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OCT 21 1988

Docket No. 50-265
License No. DPR-30
EA 88-217

Commonwealth Edison Company
ATTN: Mr. Cordell Reed
Senior Vice President
Post Office Box 767
Chicago, Illinois 60690

Gentlemen:

SUBJECT: NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NRC INSPECTION REPORTS NO. 50-254/88015[DRP]
AND NO. 50-265/88015[DRP])

This refers to the inspection conducted during the period June 5 through August 6, 1988, at the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Cordova, Illinois. The inspection included a review of a licensee identified event where the automatic transfer function of a Motor Control Center (MCC) failed during modification testing. An enforcement conference was held in the Region III Office on August 26, 1988 to discuss the event, its causes, and corrective actions.

On June 22, 1988, during a modification test Quad Cities personnel discovered that MCC 28/29-5 would not automatically transfer from the Bus 29 feed to the Bus 28 feed. Licensee investigation of the event showed that a wire was not landed according to the approved electrical drawing. It appears that the wiring problem has existed since initial installation prior to 1971. Although testing of the automatic transfer circuit has been routinely conducted, these tests were inadequate and did not completely test the automatic transfer circuit.

The NRC considers the event significant; the automatic transfer function of MCC 28/29-5 is needed in the event of a large break Loss of Cooling Accident (LOCA) concurrent with a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) and a failure of the Unit 2 Diesel Generator. Had the above situation occurred, MCC 28/29-5 would not have been available to supply power to the RHR injection valves. This is in contrast to the Quad Cities Final Safety Analysis Report Section 8.2.3.1.

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that states that the breakers feeding 480 volt motor control center 28/29-5 from 480 volt Bus 29 will open automatically and the breaker feeding 480 volt motor control center 28/29-5 from 480 volt Bus 28 will close automatically to supply motor control center 28/29-5 from DG 1/2 should DG 2 fail during a loss of offsite power. Therefore, based on these considerations, the staff has determined that this is a violation of the requirements in Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.A.3 - that the LPCI mode of the RHR system be operable - in that the LPCI injection valves for both recirculation loops would not have opened, preventing LPCI from injecting, and the recirculation pump suction and discharge valves in both recirculation loops would have been prevented from shutting. In addition, the only available low pressure core cooling supply would have been a single core spray pump. The staff recognizes that this equipment failure would have been evident in the control room and operator actions from the control room could have corrected the problem.

In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1988), the violation described in the enclosed Notice has been classified at a Severity Level III. A civil penalty is considered for a Severity Level III violation. However, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement and the Deputy Executive Director for Regional Operations, I have decided that a civil penalty will not be imposed in this case because you identified the problem and promptly reported it to the NRC and because your extensive corrective actions to prevent recurrence, and good prior performance in the area of concern offset the added significance of this violation due to the duration. NRC acknowledges that your new modification program which requires comprehensive testing of components was the primary factor in identifying this event. It is the policy of the NRC to encourage this type of comprehensive corrective action in identifying and responding to events of this type.

You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. In your response, you should document the specific actions taken and any additional actions you plan to prevent recurrence. After reviewing your response to this Notice, including your proposed corrective actions and the results of future inspections, the NRC will determine whether further NRC enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with NRC regulatory requirements.

In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice" Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

OCT 21 1988

The [redacted] directed by this letter and the accompanying Notice are not subject to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, PL 96-511.

Sincerely,

Original signed by
A. Bert Davis

A. Bert Davis
Regional Administrator

Enclosures:

- 1. Notice of Violation
- 2. Inspection Reports
 - No. 50-254/88015[DRP];
 - No. 50-265/88015[DRP]

cc w/enclosures:

- H. Bliss, Nuclear Licensing Manager
- R. L. Bax, Plant Manager
- DCD/DCB (RIDS)
- Licensing Fee Management Branch
- Resident Inspector, RIII
- Richard Hubbard
- J. W. McCaffrey, Chief, Public Utilities Division

FER FAX DATED 10/20/88

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Commonwealth Edison Company

OCT 21 1983

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