

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) EDWIN I. HATCH, UNIT 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 1 1	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 4
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TITLE (4)  
LEAKING DELUGE VALVE WETS SBGT CARBON FILTER BED AND CAUSES IT TO BE INOPERABLE

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (8)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (6)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
03	11	86	86	007	000	04	10	86	E. I. HATCH, UNIT II		0 5 0 0 0 3 6 1 6
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OPERATING MODE (9) 5	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)									
POWER LEVEL (10) 0100	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(c)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.38(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.38(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vi)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(iii)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)							
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)							
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)								

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Raymond D. Baker, Nuclear Licensing Manager - Hatch	4 0 4 5 2 6 - 7 0 1 6

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS
X	KIP	IV	IGI 21516	N					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH DAY YEAR
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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At approximately 1500 CST on 03/11/86, Unit 1 was shutdown for refueling (reactor vessel completely loaded with fuel and head not installed), and Unit 2 was operating at 2063 Mwt (approximately 85% power). At that time, personnel were performing once per operating cycle procedure 42SV-T46-003-1 on the "1A" standby gas treatment (SBGT) filter train when they noted that the filter train's downstream charcoal adsorber bed was wet.

The "1A" SBGT filter train's charcoal filter bed apparently became wet (from a leaking fire protection deluge valve) on or before 11/24/85. The deluge valve was isolated from its water supply on 11/24/85 and replaced on 1/13/86. The wetting of the charcoal caused degradation of the train, and operation in a condition contrary to the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications.

A material failure in the deluge valve seat apparently allowed enough leakage to wet the downstream filter bed. Noncompliance with Technical Specifications was due to personnel failure to recognize that a leaking deluge valve drip check valve may indicate that the deluge valve is leaking.

The charcoal bed was replaced on 3/14/86 and the train was functionally tested and returned to service on 3/17/86. Operations and Maintenance Department personnel will be instructed on the significance of leaking deluge valve drip check valves.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT

This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (i) (B) because it resulted in both Unit 1 and Unit 2 being operated in a condition contrary to the requirements of the Technical Specifications.

B. UNIT(S) STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT

Unit 1 was in shutdown for refueling (reactor vessel completely loaded with fuel and head not installed). Unit 2 was in steady-state operation at 2063 MWT (approximately 85% of rated thermal power).

C. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

At approximately 1500 CST on 03/11/86, contractor personnel were performing the once per operating cycle "TESTING OF C.R. AND SBTG FILTER TRAINS BY VENDOR" procedure (42SV-T46-003-1) on the "1A" standby gas treatment (SBGT) filter train when they noted that the filter train's downstream charcoal filter bed was wet. A seven-day LCO had been established (prior to removing the train from service for testing) per Unit 1 Technical Specifications Section 3.7.B.1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications Section 3.6.6.1, ACTION a.

An investigation of the event showed that the "1A" filter train's charcoal filter bed apparently became wet (from a leaking fire protection deluge valve) on or before 11/24/85. The details are as follows:

1. On 11/24/85, plant personnel noted that the fire protection deluge valve's drip check valve for the "1A" SBTG filter train was leaking.
2. On 11/25/85, plant personnel began repair work on the deluge valve. However, when they attempted to repair the deluge valve (1T43-F032A), they found that the valve's seat was pitted beyond repair. Subsequently, a replacement valve was ordered.
3. The new valve was installed and passed a visual inspection for leaks on 01/13/86. The deluge valve's water supply valve (1T43-F028A) was closed on 11/24/85, and opened on 01/15/86.
4. The wet charcoal was discovered on 03/11/86.

Wetting of the charcoal degraded the filter train apparently to the point that it was inoperable. This event was contrary to the following requirements of Technical Specifications:

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TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

- Unit 1 Technical Specifications Section 3.7.B.1.a allows operation (with one SBTG train inoperable) for a period of seven days, providing that all active components in the remaining SBTG systems (i.e., one in Unit 1 and two in Unit 2) are demonstrated operable within four hours, and daily thereafter.
- Unit 2 Technical Specifications Section 3.6.6.1, ACTION a requires (with one SBTG train inoperable) that the unit "restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within seven days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours."

D. CAUSE OF EVENT

The root cause of the wet charcoal was apparently due to material failure in that the deluge valve's (1T43-F032A) seat was leaking enough to wet the downstream charcoal filter bed.

The root cause of the noncompliance with Technical Specifications was a failure of the involved personnel (both licensed and non-licensed plant personnel) to recognize that a leaking drip check valve could be indicative of a leaking deluge valve.

E. ANALYSIS OF EVENT

Per section 5.3.3.3 of the Unit 1 FSAR, the SBTG trains each have 100% capacity and the effectiveness of one train is not altered by the loss of the redundant train. The "1B" SBTG train, as well as the two Unit 2 SBTG trains ("2A" and "2B") remained operable during this event.

If SBTG train "1A" had been required to operate during the time its filter bed was wet, the "1A" train may not have removed a satisfactory amount of methyl iodine (if present) which would have resulted in annunciation in the main control room of the radiation monitor in the "1A" train's discharge air duct. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not adversely affected by this event.

F. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The damaged (wet) charcoal bed was replaced in the "1A" SBTG filter train on 03/14/86. The filter train was then satisfactorily functionally tested and returned to service on 03/17/86 per procedure 42SV-T46-003-1. The Unit 1 and Unit 2 LCOs were then terminated at approximately 0845 CST on 03/18/86.

The failure of personnel to recognize the significance of the leaking drip check valve will be corrected by providing appropriate instructions to Operations and Maintenance Department personnel.

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		8 6	— 0 0 7	— 0 0	0 4	OF 0 4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

G. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. FAILED COMPONENT(S) IDENTIFICATION

VALVE MFGR: GRINNEL; MODEL: "B"; EIIS IDENTIFIER: KP.

2. PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

There have been no past similar events where a SBGT carbon bed filter has been wetted by a leaking deluge valve.

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Post Office Box 4545  
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L. T. Gucwa  
Manager Nuclear Safety  
and Licensing



SL-585  
0166C

April 10, 1986

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report 50-321/1986-007. This report meets the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

Very truly yours,

L. T. Gucwa

EBS/lc

Enclosure

c: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly  
Mr. J. T. Beckham, Jr.  
Mr. H. C. Nix, Jr.  
NRC-Region II  
GO-NORMS

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