

TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT

CONFORMANCE TO GENERIC LETTER 83-28
ITEM 2.1 (PART 1) EQUIPMENT CLASSIFICATION
RIVER BEND STATION, UNIT 1

Docket No. 50-458

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ABSTRACT

This EG&G Idaho, Inc., report documents the review of the submittals from Gulf States Utilities Company regarding conformance to Generic Letter 83-28, Item 2.1 (Part 1) for the River Bend Station, Unit 1.

Docket Nos. 50-458

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FOREWORD

This report is supplied as part of the program for evaluating licensee/applicant conformance to Generic Letter 83-28, "Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Event." This work is being conducted for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Engineering and System Technology, by EG&G Idaho, Inc., Electrical, Instrumentation, and Control Systems Evaluation Unit.

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1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

On February 25, 1983, both of the scram circuit breakers at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant failed to open upon an automatic reactor trip signal from the reactor protection system. This incident was terminated manually by the operator about 30 seconds after the initiation of the automatic trip signal. It was determined that the failure of the circuit breakers was related to the sticking of the undervoltage trip attachment.

Prior to the incident, on February 22, 1983, an automatic trip signal was generated at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant, based on steam generator low-low level during plant start-up. In this case, the reactor was tripped manually by the operator, almost coincidentally with the automatic trip.

Following these incidents, on February 28, 1983, the NRC Executive Director of Operations (EDO) directed the staff to investigate and report on the generic implications of the occurrences at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant. The results of the staff's inquiry are reported in NUREG-1000, "Generic Implications of the ATWS Events at the Salem Nuclear Power Plant."¹

As a result of this investigation, the NRC requested (by Generic Letter 83-28, dated July 8, 1983)² all licensees of operating reactors, applicants for an operating license, and holders of construction permits to respond to generic issues raised by the analyses of these two ATWS events.

Part 1 of Item 2.1 of Generic Letter 83-28 requires the licensee or applicant to confirm that all reactor trip system components are identified, classified, and treated as safety-related, as indicated in the following statement:

Licenses and applicants shall confirm that all components whose functioning is required to trip the reactor are identified as safety-related on documents, procedures, and information handling systems used in the plant to control safety-related activities, including maintenance, work orders, and parts replacement.

2. PLANT RESPONSE EVALUATION

The licensee for River Bend Unit 1 (Gulf States Utilities Co.) provided responses to Generic Letter 83-28 in submittals dated August 3, 1984³, May 20, 1985⁴, and May 12, 1988⁵.

The licensee described the proposed equipment classification program for Generic Letter 83-28, Item 2.2.1, in its first submittal, and indicated that this program was also applicable to Item 2.1 (Part 1). In the second submittal, the licensee provided a brief description of the Item 2.1 (Part 1) program. The program was to be implemented by August 15, 1985.

In the May 12, 1988, submittal, the licensee confirmed that the equipment classification (Q-list) program had been implemented and was in use. The May 1988 submittal also included a list of procedures, which were to ensure that all the reactor trip components were identified as safety-related on the plant documents, procedures, and information handling systems used to control safety-related activities.

3. CONCLUSION

Based on our review of the licensee's submittals, we find that the licensee has identified the components necessary to perform a reactor trip and that these components are classified safety-related on associated procedures and documents. We, therefore, find that the licensee's responses meet the requirements of item 2.1 (Part 1) of Generic Letter 83-28 and are acceptable.

4. REFERENCES

1. Generic Implications of ATWS Events at the Salem Nuclear Power Plant, NUREG-1000, Volume 1, April 1983; Volume 2, July 1983.
2. NRC Letter, D. G. Eisenhut to all licensees of Operating Reactors, Applicants for Operating License, and Holders of Construction Permits, "Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events (Generic Letter 83-28)," July 8, 1983.
3. Letter, Gulf States Utilities Co. (J. E. Booker) to NRC (D. G. Eisenhut), August 3, 1984.
4. Letter, Gulf States Utilities Co. (J. E. Booker) to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, (H. R. Denton) March 20, 1985.
5. Letter, Gulf States Utilities Co. (J. E. Booker) to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, May 12, 1988.