

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-373/88007(DRS); 50-374/88007(DRS)

Docket Nos. 50-373; 50-374

Licenses No. NPF-11; NPF-18

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company
Post Office Box 767
Chicago, IL 60690

Facility Name: LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2

Inspection At: LaSalle Site, Marseilles, Illinois

Inspection Conducted: March 16, 18, 23-24, 29-30, April 20, May 13, and
June 3, 1988

Inspector: *K. D. Ward*
K. D. Ward

6/13/88
Date

Approved By: *D. H. Danielson*
D. H. Danielson, Chief
Materials and Processes
Section

6/13/88
Date

Inspection Summary:

Inspection on March 16, 18, 23-24, 29-30, April 20, May 13, and June 3, 1988
(Reports No. 50-373/88007(DRS); No. 50-374/88007(DRS))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of inservice inspection (ISI) activities including review of programs (73051), procedures (73052), observation of work activities (73753), and data review (73755); of actions on Information Notice No. 88-03 (90717); and of a modification/replacement (37701).

Results: No violations or deviations were identified.

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Commonwealth Edison Company (CECo)

- *G. Diederich, Station Manager
- *D. Brown, QA Superintendent
- *W. Huntington, Services Superintendent
- *R. Clark, QC Supervisor
- *T. Hammerich, Regulatory Assurance
- *M. Oclon, QC, ISI
- J. Zappia, Project Engineer

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

- *R. Lansbury, Senior Resident Inspector
- R. Kopriva, Resident Inspector

General Electric Company (GE)

- M. Heath, Site Supervisor, Level III

Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company (HSB)

- K. Kim, ANII

The inspector also contacted and interviewed other licensee and contractor employees.

*Denotes those present at the exit interview June 3, 1988.

2. Licensee Action on Information Notice

(Closed) Information Notice (373/88900-01; 374/88900-01). Information Notice No. 88-03: Cracks in shroud support access hole cover welds. CECo and GE determined that the plates were seal welded to the shroud plate so that no crevices were exposed to the reactor vessel coolant; therefore no inspections are required.

3. Inservice Inspection (ISI), Unit 1

a. General

- (1) This was the second outage of the first period of the first ten-year plan.
- (2) GE performed the ISI in accordance with ASME Section XI, 1980 Edition, Winter 1980 Addenda. The Level II and III UT personnel performing UT were qualified for detection and discrimination

of intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) by Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) after September 10, 1985. All manual UT was performed by GE using the pulse-echo UT flaw detection instruments and various angles and MHZ transducers. Also on many welds the GE Smart ultrasonic system was used. The sampling inspection plan for addressing IGSCC concerns included 30 previously examined welds, 13 welds that were not examined previously and two welds with known IGSCC indications that were found during the first outage and still require no repair. No new IGSCC was identified during this outage. The licensee's sampling plan for addressing IGSCC concerns was in accordance with Generic Letter 84-11 and all welds were found to be acceptable. Generic Letter 88-01 "NRC Position on IGSCC in BWR Austenitic Stainless Steel Piping," was sent to all licensees of BWRs and holders of construction permits for BWRs on January 25, 1988. NRR agreed with the licensee's position that the ISI program for austenitic stainless steel piping covered under the scope of Generic Letter 88-01 would be implemented at the next refueling outage.

(3) During this outage the Mechanical Stress Improvement Process (MSIP) was applied to 30 welds.

b. Program and Procedures

The NRC inspector reviewed the ISI program and procedures and found them to be acceptable. The licensee did not make a request for relief from the ASME Code this outage.

c. Review of Material, Equipment and Personnel Certifications, Audits and Data

The NRC inspector reviewed the documents relating to the following:

- Data reports.
- Ultrasonic instruments, calibration blocks, transducers and UT couplant certifications.
- Magnetic particle material, and equipment certifications.
- Liquid penetrant material certifications.
- NDE personnel certifications in accordance with SNT-TC-1A.
- Audits/Surveillances.

d. Observation of Work Activities

The NRC inspector observed work and had discussions with personnel during the ISI activities. These observations included the following:

- (1) GE personnel performing ultrasonic examinations with the GE Ultra Image III pulse-echo ultrasonic data acquisition equipment.
- (2) Magnetic particle examination of the following welds on the RHR system: Welds No. 7, No. 13, No. 16, No. 30, No. 31, No. 34, No. 35, No. 39, No. 45, No. 47, and No. 51.
- (3) Liquid penetrant examination of Weld No. 62 on the High Pressure Core Spray system.
- (4) Ultrasonic examination of the following welds on the RHR system: Welds No. 30, No. 31, No. 34, No. 35, No. 39, No. 45, No. 47, and No. 51 and the reactor vessel head penetration weld.
- (5) Visual examination of Jet Pump No. 3. The instrumentation records for Jet Pump No. 3 indicated that the pump was unable to come up to the proper flow. During visual examination of the jet pump, it was found that the disk spacer from gate valve 67-A was lodged in the jet pump; however, it did not do any damage. The loose pump discharge valve spacer disk was removed. The gate valve was repaired and reinstalled. The jet pump was found to be acceptable by visual examination both inside and out. The system is now operable.
- (6) Visual examination of a 1½" diameter boat sample removed from the reactor vessel skirt weld (54' 4" diameter, 4½" wide and 2.5" thick). During the magnetic particle examination of the skirt weld, two linear indications were detected. They were also ultrasonic examined by GE and CECO and were determined to be (a) axial, 1.6" long, 1.5" deep, and (b) circumferential, .8" long, .3" deep. A boat sample was taken in the axial indication to try to determine the cause of the "crack-like" indication. The area where the boat sample was removed was liquid penetrant examined and found to be clear of indications. This area was then repaired. The circumferential indication was removed by blending. Both indications were remagnetic particle examined and found to be acceptable.

No violations or deviations were identified.

4. Modifications

a. Reactor Vessel Water Level Instrumentation System (RVWLIS) Modification

This modification consisted of installing two new reference legs with condensing chambers and restricting orifices inside the drywell for those level instruments that will be used by the operator to monitor the reactor vessel water level in the post-accident environment.

This modification was performed in accordance with ASME Section III, 1974 Edition, with no addenda, and the tie ends were performed in accordance with ASME Section IX, 1980 Edition, Winter 1980 Addenda. The NRC inspector reviewed NDE and welding reports and other related NDE and welding documents; also observed fitting, welding, and various stages of installation.

No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Exit Meeting

The inspector met with site representatives (denoted in Persons Contacted paragraph) at the conclusion of the inspection. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection noted in this report. The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents/processes as proprietary.