a. Control Rods:

RPS - Determined above in IV.A.: SAT _____ UNSAT _____

b. Boration:

Source	Used		Flow Rate	Length Of Time	Amount	Required for Reactivity Control	
	Y	N				Y	N
BWST	___	___	_____	_____	_____	___	___
CBAST	___	___	_____	_____	_____	___	___

c. 1% Shutdown Margin:

Was 1% shutdown margin achieved and maintained? YES NO
If "NO", explain below.

2. Thermal Control

a. Core Heat Removal Mode:

Method	Y	N	Comments
OTSG with RCPs	___	___	_____
OTSG w/o RCPs	___	___	_____
HPI	___	___	Flow Rate _____ Amount _____ Temp _____
LPI	___	___	Flow Rate _____ Amount _____ Temp _____
Core Flood	___	___	Amount _____

b. Major parameters:

<u>Parameter</u>	<u>Min</u>	<u>Max</u>	<u>Limit or Setpoint</u>	<u>Comments</u>
RCS Pressure	—	—	2500 1500 500 psig	PORV Opened Y N Safties Opened Y N
RCS Temp	—	—		
RCS Cooldown		—	100 F/Hour if T _{cold} < 500 F	PTS Concerns if T _{cold} < 500F
Pzr Level	—	—	2nd MUP or HPI	Used: MUV-23 24 25 26 MUP-1A 1B 1C
RCS P/T Subcooled Post-Trip	—	—	50/20 F Per SPDS Display	
OTSG Pressure "A"	—	—	1010 600 1050 psig 1070 psig 1090 psig 1100 psig	Open ADV Y N Reseat ADV Y N Open MSV 33 34 Reseat MSV 33 34 Open MSV 37 38 Reseat MSV 37 38 Open MSV 42 43 Reseat MSV 42 43 Open MSV 40 46 Reseat MSV 40 46
"B"	—	—	1010 600 1050 psig 1070 psig 1090 psig 1100 psig	Open ADV Y N Reseat ADV Y N Open MSV 35 36 Reseat MSV 35 36 Open MSV 39 41 Reseat MSV 39 41 Open MSV 44 45 Reseat MSV 44 45 Open MSV 47 48 Reseat MSV 47 48
OTSG Level "A"	—	—	35° 98%	EFIC EFW Y N Flow: A1 _____ gpm A2 _____ gpm
"B"	—	—	35° 98%	EFIC EFW Y N Flow: B1 _____ gpm B2 _____ gpm

3. Radioactive Inventory Control

<u>System</u>		<u>Alarm</u>		<u>Comments</u>
		<u>Y</u>	<u>N</u>	
Main	RM-A12	--	--	
Steam	RM-G's	--	--	
SW	RM-L3	--	--	
DC	RM-L5	--	--	
	RM-L6	--	--	
Reactor	RM-A1	--	--	
Bldg	RM-A6	--	--	
	RM-G's	--	--	
	Sump	--	--	
RCS	RM-L1	--	--	
	RCDT	--	--	
Aux	RM-A2	--	--	
Bldg	RM-A3	--	--	
	RM-A4	--	--	
	RM-A11	--	--	
	RM-L2	--	--	
	MWST	--	--	
Control	RM-A5	--	--	
Complex	RM-A14	--	--	
	RM-G1	--	--	

3. Equipment Availability

List any equipment that did not perform as expected. Include any Work Request or NCOR numbers in the Corrective Action column. Place a check in the appropriate column to indicate whether completion of the Corrective Action is required before restart or whether the Corrective Action may be completed after restart. Any Corrective Actions marked as required before restart must be completed before restart is authorized.

<u>Number</u>	<u>Malfunction</u>	<u>Proposed Corrective Action</u>	<u>Action Taken Before/After Restart</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

V. SUMMARY

In the space below provide a brief narrative summary of the event. Include as a minimum all significant abnormal pre-trip lineups, discussion of the cause or causes of the trip, and significant post-trip abnormalities.

VI. RESTART REVIEW AND APPROVAL

A. Post-Trip Review completed:

SOTA Date

B. Restart recommended:

PRC Chairman Date Meeting #

C. Restart authorized:

NPM/MOC Date

D. Reviewed prior to restart:

SSOD Date

UOER DISTRIBUTION

- o Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- o Director, Nuclear Operations Engineering & Licensing
- o Nuclear Plant Manager
- o Nuclear Operations Manager
- o Nuclear Operations Superintendent
- o Nuclear Maintenance Superintendent
- o Nuclear Chemistry/Radiation Protection Superintendent
- o Nuclear Plant Technical Support Manager
- o Nuclear Engineering Superintendent
- o Nuclear Safety & Reliability Superintendent
- o Chairman, Nuclear General Review Committee
- o Nuclear Operations Training Manager
- o Plant Quality Files
- o Manager Site Nuclear Licensing
- o Manager Nuclear Licensing

UNPLANNED OPERATING EVENT/TRANSIENT ASSESSMENT REPORT
FLOW DIAGRAM

