

LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY

SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION
P.O. BOX 618, NORTH COUNTRY ROAD • WADING RIVER, N.Y. 11792

JOHN D. LEONARD, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT - NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

MAY 22 1986

SNRC-1262

Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Fire Protection
Shoreham Nuclear Power Station - Unit 1
Docket No. 50-322

Reference:

- LILCO letter SNRC-1222 (J.D. Leonard, Jr.) to NRC (Mr. Harold Denton) dated Jan. 16, 1986
- NRC letter (W.R. Butler) to LILCO (J.D. Leonard, Jr.) dated April 29, 1986

Dear Mr. Denton:

As stated in the reference 2 letter, the NRC staff has carefully considered our proposal for addressing spurious Automatic Depressurization System operation during an intense control room fire and determined that this method of operation does not meet their criteria. In the interest of resolving this open item, LILCO proposes to revise station procedure 29.022.01 "Shutdown From Outside the Control Room" as suggested by the NRC Staff during conversations on this matter; i.e., to instruct operations personnel to electrically disable eight safety relief valves (seven ADS and one non-ADS valve) as one of the first actions to be taken when leaving the control room due to a severe fire. As you are aware, three other relief valves will be available for operation from the remote shutdown panel utilizing separate electrical circuitry. LILCO requests that the staff confirm our interpretation that for a postulated severe fire in the control room our new proposal is acceptable to resolve the open item described in the second paragraph on page 2 of the reference 2 letter. It is my understanding your staff advised LILCO that several other licensees are using this procedure in accordance with staff guidance.

B605270248 B60522 PDR ADDCK 05000322 PDR ADDCK 05000322 A006



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Paragraph three on page 2 of the reference 2 letter describes a second open item requiring resolution prior to issuance of the full power license. To resolve this item, LILCO commits to deenergize the motor operators of these valves (1E11*MOV81A, B and 1E21*MOV81A, B) at all times other than during surveillance testing of the check valves. It is my understanding that this proposed action will resolve the staff's concern. Your acceptance of this proposal in writing would be appreciated.

The last paragraph on page 2 of the reference 2 letter indicates that the staff found Attachment 1 to SNRC-1222 to be confusing in setting forth the location of permissives for high/low pressure interlocks. Attachment 1 to SNRC-1222 was developed to provide information in response to a staff question concerning the location of permissives and interlocks specifically associated with the main steam isolation valves (1B21*AOV081A-D and 1B21*AOV082A-D) and the scram discharge volume vent and drain valves. This staff question is listed as question number two on page two of LILCO letter SNRC-1222 and specifically pertains to interlocks in the Reactor Protection System as they apply to these two sets of valves. LILCO will provide the additional information requested in a separate submittal.

Sincerely,

John D. Leonard, Jr.

Vice President - Nuclear Operations

GJG/cf

cc: J. A. Berry