



Point Beach Nuclear Plant
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NPL 98-0896

10 CFR 50.4

October 23, 1998

Document Control Desk
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Mail Station P1-137
Washington, DC 20555

Ladies/Gentlemen:

DOCKETS 50-266 AND 50-301
GENERIC LETTER 96-06, COMMITMENT CHANGE
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2

By letter dated January 28, 1997, and as supplemented on June 25, 1997, we submitted our 120-day response to GL 96-06, "Assurance of Equipment Operability and Containment Integrity During Design Basis Accident Conditions." In that letter, we discussed the potential for thermally-induced overpressurization in certain containment penetrations at our Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP), Units 1 and 2. One of the containment penetrations discussed in the response was P-12a, "Containment DI Water Supply." Our evaluation concluded that Penetration 12a was operable for both units based on the action we had proposed to take to revise the containment integrity checklists to ensure adequate draining of the demineralized (DI) water piping between the containment penetration isolation valves and isolation of the DI water supply to the isolated pipe section. The containment integrity checklists for both units have been revised as discussed for these penetrations.

Our January 28, 1997, response also stated that, in the long term, a modification would be planned to add more valves on the supply side of the containment isolation valves to better isolate the containment piping from the water supply. Our letter dated December 18, 1997, included a summary of the corrective actions being taken for each containment penetration. That summary included our proposed schedule for the Penetration P-12a modification. We planned to complete the modification for Unit 1 during Refueling 24 and for Unit 2 during Refueling 23 scheduled to begin in December 1998. The Unit 1 piping modification has been completed.

During our evaluation of a proposed modification to the DI water piping to Unit 2 containment penetration (P-12a), we determined that the modification we had originally proposed is not necessary. The configuration of the DI water piping to the Unit 2 containment penetration is different than the Unit 1 piping. For Unit 2, we are able to use an existing valve


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(DI-2) to isolate DI water to the Unit 2 penetration isolation valves. Although this also isolates one DI hose station, (DI-5, BA Evap Condensate Demin Hose Connection), the unavailability of this hose station during Unit 2 operation does not have a significant impact. Accordingly, we are considering canceling this proposed modification and will not be installing additional valves in the associated Unit 2 DI water piping during the fall 1998 refueling outage.

Please contact us if you have any questions concerning our decision in this regard.

Sincerely,



Vito A. Kaminskas

Manager,

Regulatory Services & Licensing

CWK/dms

cc: NRC Resident Inspector
NRC Regional Administrator
NRC Project Manager
PSCW