

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant
Post Office Box 2000
Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379

June 7, 1988

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Gentlemen:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 - DOCKET NO.
50-328 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-79 - SPECIAL REPORT 88-11

The enclosed special report provides details concerning missed fire watch routes due to airborne radiation developed in the Auxiliary Building unexpectedly. This event is reported in accordance with action statement (b) of Limiting Conditions for Operation 3.7.12.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY


S. J. Smith
Plant Manager

Enclosure
cc (Enclosure):

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SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT
UNITS 1 AND 2
SPECIAL REPORT 88-11

DESCRIPTION OF CONDITION

On May 17, 1988, with unit 1 in cold shutdown (0 percent power, 1.5 psig, 124 degrees F) and unit 2 in mode 1 (45 percent power, 2235 psig, 556 degrees F), the 0300 and 0400 hourly fire watch required by Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.12 was not performed due to airborne radioactivity developed in the Auxiliary Building unexpectedly. A leakage in the Auxiliary Building, elevation 669 (holdup tank valve gallery), occurred when unit 2 Operations personnel attempted to letdown the volume control tank (VCT) to holdup tank (HUT) B in order to make allowances for a unit 2 reactor coolant dilution. The operator was unable to readily open the valve which resulted in system pressurization and leakage through the valve diaphragm in the valve gallery.

CAUSE OF CONDITION

The shift operations supervisor decided to initiate an Auxiliary Building evacuation at 0250 EDT due to leaking valves in the holdup tank valve gallery. Fire watch personnel were not allowed to enter Auxiliary Building due to overriding safety concerns caused by airborne radioactivity in the Auxiliary Building.

ANALYSIS OF CONDITION

This special report is required by the action statement b of TS LCO 3.7.12. The fire watches are being performed as compensatory measure for the Appendix R program. The 0200 and 0600 EDT fire watches were performed, and no fires occurred during this time. The areas which the fire watch includes all have fire detection capabilities. A fire would be detected and suppressed by automatic or manual action.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

At 0536 EDT, access into Auxiliary Building was permitted, and fire watch personnel resumed fire watch activities immediately.

COMMITMENT

None.

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