

**Florida  
Power**  
CORPORATION

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September 26, 1988  
3F0988-19

Dr. J. Nelson Grace  
Regional Administrator, Region II  
101 Marietta Street, N.W., Suite 2900  
Atlanta, GA 30323

Subject: Crystal River Unit 3  
Docket No. 50-302  
Operating License No. DPR-72  
Reactor Building Purge - Supplemental Information

Dear Sir:

After discussion with Regional and Headquarter's staff the following supplemental information appears to be warranted:

VALVE CONTROL LOCATIONS

The LRV (Outlet) Flowpath is controlled from the main control room in the same board location as the relavent indicators. Thus the dedicated operator does not need to communicate with others to perform his functions and is not at risk during postulated accidents. Redundant valves, capable of closing against accident pressure are utilized.

The SAV (Inlet) Flowpath is from a system which normally operates at higher than accident pressure. Thus, even though containment integrity will not be assured by closed valves no releases will occur. These valves are manual valves operated by a second dedicated operator from accessible areas in the Intermediate Building.

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SAFETY ASSESSMENT

The original analysis for CR-3 postulated the 60 second closure of 48 inch diameter main purge valves. Release from the LRV's are through the same flowpath and filters. The quantity of release is therefore much less even if operator action is not immediate. Again there would be no release from the SAV path.

ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED

The leakage assessment must occur with the primary and secondary systems at or near normal temperature and pressure and should be accomplished in their current conditions. To shut the plant down to MODE 5 where purge is allowed and reheat to appropriate conditions at the beginning or end of the outage will unnecessarily cycle the plant, could induce more or different leakage paths and would extend the outage. Entry without purging will result in both internal and external exposures.

FPC has concluded that our commitment to ALARA dose control obligates us to seek such relief. The cost benefit appears to significantly support the relief. The attachments reflect the effectiveness in RB Cleanup for various flowrates and durations.

Your prompt consideration of this matter is greatly appreciated. If we can provide further information please call this office.



Kenneth R. Wilson, Manager  
Nuclear Licensing

KRW:wla

Attachments

xc: Document Control Desk  
Senior Resident Inspector

# REACTOR BUILDING CLEAN-UP FACTORS




TABLE 1

FLOW RATE	250 CFM	500 CFM	750 CFM	1000 CFM
TIME (DAYS)				
1	2.51	2.09	1.75	1.46
2	2.10	1.46	1.02	0.71
3	1.75	1.02	0.59	0.35
4	1.46	0.71	0.35	0.17
5	1.22	0.50	0.20	0.08
6	1.02	0.35	0.12	0.04
7	0.85	0.24	0.07	0.02
8	0.71	0.17	0.04	0.009
9	0.60	0.11	0.02	0.004
10	0.50	0.08	0.01	0.002