

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 3 3	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2
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TITLE (4)
Reactor Scram Due to Procedure Inadequacy

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)			
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES			DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 3	1 5	8 6	8 6	0 0 4	0 0	0 3	1 5	8 6				0 5 0 0 0
												0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9) **N** THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

20.402(b)	20.406(e)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
20.406(a)(1)(i)	50.38(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(e)
20.406(a)(1)(ii)	50.38(a)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
20.406(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
20.406(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
20.406(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Joseph P. Flaherty Assistant Instrument & Controls Superintendent	TELEPHONE NUMBER 3 1 5 3 4 2 - 3 8 4 0
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input type="checkbox"/> NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH DAY YEAR
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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At 1855, on March 15, 1986, with the reactor in a cold shutdown condition for a general maintenance outage, a full scram was received while performing post work testing on the Backup Scram Relays. These relays had been replaced to comply with NRC Bulletin 84-02, "Failure of General Electric Type HFA Relays In Use In Class IE Safety Systems." All systems functioned as designed.

Procedure inadequacy led to placing a jumper across trip system B scram relay contacts while the A Trip System was tripped. This caused the backup scram solenoid to energize which reduced instrument air pressure to the backup scram valves and caused a full scram.

The procedure was revised and individuals involved were counseled as to the importance of reducing challenges to safety systems.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 3 3 8 5 - - - - 0 OF 0	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

At 1855, on March 15, 1986, with the Reactor in a cold shutdown condition for a general maintenance outage, a full scram was received while performing post work testing on the Back-Up Scram Relays. These relays had been replaced to comply with NRC Bulletin 84-02, "Failure of General Electric Type HFA Relays In Use In Class IE Safety Systems." All systems functioned as designed.

The normal scram logic requires an unbypassed trip signal in both the A and B Trip Systems which then de-energize both A and B Trip System scram relays. The normally open contacts of the scram relays cause the pilot scram valve solenoid to de-energize, which removes instrument air from the scram valves permitting them to open, causing a scram.

The backup scram logic differs in that when the scram relays de-energize, their normally closed contacts energize the backup scram relay and the backup scram valve solenoid. When energized, these solenoids shut off and bleed or depressurize instrument air causing a scram. Either Trip System A or B backup scram logic initiation will cause a full scram.


Prior to replacing the back-up scram relays, the Plant Operational Review Committee determined that in addition to a point to point wire check, an operational test of the replacement relays was necessary to complete post work testing. After research by the applicable department, it was decided to utilize an existing procedure for the operational test. This was concurred upon by two second reviewers.

While performing the post work testing operational test, it was noted that the test could not be performed as written. A temporary change was initiated to jumper the B scram relay contacts in the A back-up scram logic. This jumper, in addition to a manual scram signal from the A Trip System would allow the back-up scram relay to energize. However, this jumper also energized the back-up scram solenoid and resulted in a full scram when the procedure was performed.

The procedure was revised and individuals involved were counseled as to the importance of reducing challenges to safety systems.

James A. FitzPatrick
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Radford J. Converse
Resident Manager



April 14, 1986
JAFP-86-0310

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

REFERENCE: DOCKET NO. 50-333
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT: 86-004

Dear Sir:

Enclosed please find the referenced Licensee Event Report in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.

If there are any questions concerning this report, please contact Mr. Joseph P. Flaherty at (315) 342-3840, Extension 230.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'R. Converse'.

RADFORD J. CONVERSE
RESIDENT MANAGER

RC/JPF/ail

Enclosure

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