



GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY

RIVER BEND STATION POST OFFICE BOX 220 ST. FRANCISVILLE, LOUISIANA 70775
AREA CODE 504 635-9094 346-8651

October 14, 1988
RBG- 29030
File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.4

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

River Bend Station - Unit 1
Docket No. 50-458

Enclosed is Gulf States Utilities Company's Special Report concerning an invalid failure of the division III diesel generator, during a surveillance test on September 20, 1988. This report is being submitted pursuant to River Bend Station Technical Specifications 4.8.1.1.3 and 6.9.2.

Sincerely,

J. E. Booker

J. E. Booker
Manager-River Bend Oversight
River Bend Nuclear Group

JEB
JEB/TFP/PDG/AHM/ch
PK

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region IV
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
Arlington, TX 76011

NRC Resident Inspector
P.O. Box 1051
St. Francisville, LA 70775

8810260269 881014
PDR ADDCK 05000458
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SPECIAL REPORT

At approximately 0110 on 9/20/88 an invalid failure of the division III High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) diesel generator (DG) 1E22*EGS001 occurred during the performance of surveillance test procedure (STP)-309-0203, "Div. III DG Operability Test". After the DG had been started in accordance with the STP and prior to loading the DG, the "Output Synch Switch" was found not to be in the position required for the STP. This prevented the DG from being synchronized with offsite power. In accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.108, the following information is provided.

INVESTIGATION

In accordance with STP 309-0203, the HPCS DG was started at approximately 0106 using a remote start signal from the main control room. Incoming voltage never increased and it was noted that the E22*ACB01 output breaker synchronization switch in the main control room had not been placed in the "GEN/BUS" position. The synchronization switch must be placed in the "GEN/BUS" position in order to allow the DG output to be synchronized with offsite power and allow the DG to be manually loaded. Step 7.4.1 in STP-309-0203 requires proper positioning of the "output synch switch" prior to starting the DG.

When this switch mispositioning was noted by the operators, the STP was terminated and the DG was manually shutdown. The control room operator and diesel room operator reviewed the event with the shift supervisor and the control operating foreman. In accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.108 Position C.2.e.(2), this failure is classified as invalid since it was the result of operator error in performing the steps in the STP and would not have prevented the D/G from performing its normal safety related function.

The HPCS DG was restarted at 0223 and the surveillance test was successfully completed.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The control room and local DG operators were both counselled on inattentiveness in performing procedural steps. Additionally, the operations department will inform all operating crews of this incident via required reading of this special report. Corrective actions will be completed by December 15, 1988.

A special report concerning an "operator error" in synchronizing and loading the HPCS DG on 9/6/88 at 0647 was recently submitted, see RBG-28985 dated October 10, 1988. The error as described in the previous report was in setting the "Speed Droop" on the DG governor. Both of these errors are being reviewed by operations shift personnel in the operations department to assure attentiveness in following procedural steps in the future.

Diesel Out of Service: 1 hour 23 min.

Current Surveillance Interval: Div. I Monthly
Div. II Monthly
Div. III Monthly

Test Interval Conforms to Tech Spec: Yes

Failures for Div. I: 0 valid failures in last 20 valid tests
3 valid failures in last 100 valid tests

Failures for Div. II: 1 valid failures in last 20 valid tests
4 valid failures in all 72 valid tests performed

Failures for Div. III: 0 valid failures in last 20 valid tests
0 valid failures in all 67 valid tests performed