

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Susquehanna Steam Electric Station-Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 8 7 PAGE(S) 1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4) Division I LOCA Isolation Occurred Due to Blown Fuse

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
03	15	86	86	007	00	04	14	86			0 5 0 0 0 0
											0 5 0 0 0 0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)

OPERATING MODE (9) *	20.402(b)	20.406(c)	* 80.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0	20.406(a)(1)(i)	80.38(a)(1)	80.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(e)
	20.406(a)(1)(ii)	80.38(a)(2)	80.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)
	20.406(a)(1)(iii)	80.73(a)(2)(i)	80.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
	20.406(a)(1)(iv)	80.73(a)(2)(ii)	80.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
	20.406(a)(1)(v)	80.73(a)(2)(iii)	80.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
<u>T.N. Creasy</u>	AREA CODE <u>711 7</u> NUMBER <u>514 21-1321 412</u>

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRPDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRPDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO X

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces i.e., approx. twenty fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On March 15, 1986 at 0500 an unplanned Division I LOCA Isolation occurred when a fuse blew in the Division I Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System(NSSSS) logic. This caused an isolation of the Zone I and Zone III Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) Systems, initiation of the 'A' Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply System, and various other containment isolations. The 'A' Standby Gas Treatment System was in service prior to the event and automatically realigned to the Zone I & III HVAC Systems. The circuit was checked for shorts or grounds, the fuse replaced, and the isolation logic reset at approximately 0615.

No specific cause for the blown fuse could be determined. The isolation occurred at the same time a wire was being lifted from a relay contact in the NSSSS logic. The wire was lifted to allow periodic maintenance to be performed on the relay. Inadvertent grounding of the lifted wire could have caused the fuse to blow. The procedure controlling the relay maintenance will be reviewed to determine if more accessible isolation points are available to reduce the potential for grounding.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) Susquehanna Steam Electric Station-Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 8 7 8 6	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
		8 6	0 0 7	0 0	0 2	OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On March 15, 1986 at 0500 an unplanned Division I LOCA Isolation occurred when a fuse blew in the Division I Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System (NSSSS, EIIS Code: JM) logic. This caused an isolation of the Zone I and Zone III Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) Systems (EIIS Code: VA) and initiation of the 'A' Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply System (EIIS Code: BH). An initiation signal was also generated for the 'A' Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS, EIIS Code: BH) however, the system was already in service exhausting air from the drywell. The 'A' SGTS automatically realigned to the Zone I and III HVAC Systems as designed. Various other containment isolations occurred although many containment valves were already closed or de-energized to support maintenance activities.

The isolation occurred at the same time a wire was being lifted from a relay contact in the NSSSS logic. The wire was lifted to allow periodic maintenance to be performed on the relay, however no isolation should have occurred. Operations immediately contacted the Maintenance personnel to reland the wire and they did so. Operations attempted to reset the isolation logic but could not. Investigation revealed a blown fuse in the NSSSS logic prevented reset of the isolation logic. The fuse was removed, and the circuit was checked for shorts or grounds but none were found. A new fuse was installed and the isolation logic reset at approximately 0615. Operations then restored the affected systems to their desired status.

Although a specific cause for the blown fuse could not be determined, inadvertent grounding of the lifted wire could have caused the fuse to blow. The procedure controlling the relay maintenance will be reviewed to determine if alternate isolation points for the relays are available which might be more accessible (less potential for grounding).



Pennsylvania Power & Light Company

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April 14, 1986

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 86-007-00
FILE R41-2
PLAS- 161

Docket No. 50-387
License No. NPF-14

Attached is Licensee Event Report 86-007-00. This event was determined reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv), in that an unplanned Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation occurred when a fuse blew.

T.M. Crimmins, Jr.
Superintendent of Plant-Susquehanna

TNC/pjg

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