

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-483/88007(DRP)

Docket No. 50-483

License No. NPF-30

Licensee: Union Electric Company
Post Office Box 149 - Mail Code 400
St. Louis, MO 63166

Facility Name: Callaway Plant, Unit 1

Inspection At: Callaway Site, Steedman, MO

Inspection Conducted: April 3 through May 21, 1988

Inspectors: B. H. Little

C. H. Brown

Approved By: *R. C. Knapp for*
R. W. DeFayette, Chief,
Reactor Projects Section 3A

6/7/88
Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection from April 3 through May 21, 1988 (Report No. 50-483/88007(DRP))

Areas Inspected: A routine unannounced safety inspection of Licensee Event Reports (LERs), previous identified problems, plant operations, engineered safety features (ESF) system walkdown, quality programs and administrative controls affecting quality, surveillance, maintenance, fire protection, radiological controls, outages, security, emergency preparedness, regional meeting and unresolved items.

Results: The licensee is expending significant staff time in developing and performing a safety system functional analysis (SSFA) type review of their systems. This area was discussed with regional management. The procedures for startup of the plant were revised with the operator's latitude for decisions being tightened in an effort to reduce problems during startup. Painting in the turbine building and the auxiliary building has improved housekeeping. No violation or deviations were identified. One unresolved item was identified in section six pertaining to the essential service water (ESW) system flow rates.

8806140360 880608
PDR ADOCK 05000483
Q DCD

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

D. F. Schnell, Vice President, Nuclear
*G. L. Randolph, General Manager, Nuclear Operations
*J. D. Blosser, Manager, Callaway Plant
*C. D. Naslund, Manager, Operations Support
A. P. Neuhalfen, Manager, Quality Assurance
J. R. Peevy, Assistant Manager, Technical Services
W. R. Campbell, Assistant Manager, Nuclear Engineering
M. E. Taylor, Superintendent, Operations
D. E. Young, Superintendent, Maintenance
*W. R. Robinson, Assistant Manager, Operations and Maintenance
R. R. Roselius, Superintendent, Health Physics
T. P. Sharkey, Supervisor, Compliance
G. J. Czeschin, Superintendent, Planning and Scheduling
W. H. Sheppard, Superintendent, Outages
*G. R. Pendegraff, Superintendent, Security
*L. H. Kanuckel, Supervisor, Quality Assurance Program
R. D. Affolter, Superintendent, Systems Engineering
J. V. Laux, Superintendent, Technical Support, Quality Assurance
G. A. Hughes, Supervisor, Independent Safety Engineer Group
J. C. Gearhart, Superintendent, Operations Support, Quality Assurance
*J. J. Cassmeyer, Quality Assurance Engineer

*Denotes those present at one or more exit interviews.

In addition, a number of equipment operators, reactor operators, senior reactor operators, and other members of the quality control, operations, maintenance, health physics, and engineering staffs were contacted.

2. Inspection of Licensee Event Reports (LERs) (92700)

Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and a review of records, the following licensee event report was reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, that immediate corrective action was accomplished, and that corrective action to prevent recurrence was accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications (T/Ss). The LER listed below is considered closed.

LER 87-030-00: Engineered Safety Features (ESF) Actuation on Loss of ESF Bus NB01.

The above LER describes three separate occurrences of unplanned containment purge isolations (CPIs) and control room ventilation isolations (CRVIs) caused by upscale signal spikes on radiation monitors upon loss of ESF bus NB01. The events, causes and corrective actions are summarized as follows:

Event 1: On October 23, 1987, the main switchyard breaker, 52-3, tripped open resulting in loss of the ESF bus NB01. The licensee's review did not determine the cause of the event. There was no associated work activities and no apparent equipment failures. The licensee is evaluating a design change which would use the relay outputs from radiation monitors to provide the actuations of the ESF systems.

Event 2: On October 28, 1987, a loss of ESF bus NB01 occurred when utility operators attempted to energize the load shed emergency load sequencer (LSELS) Train A (NF039A). The LSELS bistables were in the "off" position during work on a LSELS undervoltage power supply module.

When the associated relay power supply was energized with the de-energized LSELS bistables, a degraded voltage signal/load shed signal was produced and sent to NB01's normal feeder breaker, NB0112. The breaker tripped open, causing a loss of NB01.

Operations personnel were not aware that the local bistable switches were in the "off" position and OTS-NB-00001 (Preparation for and Performance of NB01 Bus Outages) did not adequately define power-up operations for NF039A.

OTS-NB-00001 and the similar procedure for NB02 have been revised to include more detailed instructions, and precautions for the operator to take prior to restoring output relay power to NF039A and B.

Event 3: On October 29, 1987, utility system relay personnel were performing MPE-ZZ-NY159, "Operational Test Sequence of 345KV Bus 'A'." Due to miscommunication, relay number 51S#1-V22 in the 52-1 power circuit breaker (PCB) panel was operated instead of relay 51NS#1-V22 located in the XNB01 switchgear panel next to the 52-1 panel. This action caused breaker 52-3 to trip open causing loss of power to NB01.

The event was reviewed by the utility system relay services field and engineering personnel with emphasis on careful reading and following of procedures. The standard relay precautionary practices to prevent trips were also emphasized.

The inspectors determined that the events posed no threat to public or plant safety. The CPI and CRVI did not result from actual radiation levels, and safety systems functioned as designed. The activities and personnel involved in Events 2 and 3 differ but identify procedural weakness and indicate a need for increased attention to detail. The licensee has taken appropriate action to bring about improvement in this area.

No violations or deviations were identified.

3. Inspection of Previous Identified Problems (92701)

(Closed) Violation (483/87026-01(DRP)): Technical Specifications Violation due to inoperable safety injection pumps. This item concerns an unreviewed safety question (10 CFR 50.59(a)(1)(iii)) which resulted during closure of valve BN-HV-8813 (Safety Injection Combined Recirculation) to perform operations surveillance and maintenance retest activities. The violation was identified and documented by the licensee in LER number 87017-00.

The licensee's action to prevent recurrence included the following:

- The preventive maintenance on EJ-HV-8804A and B has been rescheduled to occur during Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) or Mode 6 (Refueling). This will preclude closure of BN-HV-8813 for retests of the two EJ valves in modes when BN-HV-8813 is required to be operable.
- A letter was issued to the Shift Supervisors to emphasize the necessity for adequate evaluation of all activities prior to performance.
- The quarterly pump surveillance procedures were changed to delete the requirement for cycling BN-HV-8813. In addition, other surveillance procedures which cycle the valves referenced in Technical Specification 4.5.2, were reviewed to ensure they are not cycled during power operations, startup, or hot standby in any other procedure. No other problems were identified.
- Special notations were added to the computerized Master Equipment List to identify the appropriate precautions and mode restraints necessary for maintenance of the valves listed in Technical Specification 4.5.2.

The inspectors verified the licensee's completion of corrective actions in this matter. The violation and LER 87017-00 are considered closed.

4. Plant Operations (71707)

a. Operational Safety Verification

Inspections were routinely performed to ensure that the licensee conducts activities at the facility safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements. The inspections focused on the implementation and overall effectiveness of the licensee's control of operating activities, and on the performance of licensed and non-licensed operators and shift technical advisors. The following items were considered during these inspections:

- Adequacy of plant staffing and supervision.
- Control room professionalism, including procedure adherence, operator attentiveness, and response to alarms, events, and off-normal conditions.

- Operability of selected safety-related systems, including attendant alarms, instrumentation, and controls.
- Maintenance of quality records and reports.

The inspections included direct observation of activities, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, independent verification of safety system status and LCOs, and reviews of facility procedures, records, and reports.

Performance of the following procedures was observed.

<u>Procedure Number</u>	<u>Activity</u>
OTG-ZZ-00003	Plant Startup (5 to 20 Percent Power)
OTO-AC-00001	Turbine Trip Off-Normal
E-O/ES0.1	Emergency Procedure

b. Off-shift Inspection of Control Rooms

The inspectors performed routine inspections of the control room during off-shift and weekend periods; these included inspections between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m. The inspections were conducted to assess overall crew performance and, specifically, control room operator attentiveness during night shifts. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's administrative controls regarding "Conduct of Operations" and interviewed the licensee's security personnel, shift supervisors and operators to determine if shift personnel were notified of the inspectors' arrivals on site during off-shifts.

The inspectors determined that both licensed and non-licensed operators were attentive to their duties, and that the inspectors' arrivals on site were unannounced. The licensee has implemented appropriate administrative controls related to the conduct of operations. These include procedures which specify fitness for duty and operator attentiveness. Personal radios and reading materials are prohibited.

No violations or deviations were identified.

5. ESF System Walkdown (71710)

The operability of selected engineered safety features was confirmed by the inspectors during walkdowns of the accessible portions of several systems. The following items were included: verification that procedures match the plant drawings, equipment conditions, housekeeping, instrumentation, valve and electrical breaker lineup status (per procedure checklist), and verification that locks, tags, jumpers, etc. are properly attached and identifiable. The following systems were walked down during this inspection period:

- "A" Emergency Diesel Generator
- "B" Emergency Diesel Generator
- Component Cooling Water System
- Essential Service Water System
- Auxiliary Feed Water System
- Reactor Trip System
- 125 Volt D.C. Power Source
- AC Electrical Vital Power Source

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Quality Programs and Administrative Controls Affecting Quality (35701)

An inspection of the licensee's quality programs was performed to assess the implementation and effectiveness of programs associated with management control, verification, and oversight activities. The inspectors considered areas indicative of overall management involvement in quality matters, including the frequency of management plant tours and control room observations, and management personnel's attendance at technical, planning/schedule, and committee meetings. The inspectors attended On-site Review Committee meetings and incident/event critiques and reviewed related documents, focusing on the licensee's root cause determinations and corrective actions. The inspectors accompanied licensee management on monthly plant tours, which focused on quality activities and material conditions within the plant. The inspection also included a review of quality records and selected quality assurance audit and surveillance activities. Performance in this area included the following major items:

Safety System Functional Assessment (SSFA) of the Essential Service Water System (ESWS)

The licensee developed and implemented a SSFA program to obtain an in-depth performance and technical assessment of plant safety systems operational readiness. The objective of the initial SSFA was to assess the operational readiness of the Essential Service Water System by determining whether:

- The system is capable of performing the safety functions required by the design bases.
- Testing is adequate to demonstrate that the system would perform all of the safety functions required.
- System maintenance (with emphasis on pumps and valves) is adequate to ensure system operability under postulated accident conditions.
- Operator and maintenance technician training is adequate to ensure proper operation and maintenance of the system.

- Human factors considerations relating to the selected system (e.g., accessibility and labeling of valves) and the supporting procedures for the system are adequate to ensure proper system operation under normal and accident conditions.
- Management controls including procedures are adequate to ensure that the safety system will fulfill the safety functions required by the design bases.

The SSFA team members were comprised of personnel from several disciplines within Engineering, Operations, Instruments and Controls (I&C), and Quality Assurance (QA). The QA Division of the Quality Systems Department maintained coordination and oversight responsibility for this SSFA.

The assessment was performed during January through April, 1988, and consumed approximately 150 man-weeks of effort. The assessment identified a number of weaknesses as well as needs for program enhancement in the following areas:

- Control of calculations, design bases and design inputs.
- ESW system flow uncertainties.
- ESW system corrosion and siltation.
- Callaway modification package interfaces with drawings, procedures and retests.
- Functional testing and I&C preventive maintenance.

The SSFA team's finding, based on review of the entire scope of testing conducted on the ESW system showed that, although technical specification surveillance test (includes ASME, Section XI) requirements have been met, system functional testing has not been sufficient to conclude that the system would supply the post-LOCA flows stated in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).

The licensee developed and implemented an action plan in response to the flow concerns. On April 24, 1988, while the plant was in Mode-5 (Cold Shutdown), flow verification of ESWS, Train 'A' was performed with the system in a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) line up.

The initial flow verification (using installed flow instruments) determined that reduced flow condition existed in cooling lines to the diesel generator (D/G) and various safety components room coolers. Subsequent flow measurements with a poly-seismic flow instrument showed that the reduced flow was limited to the 'A' D/G cooler. The as-found flow was 741 gpm. The FSAR Table 9.2-3 (Essential Service Water System Flow Requirements Post LOCA Operation) specifies 1200 gpm flow to the D/G cooler. During performance of prerequisites for the flow test, four throttle valves for room coolers, were found to be out of position from that specified in plant procedure positions (established during preoperational tests).

The largest position variance was 1 3/8 turns. Repositioning of the valves, to the specified position, had minimal effect on system or component flows.

On April 28, 1988, flow verification was performed on ESWS, Train 'B'. Flows of less than those specified in the FSAR were identified. The total ESWS Train 'B' flow was approximately 3% low. Throttle valve position variances were also identified.

The 'A' D/G heat exchangers, ESW side, were opened and inspected. The material found in the flow path was judged to have caused minimal flow blockage. The flow rates were determined to be relatively high in these heat exchangers and flow degradation from silting was probably not occurring.

Through routine discussions with utility management and SSFA team members, the resident inspectors were apprised of on-going SSFA activities, significant findings and the licensee's response. The inspectors reviewed the SSFA Assessment Report and associated incident reports and observed that appropriate corrective action was initiated.

It appears that the licensee's initial SSFA effort resulted in a comprehensive professional assessment of the ESWS. It was also apparent that utility management and staff were supportive of the SSFA initiative and responsive to the team's findings.

The licensee is performing component operability evaluations based on the "as-found" flows. A review is also being made to determine the reason for throttle valve position changes.

The licensee's evaluation in this matter is continuing. This matter is unresolved, pending further NRC review. (Unresolved Item (483/88007-01(DRP))).

No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Surveillance (61726)

The inspectors reviewed or observed selected portions of the Technical Specifications required surveillance testing during power operations. Items which were considered during the inspection included whether adequate procedures were used to perform the testing, whether test instrumentation was calibrated, whether test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedural requirements, and whether tests were performed within the required time limits. The inspectors determined that the test results were reviewed by individuals other than the personnel involved with the performance of the tests, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.

The inspectors' overview of the licensee's surveillance program showed that the licensee had developed and implemented a comprehensive and effective program.

The reviewed surveillances included:

<u>Procedure No.</u>	<u>Activity</u>
OSP-SF-0005	Estimated critical position calculations.
ITLs are I&C Loop Calibration Procedures	
ITL-AE-0F550	Loop Flow; Steam generator 'A' feedwater bypass flow.
ISL-GS-00A2B	I&C Loop test on loop analysis; Containment hydrogen analyzer train 'B'.
ITL-AE-0F540	Loop Flow; Steam generator (S/G) 'D' feedwater (FW) flow control.
ITL-AE-0F530	Loop Flow; Steam generator (S/G) 'C' feedwater (FW) regulating valve.
ITL-AE-0F520	Loop Flow; Steam generator (S/G) 'B' feedwater (FW) regulating valve.
ITL-AE-0F510	Loop Flow; Steam generator (S/G) 'A' feedwater (FW) regulating valve.
OSP-ZZ-00001	Control room shift and daily log reading and channel checks.
ISF-AB-0P534	I&C Functional Test: Functional-pressure S/G 'C' pressure.
ISF-AB-0P544	I&C Functional Test: Functional-pressure S/G 'D' pressure.
ITM-ZZ-00015	I&C Generic Procedure: Rod control trouble-shooting guidelines.
ISL-AL-000F3	I&C Loop Calibration: Loop-flow auxiliary feedwater to S/G 'B'.
ISL-GN-0P935	I&C surveillance loop-pressure containment pressure protection.
ISL-SE-0N44B	I&C Loop Calibration: Loop-nuclear; nuclear instrument power range N42.

Surveillances were performed per procedures and on schedule during this inspection period. The licensee is proceeding with development of a computer tracking system for completed surveillances.

All surveillances observed were conducted satisfactorily and no violations or deviations were identified.

8. Maintenance (62703)

Selected portions of the plant maintenance activities on safety-related systems and components were observed or reviewed to ascertain that the activities were performed in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards, and the Technical Specifications. The inspections included activities associated with preventive and corrective maintenance of electrical, instrumentation and control, and mechanical equipment and systems. The following items were considered during these inspections: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibration was performed prior to returning the components or systems to service; parts and materials that were used were properly certified; and appropriate fire prevention, radiological, and housekeeping conditions were maintained.

The reviewed maintenance activities included:

<u>Work Request No.</u>	<u>Activity</u>
PS WR 4251	Feedwater control bypass valves (valve stroke/regulator adjustment).
PW WR 4521	Troubleshooting (spiking on source range channel N-31).
TM 88-E0007	Disable throttle pressure limiter (main turbine control system).
W106420	Thermocouple conoseal leak repair.
W106449	Diesel Generator 'A' (inspect and clean coolers).
WR 113960	Main feed pump (MFP) 'B' failure to trip on high discharge pressure and remote signal.
ETP-ZZ-ST014	Engineering test procedure for the reactor power upgrade.
ETP-ZZ-01322	Determination of electrical power generator capability at nuclear steam supply system thermal power output of 3579 MWTH.
Multiple Work Requests for Each Feedwater Regulating Valve (4 Total)	Inspection, "roll pin" removal and replacement with solid pin and tack weld in the plug-stem connection.

Multiple Work
Requests for 1-C
Heater Repair

Open, inspect, eddy current performed on tubes,
placing stiffening rods in leaking tubes and
plugging.

The maintenance work was performed in a satisfactory manner. Rigging was used where necessary to prevent equipment damage and provide personnel protection. The procedures were found to be adequate and cleanliness was maintained when systems were open. Several pieces of the "roll pins" were found missing and an evaluation was performed to assess possible damage to steam generator tubes. It was also noted that the smaller bypass feedwater regulating valves were disassembled and solid pins installed and tack-welded to prevent the stem from separating from the plug.

A modification was installed and tested. CMP-87-1004 and WR-C435057: the installation of an alarm on the main control board "Turbine Run Back". This alarms when the vendor turbine run-backs occur, and not the owner installed run-backs.

All maintenance activities inspected were satisfactory and no violations or deviations were identified.

9. Fire Protection (64704)

Implementation of the licensee's fire protection/prevention program was routinely assessed by the inspectors during plant tours. The inspection included observation of housekeeping conditions, storage and control of combustible material, operability of fire protection/suppression systems, and fire brigade staffing and training.

One announced fire brigade drill was monitored during the inspection interval. The response time of the brigade to assemble was satisfactory. The manual fire equipment was noted to have been maintained; and at the completion of the drill, the equipment was returned to readiness status.

The housekeeping and control of combustible materials and flammable liquids were found to be satisfactory. A review of selected surveillances for this area indicated that the surveillances were up to date. The operability of the fire protection/suppression equipment and systems were maintained. Fire watches and patrols were utilized in areas of the plant when required by the Technical Specifications.

The licensee has been painting in several areas of the plant for preservation and radiological controls. The painting has improved the housekeeping and general appearance in these areas. Tentative plans include additional painting in other areas. The painting has improved the lamination levels in these areas which may improve personnel safety and associated items.

Fire protection, equipment control and verification have been removed from the Technical Specifications and placed in the plant procedures. The following Nuclear Function Administrative Procedures were issued or revised:

APA-ZZ-00700, Rev. 5, Dated 4/11/88, Fire Protection Program.

APA-ZZ-00701, Rev. 3, Dated 4/11/88, Control of Impairments to Fire Protection Systems and Components.

APA-ZZ-00702, Rev. 2, Dated 4/11/88, Actions of Plant Personnel Upon Discovery of a Fire.

APA-ZZ-00703, Rev. 0, Dated 4/11/88, Fire Protection Operability Criteria and Surveillance Requirements.

APA-ZZ-00741, Rev. 8, Dated 4/11/88, Control and Transportation of Combustible Materials.

APA-ZZ-00742, Rev. 7, Dated 4/11/88, Control of Ignition Sources.

APA-ZZ-00743, Rev. 10, Dated 4/12/88, Fire Team Organization and Duties.

APA-ZZ-00744, Rev. 3, Dated 4/11/88, Control of Fire Barrier Integrity.

Other procedures, referencing fire protection, were also revised.

No violations or deviations were identified.

10. Radiological Controls (71709)

The licensee's radiological controls and practices were routinely observed by the inspectors during plant tours and during the inspection of selected work activities. The inspection included direct observations of health physics (HP) activities relating to radiological surveys and monitoring, maintenance of radiological control signs and barriers, contamination, and radioactive waste controls. The inspection also included a routine review of the licensee's radiological and water chemistry control records and reports. Good HP housekeeping practices were observed. The inspectors observed that personnel entering, working in, and exiting radiological control areas generally displayed good radiological work practices.

During the inspection period, radiologically contaminated areas were reduced. Several areas were painted to facilitate cleanup if the area becomes contaminated.

No violations or deviations were identified.

11. Outages (71707 - 61715)

The inspectors observed or reviewed the licensee and contractor activities associated with plant outages. The inspection focused on outage management program implementation, including planning, scheduling and oversight activities. The inspection included attendance of the planning and scheduling meetings, direct observation of selected modifications, repair or testing of safety systems or components, and the review of quality records.

During the inspection period the licensee had two outages for maintenance. On April 11, the plant output was reduced to 94% due to tube leaks in the 1-C feedwater heater resulting in the isolation of that heater string. The plant was shutdown for two days, April 16 and 17, to repair the heater and other maintenance items. The general control and performance during the outage was satisfactory although several items were noted. During shutdown, at approximately 10% power, the turbine was auto-tripped to a high steam generator level - the feedwater regulating valve actuator was improperly adjusted and the valve indicated closed but was not and the steam generator's continued level increase was not noted. During the restart sequence, steam generator level oscillations occurred resulting in a reactor trip. During work on the 1-C heater it was found that a 17" X 34" piece of 3/4" plywood had not been removed after work had been performed in the heater during the second refueling outage. The licensee's actions on these items was considered satisfactory. The events are still under review by the licensee.

On April 21, the reactor was manually tripped from about 94% when the feedwater regulating valve plug separated from the stem and shut off flow to the steam generator. The plant was taken to mode 5 later on when a leak was noted on the core thermo-couple conoseal. During the 10-day outage, the four feedwater regulating valves and the similarly constructed feedwater bypass regulating valves were modified to prevent plug-stem separation. The leak on the conoseal was seal-welded. Maintenance items were performed, including the "critical" welds on the piping replacements in the feedwater systems, due to pipe wall thinning. The piping replacement was already in progress, but the work was easier to perform with the plant shutdown. Due to EQ issues, two spare containment penetration modules were removed for further evaluation.

During the outage the ESW system flow verifications were performed; see section 6.a for the discussion. The startup from this outage was performed with revised procedures which provided a smooth startup. The procedures were used again to restart from a trip on May 2 with similar results. The revision was part of the licensee's action due to past problems during restart of the plant.

12. Security (71881)

The licensee's security activities were observed by the inspectors during routine facility tours and during the inspectors' site arrivals and departures. Observations included the security personnel's performance associated with access control, security checks, and surveillance activities, and focused on the adequacy of security staffing, the security response (compensatory measures), and the security staff's attentiveness and thoroughness.

The security forces' performance in these areas appeared satisfactory. An increase of monitoring doors which were not being fully closed has helped alleviate this problem. A problem with leaving keys inside

onsite cars and trucks was noted in the onsite newsletter. Asking everyone's cooperation appears to have helped minimize the problem's recurrence.

No violations or deviations were identified.

13. Emergency Preparedness (82301)

An inspection of emergency preparedness activities was performed to assess the licensee's implementation of the emergency plan and implementing procedures. The inspection included monthly observation of emergency facilities and equipment, interviews with licensee staff, and a review of selected emergency implementing procedures.

Two emergency preparedness drills were performed during this inspection interval in preparation for the June 6 drill that will be graded. The inspectors were notified at the initial phase of the drills and plan to participate in the June 6 drill. The licensee's personnel appear to be satisfactorily prepared for emergencies.

No violations or deviations were identified.

14. Regional Meeting

On May 18, a meeting was held including Region III staff and Callaway management to discuss the increase of occurrences of reactor trips and personnel errors as compared to the previous year. The licensee also discussed their ongoing systems evaluation program. Upgrading of reactor power and results of the tests were discussed. The flow anomaly, previously experienced, was stated not to have changed with the upgrade. The exchange of information in this manner was considered to be beneficial to both parties.

15. Unresolved Item

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether it is an acceptable item, a violation, a failure to meet a licensee commitment, or a deviation. An unresolved item (483/88007-01 (DRP)) is contained in section 6.a.

16. Exit Meeting (30703)

The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted under Persons Contacted) at intervals during the inspection period. The inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee representatives acknowledged the findings as reported herein. The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents/processes as proprietary.