

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT UNIT 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 0 6	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 3
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TITLE (4) **Failure to Perform Airlock Seal Test Within The Required Time Period as a Result of Personnel Error**

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 9	2 1	8 8	8 8	0 0 1	0 0 1	0 2	2 2	8 8			0 5 0 0 0
THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11):											

OPERATING MODE (9) N	20.402(k)	20.406(e)	80.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10) 11 0 1 0	20.406(a)(1)(iii)	80.73(a)(1)	80.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(c)
	20.406(a)(1)(iii)	80.73(a)(2)	80.73(a)(2)(iv)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)
	20.406(a)(1)(iii)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(i)	80.73(a)(2)(iv)(i)(A)	
	20.406(a)(1)(iii)	80.73(a)(2)(iv)	80.73(a)(2)(iv)(i)(B)	
	20.406(a)(1)(iii)	80.73(a)(2)(iii)	80.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Arne A Hunstad, Staff Engineer	TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 6 1 2 3 8 8 - 1 1 2 1
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

<input type="checkbox"/> YES (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15) MONTH DAY YEAR
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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On September 20, 1988, a Unit 2 containment entry was made to perform the monthly containment inspection. Normally, entry is made only through the maintenance airlock, but due to problems with access to the personnel airlock, which is normally unlocked during containment entries, the personnel airlock was also utilized for containment entry. On September 21, 1988, a review of the containment entry logs for containment entries within the two previous days, identified the September 20, 1988 containment entry through the maintenance airlock, but overlooked the log entry for the personnel airlock entry on September 20, 1988. Consequently, the personnel airlock door seal test was not performed within three days of the entry. This was a violation of Technical Specification 4.4.A.2, which requires that each airlock be tested every 3 days if it is in use.

On September 25, 1988, a Shift Supervisor, reviewing the Containment Entry Logs and the Airlock Door Seal Test Results Logs, noted that the personnel airlock seal test had not been performed as required. The personnel airlock seal test was performed on September 26, 1988 with satisfactory results.

Copies of this report will be distributed to the individuals involved, and the operations staff, to emphasize the importance of adequately reviewing the containment entry logs during the performance of the airlock test procedure.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
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TEXT: If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A (1) (7)

CAUSE OF THE EVENT

This event was the result of an oversight by the reactor operator and Shift Supervisor on September 21, 1988 in reviewing the Personnel Airlock Containment Entry Log for containment entries through the personnel airlock since September 19, 1988. This is evidenced by the written comments of the reactor operator in the Personnel Airlock Door Seal Test Result Log on September 21, 1988 that no entries had been made.

A contributing factor to the event was the status of the personnel shield building double doors which indirectly led to a containment entry through the personnel airlock during the monthly containment inspection. This in conjunction with the practice of normally only using the maintenance airlock during the monthly containment inspection may have contributed to the oversight of the personnel airlock entry.

ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT

This event resulted in a violation of Technical Specification Section 4.4.A.2 and as a result is reportable under 10 CFR Part 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

The personnel airlock door seals were successfully tested on September 26, 1988 and there is no evidence to suggest that the personnel airlock door seals would not have fulfilled their design function at any time during this event. Therefore, this event had no impact on the health and safety of the public.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The personnel airlock door seal test was successfully performed on September 26, 1988.

The failure to perform the personnel airlock door seal test was due to an oversight in reviewing the containment entry logs. Review of the event has shown it to be an isolated case and has not identified any programmatic deficiencies and as such no procedural changes are anticipated. However, copies of this report will be distributed to the individuals involved, and the operations staff, to emphasize the importance of adequately reviewing the containment entry logs during the performance of the personnel and maintenance airlock test procedure.

The shield building doors will be repaired or modified to eliminate the need to use the annulus for access to the personnel airlock, thus reducing the probability of its being used for containment entry during the monthly containment inspections.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

The only instances of overdue surveillances in the last five years were the result of scheduling errors and were reported by Unit 1 RE 87-012 and Unit 2 RE 85-003. Compliance with the surveillance program at Prairie Island has been very good.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 368A (1-82))

EVENT DESCRIPTION

On September 20, 1988, Unit 2 was at 100% power. At 1330, an entry was made into the Unit 2 containment to perform the monthly at power containment inspection per surveillance procedure SP-2544, "Containment at Power Inspection - Unit II". Normally, entry into the containment for the performance of SP-2544 is made only through the maintenance airlock (EIS Identifier AL) and as a personnel safety measure the personnel airlock (EIS Identifier AL) is unlocked to provide two exits from the containment in case of emergency. Unlocking the personnel airlock is normally accomplished by entering through the personnel shield building double doors to gain access to the containment personnel airlock. However, at the time of the entry on September 20, 1988, the personnel shield building double doors were locked from the annulus side due to a malfunctioning door interlock. This meant that the containment personnel airlock could only be accessed from the maintenance airlock via a pathway through the annulus between the containment and shield building. After unlocking the containment personnel airlock, containment entry was made via the personnel airlock rather than returning to the maintenance airlock through the annulus. Following completion of the containment inspection, the containment was exited via the maintenance airlock. The personnel airlock was then re-locked via the annulus pathway from the maintenance airlock. All containment entries were properly logged in the Maintenance Airlock Containment Entry Log and the Personnel Airlock Containment Entry Log.

Technical Specification 4.4.A.2 requires that when containment system integrity is required, each airlock shall be tested every 3 days if it is in use, by pressurizing the intergasket space to 10 psig. Surveillance procedure SP-2132, "Personnel and Maintenance Airlock Test Procedure - Unit 2", is utilized to ensure that when containment system integrity is required, the personnel and maintenance airlock door seals are leak tested within three days if the airlock was opened. Every Monday, Wednesday and Friday the Maintenance Airlock Containment Entry Log and Personnel Airlock Containment Entry Log are reviewed to identify any containment entries made since the last door seal test. If there has been a containment entry since the last door seal test on the airlock(s) used for entry (either maintenance or personnel), a leak test is performed on the door seals of the airlock(s) used for entry.

On September 21, 1988, a review of the containment entry logs for containment entries within the two previous days, identified the September 20, 1988 containment entry through the maintenance airlock, but overlooked the log entry for the personnel airlock entry on September 20, 1988. Consequently, the maintenance airlock seal test was performed on September 21, 1988 as required, but the personnel airlock seal test was not.

At 2330 on September 25, 1988, a Shift Supervisor, reviewing the Personnel Airlock Containment Entry Log and the Personnel Airlock Door Seal Test Results Log (required by SF-2132), noted that the personnel airlock seal test had not been performed on September 21, 1988 as required. The personnel airlock seal test was performed at 0019 on September 26, 1988 with satisfactory results.



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October 21, 1988

10 CFR Part 50
Section 50.73

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
Docket Nos. 50-282 License Nos. EPR-42
50-306 DPR-60

Failure to Perform Airlock Seal Test Within the Required
Time Period as a Result of Personnel Error

The Licensee Event Report for this occurrence is attached.

Please contact us if you require additional information related to this event.

Eugene Eckhardt

for David Musolf
Manager - Nuclear Support Services

c: Regional Administrator- III, NRC
NRR Project Manager, NRC
Sr Resident Inspector, NRC
MPCA
Attn: Dr F W Ferman

Attachment

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