

NRC FORM 366		U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION			APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-011 EXPIRES 4/30/98					
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)					Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50.0 hrs. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to the industry. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Information and Records Management Branch (T-6 F33), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20503. If a document used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to the information collection.					
(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)										
FACILITY NAME (1) MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT					DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000 - 263		PAGE (3) 1 OF 3			
TITLE (4) HPCI Removed from Service to Repair Steam Leak in Drain Trap Bypass										
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
09	21	98	98	-- 005	-- 00	10	21	98		05000
OPERATING MODE (9)		N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)							
POWER LEVEL (10)		100 %	20.2201(b)		20.2203(a)(2)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)	
			20.2203(a)(1)		20.2203(a)(3)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)	
			20.2203(a)(2)(i)		20.2203(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		73.71	
			20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		20.2203(a)(4)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		OTHER	
			20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A	
			20.2203(a)(2)(iv)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)			
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)										
NAME Tom Parker						TELEPHONE NUMBER (include Area Code) 612-295-1014				
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)										
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	
B	BJ	ISV	W255	Y						
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)						EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE.)						NO				

ABSTRACT Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)
NRC FORM 366

During post maintenance testing on another component, an operator discovered a barely detectable steam leak coming from an air-operated drain valve in the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system. The valve was declared inoperable and replaced with a manual valve. Procedures were revised to address the use of a manual valve in place of an air-operated valve.

During the valve replacement, HPCI was inoperable, but other redundant systems were available. It is planned to install a new automatic valve in the steam trap bypass line. Action will be taken to minimize the potential for leakage from this and other similar carbon steel valves in the HPCI and RCiC steam line drains.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME(1)	DOCKET	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT	05000-263	98	-- 005 --	00	2 of 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 365A) (17)

Conditions Prior to the Event

On September 21, 1998, the plant was operating at 100% power.

Description

On September 21, 1998 at approximately 1700, an operator performing post maintenance testing on another valve¹ observed a barely detectable steam leak from the body of CV-2043, HPCI (High Pressure Coolant Injection) Steam Line Drain Trap Bypass. The leakage was confirmed by the system engineer, and the valve was declared inoperable. In order to replace the valve, HPCI² was removed from service on September 22, 1998.

CV-2043 is an air-operated 1" globe valve, located in the bypass line around the steam trap³ in the HPCI main steam line drain. When HPCI is not operating, the condensation in the steam line drains through a steam trap to the main condenser. During system warm-up the volume of condensate exceeds the capacity of the steam trap. A high condensate level signal opens CV-2043 to provide additional condensate removal capability. When HPCI is operating, valves downstream of CV-2043 and the steam trap isolate the drain line to the main condenser.

CV-2043 performs a safety function of maintaining the system pressure boundary. The valve operation of bypassing of the steam trap is not a safety function.

Cause

Seat leakage in CV-2043 impinged on the inside of the carbon steel valve body causing localized erosion of the valve body. Ultimately, a barely detectable steam leak through the downstream side of the valve body resulted.

Analysis of Reportability

This report is being submitted per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v). In order to isolate the steam leak and replace the valve, HPCI was removed from service. Since HPCI is a single train system, this event is reportable.

¹ EIS Component Code: V

² EIS System Code: BJ

³ EIS Component Code: TRP

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME(1)	DOCKET	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT	05000-263	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	3 of 3
		98	-- 005 --	00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

Safety Significance

This steam leak had no effect on the ability of HPCI to perform its intended safety function. Redundant systems were available during the period of time that HPCI was isolated.

This event did not and will not have any effect on the potential offsite releases of radioactivity, and therefore, this event has no effect on the health and safety of the public.

Actions

On September 24, 1998, this remotely operated valve was replaced with a manual valve and HPCI was returned to service. Procedures were revised to address the use of a manual valve in place of an automatic valve.

It is planned to install a new automatic valve in the steam trap bypass line.

Action will be taken to minimize the potential for leakage from this and other similar carbon steel valves in the HPCI and RCIC⁴ steam line drains.

Failed Component Identification

WKM (formerly BS&B), Model 70-18-1BDRT.

Similar Events

No other similar reportable events have occurred.

⁴ EIS System Code: BN