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the southern electric system

NON-00301

October 6, 1988


U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

PLANT VOGTLE - UNIT 1
NRC DOCKET 50-424
OPERATING LICENSE NPF-68
SPECIAL REPORT
INVALID DIESEL GENERATOR FAILURES

Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of the Plant Vogtle - Unit 1 Technical Specification section 4.8.1.1.3 and 6.8.2, Georgia Power Company is submitting the enclosed revised Special Report concerning invalid diesel generator failures. The enclosed report supercedes the special report previously submitted by our letter SL-4805 dated June 17, 1988.

Sincerely,



W. G. Hairston, III

TEW/stl

Enclosure: Special Report 88-002, Revision 2

c: Georgia Power Company
Mr. P. D. Rice
Mr. G. Bockhold, Jr.
Mr. M. Sheibani
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Mr. J. B. Hopkins, Licensing Project Manager, NRR (2 copies)
Mr. J. F. Rogge, Senior Resident Inspector-Operations, Vogtle

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ENCLOSURE

PLANT VOGTLE - UNIT 1
NRC DOCKET 50-424
OPERATING LICENSE NPF-68
SPECIAL REPORT 88-002

A. Requirement for Report

This report is required in accordance with the Plant Vogtle - Unit 1 Technical Specifications section 4.8.1.1.3. This section of the Technical Specifications requires that all diesel generator failures, valid or nonvalid, shall be reported to the Commission in a Special Report pursuant to Specification 6.8.2 within 30 days. This report is being submitted due to the recent clarification by the NRC - Region II of the definition of an invalid failure.

B. Description of Invalid Failures for the Train A Diesel Generator

On February 18, 1987, Start No. 1-87-0043 was attempted after performing maintenance activities on the Unit 1 - Train A diesel generator. Shortly after startup, the engine tripped. An investigation revealed that the valve from the fuel oil day tank to the diesel was locked closed. This valve was subsequently reopened. The engine had not been run since Start No. 1-87-0042 on 2-3-87 and it is not known when during the ensuing 15 day period that the valve was closed. A Locked Valve Manipulation Log was implemented on 2-24-87 to verify proper valve configuration. Later on February 18, 1987, Start No. 1-87-0044 was attempted but a trip occurred due to low turbocharger oil pressure, a normal trip function which is bypassed in the emergency mode. It was found that a pre-lube valve, which should be closed after starting, had been left open. Start No. 1-87-0045 was attempted and the pre-lube valve was closed in a timely manner. However, a low turbocharger oil pressure trip occurred again, even though a turbocharger oil pressure gauge registered a pressure above the trip setpoint. A search discovered a loose fitting on the right bank turbocharger pressure switch. The loose fitting was tightened.

On June 23, 1987, start attempt 1-87-0055 was performed on the Unit 1 - Train A diesel generator. The generator was paralleled to the grid and loading was in progress when the operator noticed air escaping from some of the cylinder cocks. The output breaker was tripped and the diesel was shut down. The cylinder cocks had been left open following the performance of the routine moisture checks. The operator failed to follow the procedure and ensure that the cylinder cocks were closed. Emergency start capability was not affected.

ENCLOSURE (Continued)

SPECIAL REPORT 89-002

C. Description of an Invalid Failure for the Train B Diesel Generator

On February 6, 1987, Start No. 1-87-0036 was performed on the Unit 1 - Train B diesel generator. While the generator was being paralleled to the grid, the operator allowed the KVAR to go negative for a length of time sufficient that the loss of excitation relay tripped the output breaker and the diesel. For this event, the operator failed to follow a procedure. Again, emergency start capability was not affected.

D. Summary

Since these invalid failures were not valid tests, the surveillance test frequency was not effected and remained at 31 days for Train A Diesel Generator, and at 7 days for Train B Diesel Generator, as defined by Technical Specification Table 4.8-1.