




**LOUISIANA**  
POWER & LIGHT

WATERFORD 3 SES • P.O. BOX 8 • KILLONA, LA 70066-0751



May 12, 1986

W3A86-0047  
A4.05  
QA

Mr. Robert D. Martin  
Regional Administrator, Region IV  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000  
Arlington, TX 76011

Subject: Waterford 3 SES  
Docket No. 50-382  
License No. NPF-38  
Reporting of Special Report

Dear Mr. Martin:

Attached is Special Report Number SR-86-002-00 for the Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3. This Special Report is submitted per Technical Specification 6.9.2.

Very truly yours,

*R.P. Barkhurst*  
R.P. Barkhurst  
Plant Manager - Nuclear

RPB/LWL/wp

Attachment

cc: NRC Document Control Desk  
NRC, Director, Office of I&E  
G.W. Knighton, NRC-NRR  
J.H. Wilson, NRC-NRR  
NRC Resident Inspectors Office  
INPO Records Center (J.T. Wheelock)  
B.W. Churchill  
W.M. Stevenson

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SPECIAL REPORT

SR-86-002-00

Velocity Probe Failure Rendered Wide Range Gas Monitor  
Inoperable Greater than Seven Days

INTRODUCTION

At approximately 0800 hours on April 23, 1986 Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3 was operating at 100% reactor power when operations personnel declared Wide Range Gas Monitor (WRGM), PRM-IR-0110, inoperable due to a defective sample velocity probe. In accordance with Technical Specification 3.3.3.1 Action 27, Health Physics established the preplanned alternate method of monitoring plant stack emissions as defined in procedure EP-2-050, "Off-Site Dose Assessment (Manual)".

Since the monitor could not be replaced within seven days, this report is being submitted pursuant to Technical Specification 3.3.3.1 Action 27 and 6.9.2.

NARRATIVE

At approximately 0800 hours on April 23, 1986 Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3 was operating at 100% reactor power when operations personnel declared the Wide Range Gas Monitor (WRGM), PRM-IR-0110, inoperable due to a defective sample velocity probe. As a result, the auxiliary sample pump used for the middle and high range detector flow path did not appropriately energize, rendering the monitor inoperable. In accordance with Technical Specification 3.3.3.1 Action 27, Health Physics established the preplanned alternate method of monitoring plant stack emissions as defined in procedure EP-2-050, "Off-Site Dose Assessment (Manual)".

The failure was due to a broken resistance wire located within the probe. Since the probe is exposed to the flow stream, small vibrations are induced in the probe resulting in a fatigue failure of the wire. A replacement probe could not be calibrated; therefore, a new probe was ordered from the manufacturer (General Atomic). Since the replacement probe could not be obtained before the end of the seven day limit (April 30, 1986), as defined in Technical Specification 3.3.3.1 Action 27, this Special Report is submitted pursuant to Specification 6.9.2.

Since Health Physics personnel had an alternate method for monitoring plant stack emissions, and since the low range detector was operable, the inoperability of the wide range monitor did not pose a safety concern.

Upon receipt, maintenance personnel calibrated and replaced the probe. Operations personnel placed the Wide Range Gas Monitor in an operable status at 1742 hours on May 2, 1986. To assure a reliable supply, plant personnel have increased the maximum/minimum reorder levels of the subject probes.

#### PLANT CONTACT

T. Smith, Maintenance Superintendent, 504/464-3138