

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket No: 50-461
License No: NPF-62

Report No: 50-461/98025(DRS)

Licensee: Illinois Power Company

Facility: Clinton Power Station

Location: Route 54 West
Clinton, IL 61727

Dates: October 5-9, 1998

Inspectors: James E. Foster, Sr. Emergency Preparedness Analyst
Donald E. Funk, Emergency Preparedness Analyst

Approved by: James R. Creed, Chief, Plant Support Branch 1
Division of Reactor Safety

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Clinton Nuclear Power Station
NRC Inspection Report 50-461/98025

This inspection reviewed a portion of the Emergency Preparedness (EP) program. This inspection included a review of documentation, tours and observations of emergency response facilities and equipment, and included follow-up on previous inspection findings. This was an announced inspection conducted by two regional inspectors.

- The control room had current copies of the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures available. The Emergency Notification System (ENS) phone was verified operable. (Section P2.1.b.1)
- The material condition of the Technical Support Center (TSC) was marginal, as identified in the two last inspections, with a conduit modification adding a considerable tripping hazard. The only change noted in the facility was a "catalog display stand" for the Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures. The Area Radiation/Process Radiation panel in the TSC was nonfunctional. (Section P2.1.b.1)
- Several emergency medical kits were present in an Operational Support Center (OSC) Emergency Response Organization (ERO) locker. The EP staff were unaware of their presence, and the condition of these kits was poor. (Section P2.1.b.1)
- Review of pager test records indicated an improving trend. (Section P2.1.b.2)
- The EP training program appeared effective. ERO personnel were qualified for their emergency response positions. The after-hours augmentation drill was successful. The drill critique documentation was good, including a summary, time line, backup data for individual response times, a list of problems identified, and recommended solutions. (Section P5)
- Corrective actions had been taken on a number of issues relative to the February 1998 Alert. Effective, acceptable corrective actions on these issues indicated that the EP program was on an improving trend. However, several other corrective actions, such as implementation of the new autodialer callout system, were yet to be completed. (Section P8)

Report Details

IV. Plant Support

P2 Status of EP Facilities, Equipment, and Resources

P2.1 Material Condition of Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs)

a. Inspection Scope (82701)

The inspectors evaluated the material condition of emergency response equipment in the control room, Technical Support Center (TSC), Operational Support Center (OSC), and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). The licensee demonstrated the operability of numerous pieces of emergency response equipment, including radiological survey instruments, dose assessment computers, and communications equipment. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's documentation related to emergency supplies' inventories and pager tests.

b. Observations and Findings

b.1 Emergency Response Facilities Material Condition

The control room had current copies of the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures available. The Emergency Notification System (ENS) phone was verified operable. Shift personnel were not aware that the ENS telephone was not an automatic ringdown line.

The OSC was generally well-maintained, with sufficient supplies available, and instrumentation was operable and within calibration periods. Inspection of emergency supplies in several lockers revealed some problems: several emergency medical kits of unknown origin were present in one locker; the kits contained two deteriorated cold packs and several containers of saline solution and distilled water which were past their respective expiration dates. An emergency oxygen kit was lacking the emergency oxygen bottle. As the kits were present in the ERO cabinet, there was some potential that the kits could have been utilized in an emergency. Status of OSC emergency medical kits was an **Inspection Follow-up Item (IFI 50-461/98025-01(DRS))**.

Additionally, one OSC locker contained an outdated (1990) list of individuals qualified to perform self-monitoring and a valve list dated November 1990. The safety significance of these outdated documents was minimal; users would quickly determine that the lists were outdated. The outdated documents were immediately removed by the licensee.

The majority of emergency lights tested functioned acceptably; one portable fluorescent light and two table lamps did not light. Discussion with EP personnel indicated that OSC door number 526 was to be provided with a key card reader to facilitate OSC access. Currently, an access card reader for a nearby door and the presence of a security officer are utilized for access control of this door during emergencies.

The EOF was well-maintained with adequate supplies, current plans and procedures, and operable survey instrumentation within calibration periods. "Catalog display stands" for the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures had been placed at four locations in the EOF.

The TSC was in marginal material condition, as identified in the two last inspections, with a conduit modification adding a considerable tripping hazard. The only change noted in the facility was a "catalog display stand" for the Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures. The Area Radiation/Process Radiation panel in the TSC was nonfunctional. Discussion with EP personnel indicated that lack of control over the usage of the TSC resulted in their not being aware of the facility's condition on a day-to-day basis.

One of the two backup personal computers functioned and ran the dose projection program. The other backup personal computer (PC 174) had been left on, discharging the battery. A replacement battery for the discharged personal computer was not available in the TSC. A Texas Instruments replacement for the Hewlett-Packard calculator was noted in the TSC; the calculator was functional. Two older Hewlett-Packard strip-programmable calculators were in the TSC cabinet; these were operable and described in the procedure used to perform core damage calculations via strip programmed calculations.

Telephones, computer terminals, and other equipment were tested and found operable. Current procedures were available in the facilities.

b.2 ERO Pager Tests

Discussion with licensee personnel indicated that key ERO personnel had been provided alphanumeric pagers which would allow the display of short event classification messages, in addition to the response telephone number. The alphanumeric function of the pagers had not been implemented at the time of this inspection, due to problems with a new autodialer unit.

The inspectors reviewed the results of recent ERO pager tests and discussed plans for future pager tests with licensee personnel. Recent (1998) pager test results were as follow:

3/24	10:00 a.m.	27 A team members not responding.
3/25	9:30 a.m.	A team on call; 11 members not responding.
3/25	2:00 p.m.	Pager problems; test a failure, vendor troubleshoots.
3/27	9:00 a.m.	A team on call; positions filled.
4/02	9:00 a.m.	B team on call; 14 members not responding.
4/03	10:30 a.m.	B team on call; 5 positions not filled, one a key position.
4/07	10:00 a.m.	B team on call; 4 members not responding.
4/15	7:00 p.m.	B team on call; 8 members not responding.
4/20	9:00 p.m.	B team on call; 1 member not responding.
5/05	2:30 p.m.	A team on call; positions filled.
5/27	9:00 p.m.	A team on call; 4 positions not filled, no key positions.

6/15	8:50 p.m.	B team on call; 3 positions not filled, no key positions.
7/27	1:00 p.m.	A team on call; 2 positions not filled, no key positions.
7/28	8:30 a.m.	A team on call; 1 position not filled, no key positions.
7/31	1:00 p.m.	B team on call; 5 positions not filled, no key positions.
8/04	10:00 a.m.	B team on call; 2 positions not filled, one key position.
8/06	8:30 p.m.	C team on call; positions filled.
8/10	9:45 a.m.	C team on call; positions filled.
8/13	7:00 p.m.	D team on call; 3 positions not filled, no key positions.
8/29	8:05 a.m.	B team on call; 1 position not filled, no key positions.
9/16	7:55 p.m.	B team on call; positions filled.
9/22	8:30 p.m.	A team on call; positions filled.

In general, review of the pager tests results indicated an improving trend, followed by achievement of acceptable results.

b.3 Inventory Records

Inventory records of emergency equipment and supplies for the 3rd quarter FY 1998 were reviewed. Licensee procedure FE-05, "Emergency Equipment and Supplies," dated May 29, 1997, stated that these inventories shall be conducted at least once per quarter and after each use, or when a cabinet seal is discovered broken. The inspector's review determined that all inventory records were completed as required within the appropriate timeframe.

The applicable inventory forms did not indicate in which cabinet the supplies were located. In a number of cases, equipment not listed on the inventory was found mixed with emergency supplies. Discussion with EP personnel indicated that a review of supplies would be performed to determine whether the equipment is currently needed to support the Emergency Plan and procedures.

c. Conclusions

The EOF was in an excellent state of operational readiness. The material condition of the TSC was marginal, as in the last inspection. Several emergency medical kits of unknown origin were present in an OSC locker. Review of pager tests indicated an improving trend. All inventory records were completed as required within the appropriate timeframe.

P5 Staff Training and Qualification in EP

a. Inspection Scope (82701)

The inspectors discussed the current training program with the EP Supervisor of Emergency Planning and the Senior Emergency Planner. The inspectors reviewed the EP Training Program Description Matrix requirements, Procedure AP-05, "EP Training Program," and the ERO overdue training tracking system list. Also reviewed was the licensee's documentation of its after-hours response drill.

b.1 Training Documentation

The training matrix delineated the required training for each ERO position, including respiratory protection/self-contained breathing apparatus qualifications. The inspectors performed a check to ensure personnel assigned to the ERO were currently qualified. EP Implementing Procedure AP-05, "EP Training Program," requires that members of the ERO receive annual refresher training on their assigned duties.

All members of the ERO reviewed were currently qualified except one EOF member who did not have the required respiratory protection training for his assigned position. Discussion revealed that this individual did not attend the required training because he had recently changed ERO positions from Field Team Member to Field Team Coordinator and did not understand that respiratory protection training was required for the new position. The individual was scheduled for this training on October 15, 1998.

b.2 After-hours Emergency Response Drill

At 8:32 p.m. on Tuesday, September 22, 1998, the licensee conducted an unannounced after-hours response drill (drill 98-032). An initiating call to the Secondary Alarm Station, declared a simulated Site Area Emergency (SAE), which requires activation of the Emergency Response Organization (ERO). The drill included actual, real-time onsite/offsite response by key ERO personnel and activation of response facilities.

Personnel call-out was accomplished by the use of an autodialer which activates ERO pagers. The autodialer functioned as designed and activated within two minutes of the simulated SAE declaration with ERO pagers activating seven minutes (8:41 p.m.) thereafter. The drill was terminated at 9:51 p.m., after arrival of the last "60-minute responder" to the OSC.

The licensee concluded that all six of its stated objectives were satisfactorily met. Review of documentation determined that objective two, "Demonstrate that 30-and 60-minute responders per Clinton Power Station (CPS) Emergency Plan Table 2-1 could respond within the goals," was met, with one exception. An OSC 60 minute responder did not respond to the OSC until 1 hour and 19 minutes had elapsed. The licensee's criteria to determine satisfactory completion of the objective was 60 minutes from SAE initiation plus a margin of 25%. The licensee stated that the individual was onsite working in the chemistry lab and would have responded if an actual event had occurred.

The licensee's drill critique documentation package was good. The critique included a summary, time line, backup data for individual response times, a list of problems identified, and recommended solutions. Followup actions and documentation regarding individuals that failed to respond were also good. Corrective actions included providing management with the names of individuals who did not respond to the activation. Management reviewed each individual circumstance and provided a written reply to the Supervisor, Emergency Planning. Individual response times were also well-documented by the use of facility evaluator notes, access authorization reports, training attendance records, and the autodialer call activity report.

c. Conclusions

The EP training program appeared effective. All ERO personnel, with only one exception, were qualified for their emergency response positions. The after-hours augmentation drill was successful. The drill critique documentation was good, including a summary, time line, backup data for individual response times, a list of problems identified, and recommended solutions. Followup actions and documentation regarding individuals that failed to respond were also good.

P6 EP Organization and Administration

The emergency planning organization had been modified since the last inspection, and consisted of a Supervisor, Emergency Planning directly supervising two Emergency Planners, a Senior Emergency Planner, and one Emergency Planning Clerical Support individual. The Supervisor reported to the Director, Security and Emergency Planning, who reported to the Manager, Nuclear Support. The Manager, Nuclear Support reported directly to the Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer.

P8 Miscellaneous EP Issues

- P8.1 (Closed) Inspection Followup Item (IFI) No. 50-461/97022-04: Training needed regarding requesting additional operator resources. Discussion and review of documentation associated with Condition Report 1-98-01-374 indicated that the proposed training had been completed and documented. This item is closed.
- P8.2 (Closed) Inspection Followup Item (IFI) No. 50-461/97022-05: Correction to training on Emergency Operating procedure number 6. Discussion and a review of documentation associated with Condition Report 1-98-01-373 indicated that corrections had been made to portions of the training program. The provision of reasonable assurance that deficiencies found during requalification exams have been identified and corrected will be evaluated under NRC Manual Chapter 0350, Case Specific Checklist Item II.5, and is distinct from this item. This item is closed.
- P8.3 (Open) Inspection Followup Item (IFI) No. 50-461/98003-12: Reliability of the ND-6685 computer. The licensee discussed future upgrades to the plant computer systems which would improve the reliability of the information currently handled by the ND-6685 system. These changes were not intended to be implemented for some time. This item will remain open.
- P8.4 (Open) Inspection Followup Item (IFI) No. 50-461/98003-13: Ability to complete follow-up state notifications. This item will remain open pending appropriate demonstration in an evaluated exercise.
- P8.5 (Closed) Inspection Followup Item (IFI) No. 50-461/98003-14: Ability to activate the Technical Support Center in an hour. The CPS Emergency Plan, section 3.1.2.2, "Staffing," indicates that the TSC will be activated upon declaration of an Alert or higher. "Upon activation of the TSC, designated personnel shall report to the TSC so as to be fully operational within about one (1) hour." Review of the off-hours augmentation drill

results indicated that the licensee has the capability to staff and activate the TSC within one hour. Evaluation of off-hours augmentation results was more technically correct than evaluation of TSC activation time during a daytime exercise. This item is closed.

- P8.6 (Open) Inspection Followup Item (IFI) No. 50-461/98003-16: Activation and response of the autodialer system. The licensee indicated the current system would be revised to provide the telephone number for responders to call, and the autodialer program would be upgraded with an improved logic system which would provide flexibility in assigning higher level positions. A newer autodialer with enhanced speed and capacity (32 lines) was purchased. It was planned that this unit would undergo a test period and then be the primary autodialer, with the present unit serving as a backup. The new unit has experienced operability problems, and the vender has been contacted. This item will remain open pending implementation and NRC review.
- P8.7 (Open) Inspection Followup Item (IFI) No. 50-461/98003-18: Transfer of Command and Control from the Main Control Room to the Technical Support Center. Licensee personnel indicated that Shift Supervisors were advised that priorities for response efforts should be well-communicated during response efforts. This item will remain open pending appropriate demonstration in an evaluated exercise.
- P8.8 (Open) Inspection Followup Item (IFI) No. 50-461/98003-20: Sample control in the Emergency Operations Facility. This item will remain open pending appropriate demonstration in an evaluated exercise.
- P8.9 (Open) Inspection Followup Item (IFI) No. 50-461/98003-21: Control Room to Technical Support Center communication. This item will remain open pending appropriate demonstration in an evaluated exercise.
- P8.10 (Open) Inspection Followup Item (IFI) No. 50-461/98003-22: Ability to disseminate information to plant personnel. During the February 13, 1998 event, few inplant announcements were made. This item will remain open pending appropriate demonstration in an evaluated exercise.
- P8.11 (Closed) Inspection Followup Item (IFI) 50-461/98009-01: Use of Shift Technical Advisor to perform initial notifications. Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP) EC-07, "Emergency Plan Notification," Section 4.1.3, specified that the responsibility for completing notification to the State and NRC should not be assigned to the STA. Clinton Power Station (CPS) procedure 1401.02, "Operations Department Organization, Duties, and Responsibilities," dated September 1, 1998, describes in section 6.1 the operations shift compliment, to include an ERO Communicator. CPS form 1401.02F001, "Minimum Shift Coverage Log," Revision 0, dated September 1, 1998, provides for a Non-licensed Operator (NLO) to be appointed as ERO Communicator at the beginning of a shift. This item is closed.
- P8.12 (Closed) Violation (VIO) 50-461/98009-02: Failure to initiate the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) as soon as possible or within one hour of an Alert or higher emergency declaration. Discussion with licensee personnel and a review of procedures indicated that there was adequate assurance that the ERDS system would be initiated at

an Alert or higher. Procedure EC-07, Revision 10, dated February 11, 1997, in step 4.1.5.3, provided guidance to activate the ERDS system at an Alert or higher immediately after performing previous procedural steps. The procedure additionally noted that the checklists for the TSC Computer Operator and EOF Computer Operator describe how to activate ERDS. (Advance Change Notice 11/2).

Plant Protection Standing Order PSO-029, "Emergency Security Notifications," Revision 30, dated July 24, 1998, was revised to add the requirement for Security Supervision to activate the "simulator portion" of the ERDS activation sequence within one hour of the declaration of an Alert or higher emergency classification. Attachment #4 to the above procedure provides guidance for the security officer activating the system. The inspectors requested that a security supervisor be called to demonstrate the capability to perform the procedural steps to initiate the ERDS system. The officer was aware of the location of the simulator, the simulator computer room, and the specific terminal utilized for ERDS activation. He demonstrated knowledge of the location of the local copy of the procedure, and quickly performed the steps required for initiation of the "simulator portion" of the ERDS system.

Discussion with EP personnel indicated that an engineering request had been made to modify the ERDS system to allow system initiation from a single location. This modification will simplify the initiation sequence considerably and should reduce the overall time necessary for ERDS activation. Discussion indicated that the system modification should be completed by late 1999. This item is closed.

- P8.13 (Closed) Violation (VIO) 50-461/98009-03: Failure to have a sufficient number of trained response personnel on-shift. The licensee placed on shift the radiation protection technicians, mechanics, electricians, and control and instrumentation technicians that were 30-minute responders per Emergency Plan Table 2-1. An evaluation of the guidance in NUREG-0654 table B-1 and the Emergency Plan Table 2-1 was performed, considering the experience obtained from the response to the off-hours alert declaration on February 13, 1998. The licensee has developed a new table 2-1, which maintains most thirty-minute responders on shift. This revised table was submitted to NRC for prior review on July 14, 1998, but was described as an increase in the effectiveness in the Emergency Plan, and was therefore not reviewed by the NRC under 10 CFR 50.54(q). This item is closed.
- P8.14 (Open) Inspection Followup Item (IFI) 50-461/98009-04: Procedural definition of how the Station Emergency Director (SED) will control inplant teams. During the Alert declaration of February 13, 1998, the licensee determined that the SED was not always aware of operations teams formed and dispatched by the Assistant Shift Supervisor. This Item will remain open pending appropriate demonstration of capability to appropriately track field teams during an evaluated exercise.
- P8.15 (Closed) Violation (VIO) 50-461/98009-05: Failure to have Emergency Response Organization badge to facilitate entry to the Protected Area and response facilities. Station personnel were advised by bulletin of their management's expectation that all members of the ERO will carry their ERO badges at all times. Nuclear Support Services Department Procedure 3.94, "Access Processing," Revision 6, dated February 18, 1998,

with applicable advance change notices, was reviewed and did not appear to address wearing of the Owner Controlled Area (OCA) badge, had not been revised to require wearing of the OCA badge as indicated in the licensee's letter of August 5, 1998, and appeared to pertain to security badge request processing only. Discussion with EP personnel indicated that it had been decided to issue a policy statement rather than add a requirement to the badge processing procedure. While this appeared to be acceptable, it was different from the commitment contained in the licensee's response letter of August 5, 1998. Discussion with licensing personnel indicated that the licensee would clarify their response with an additional letter.

An off-hours emergency response drill was conducted and responders requested to verify ERO badge possession. EPIP EC-09, "Security During Emergencies," had been revised as committed. Sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 of the procedure indicated that ERO badges will be issued and access during emergencies will be by ERO badge or presence on the ERO roster. Illinois Power Company Nuclear Policy Statement (NPS) Number 17, "Nuclear Site Badges," Revision 0, dated June 1, 1998 indicated that Owner Controlled area badges should be worn at all times when the individual is present in the OCA. "Emergency Response Organization (ERO) members are required to have their OCA badge with the ERO insignia on their person while off-site so that CPS security and local law enforcement do not impede their re-entry to the site for emergency functions. Employees who inadvertently report to work without their OCA badge will not be denied OCA access; supervisors have discretion to enforce this policy. This item is closed.

- P8.16 (Closed) Inspection Followup Item (IFI) 50-461/98009-06: Exit signs did not illuminate in the Emergency Operations Facility. Discussion with EP personnel and a review of Condition Report 1-98-05-129 Revision 0, issued May 11, 1998, indicated that the Nicad rechargeable batteries for the EOF/training building exit lights had been replaced and a walkdown had been performed in other OCA buildings to make sure the exit lights and bulbs were working. An action was added to quarterly Preventive Maintenance (PM) Q007 to check exit signs. A sample of four exit lights in the EOF were tested, utilizing the test button, and functioned properly. This item is closed.
- P8.17 (Closed) Inspection Followup Item (IFI) 50-461/98009-07: Uninterruptible power supplies in the Emergency Operations Facility did not function for an acceptable length of time. The three uninterruptible power supplies in the EOF had been placed on a maintenance schedule which provided for battery discharge and recharge on a quarterly basis. The inspectors checked UPS performance by pulling their plugs and observing power supply performance. Equipment attached to the power supplies was utilized: the facsimile machine was used to send facsimiles, and the field team radio was used for radio communication. No problems were noted. This item is closed.
- P8.18 (Closed) Inspection Followup Item (IFI) 50-461/98009-08: Inability to perform dose projection in the Emergency Operations Facility using any of the backup methodologies. The inspectors tested the backup laptop personal computer and verified that the dose assessment program was functional. The calculator provided for use with the paper calculation method had been replaced with a more current model. This item is closed.

X1 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to licensee management at the conclusion of the onsite inspection on October 9, 1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.

The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

D. Basham, Supervisor, QA
K. Evans, Emergency Planning
J. Forman, Licensing Engineer
G. Hunger, Plant Manager
W. MacFarland, IV, Senior Vice President
W. Maguire, Director - Operations
B. Matherson, Auditor
R. Phares, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Performance Improvement
T. Roe, Maintenance
W. Romberg, Manager, Nuclear Station Engineering Department
P. Ryan, Shift Manager
R. Schenck, Supervisor, Maintenance
J. Sipek, Director, Licensing
D. Smith, Director, Security and Emergency Planning
W. Yaroz, Emergency Planning

NRC

T. Pruett, Senior Resident Inspector
C. Brown, Resident Inspector
K. Stoedter, Resident Inspector

Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety

D. Zemel, Resident Engineer

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

IP 82701 Operational Status of the Emergency Preparedness Program

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Opened

50-461/98025-01 IFI Problems with OSC emergency medical kits.

Closed

50-461/97022-04 IFI Training needed regarding requesting additional operator resources.

50-461/97022-05 IFI Correction to training on Emergency Operating procedure No. 6.

50-461/98003-14 IFI Ability to activate the Technical Support Center in an hour.

50-461/98009-01 IFI Use of Shift Technical Advisor to perform initial notifications.

50-461/98009-02 IFI Failure to initiate ERDS as soon as possible or within one hour of an Alert.

50-461/98009-03 VIO Failure to have sufficient trained response personnel on-shift.

50-461/98009-05 VIO Failure to have Emergency Response Organization badge to facilitate entry to the Protected Area and response facilities.

50-461/98009-06 IFI Exit signs did not illuminate in the Emergency Operations Facility.

50-461/98009-07 IFI Uninterruptible power supplies in the Emergency Operations Facility did not function for an acceptable length of time.

50-461/98009-08 IFI Inability to perform dose projection in the Emergency Operations Facility using any of the backup methodologies.

Discussed

50-461/98003-16 IFI Activation and response of the autodialer system.

50-461/98003-18 IFI Transfer of Command and Control from the Main Control Room to the Technical Support Center.

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

ACN	Advance Change Notice
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CPS	Clinton Power Station
CR	Condition Report
DRP	Division of Reactor Projects
DRS	Division of Reactor Safety
EAL	Emergency Action Level
ENS	Emergency Notification System
EOF	Emergency Operations Facility
EOP	Emergency Operating Procedures
EP	Emergency Preparedness
ERF	Emergency Response Facilities
ERO	Emergency Response Organization
EPIP	Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure
ERDS	Emergency Response Data System
IDNS	Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety
IFI	Inspection Followup Item
JPIC	Joint Public Information Center
NARS	Nuclear Accident Reporting System
NLO	Non-licensed Operator
NPF	Nuclear Power Facility
NPS	Nuclear Policy Statement
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRR	Nuclear Reactor Regulation
NUREG	Nuclear Regulatory Commission document
OCA	Owner Controller Area
OSC	Operations Support Center
PDR	Public Document Room
PM	Preventative Maintenance
RPT	Radiation Protection Technician
SAE	Site Area Emergency
SCBA	Self Contained Breathing Apparatus
SED	Station Emergency Director
SRI	Senior Resident Inspector
STA	Shift Technical Advisor
TSC	Technical Support Center
VIO	Violation

PARTIAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

EP Training Program Description Matrix requirements, Procedure AP-05, "EP Training Program."

Procedure FE-05, "Emergency Equipment and Supplies," dated May 29, 1997.

Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP) EC-07, "Emergency Plan Notification," Section 4.1.3.

Procedure EC-07, Revision 10, dated February 11, 1997.

Plant Protection Standing Order PSO-029, "Emergency Security Notifications," Revision 30, dated July 24, 1998.

Nuclear Support Services Department Procedure 3.94, "Access Processing," Revision 6, dated February 18, 1998.

EPIP EC-09, "Security During Emergencie: "

Illinois Power Company Nuclear Policy Statement (NPS) Number 17, "Nuclear Site Badges," Revision 0, dated June 1, 1998.

Condition Report 1-98-05-129 Revision 0, dated May 11, 1998.

CPS procedure 1401.02, "Operations Department Organization, Duties, and Responsibilities," dated September 1, 1998.

CPS form 1401.02F001, "Minimum Shift Coverage Log," Revision 0, dated September 1, 1998.

Nuclear Support Services Department Procedure 3.94, "Access Processing," Revision 6, dated February 18, 1998.