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Licensee: Philadelphia Electric Company
2301 Market Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101

Facility Name: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Units 2 and 3

Location: Delta, Pennsylvania

Dates: November 13, 1987 to January 14, 1988

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6/1/88
date

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6-1-88
date

A special inspection was conducted to assess the newly formed operating shifts at Peach Bottom. The inspection results are given in the Summary (Section 1).

Philadelphia Electric should evaluate and correct individual communications concerns identified in Section 8 of this report.

No violations were identified. No programmatic weaknesses were identified.

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Enclosures:

1. Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Fall 1987 Simulator Teamwork Training Evaluation Checklist
2. NRC Evaluation Form

1. SUMMARY

As a result of the newly formed operating crews, at the Peach Bottom facility, the NRC determined that an assessment of crew performance was necessary. Arrangements for the assessments were described in a letter from the NRC to Philadelphia Electric Company (PECo) dated September 21, 1987.

The assessments were performed to measure overall crew interaction, the knowledge and use of Peach Bottom procedures, the knowledge and use of Technical Specifications, crew communications, and operator responsibility. Additionally the assessments measured the Shift Managers' ability to supervise the operating crews and implement the Emergency Plan.

The objective of this assessment was to evaluate the effectiveness of the Shift Manager and operating crew training in the above areas to ensure that all operating crews exhibited acceptable performance for the safe restart of the Peach Bottom reactors.

The assessments were conducted by the NRC between November 13, 1987 and January 14, 1988, at the Limerick simulator, using Peach Bottom tapes in the computer memory.

Section 7 of this report characterizes performance, strengths and weaknesses for each crew. General conclusions on weaknesses and strengths are given below.

Two concerns were related to individual performance. The first concern relates to individual communication weaknesses. This area should be reviewed by PECo to correct any problems found and further enhance crew performance. The second concern relates to the attitude expressed by a crew member when he was turning over a stuck rod control problem to an instructor acting as the Reactor Engineer (see Section 7.4). The attitude displayed is of concern because it has the potential to create interface problems between the operators and other departments on site. This attitude was observed on only one occasion and is considered unique.

The crews responded very well to transients. The crews also demonstrated good knowledge and use of Technical Specifications and procedures.

The Shift Managers were assessed as being effective in their roles as crew supervisors and leaders.

The inspection team concluded that each operating crew exhibited satisfactory performance for all areas assessed.

No violations were identified. No programmatic weaknesses were identified.

2. BACKGROUND

Subsequent to the NRC Order of March 31, 1987 and the establishment by Philadelphia Electric Company (PECo) of new operating crews, headed by Shift Managers, the NRC determined that an assessment of these operating crews was necessary. Arrangements were made for the assessments via a letter from Mr. William Russell, Regional Administrator to Mr. J. W. Gallagher, Vice President, Nuclear Operations dated September 21, 1987.

This inspection report documents the crew assessments. These assessments were conducted between November 13, 1987 and January 14, 1988. Interim exit meetings were held by the team leaders after each assessment was performed.

3. SCOPE OF INSPECTION

The assessment were performed to measure the following eight (8) areas:

1. overall crew interaction
2. the knowledge and use of Peach Bottom procedures
3. the knowledge and use of Technical Specifications
4. crew communications
5. operator responsibility
6. supervisory ability
7. Shift Managers' ability to supervise and lead the operating crews
8. Shift Managers' implementation of the Emergency Plan.

The objective of this assessment was to evaluate the effectiveness of the Shift Manager and operating crew training in the above areas to ensure that the operating crews exhibited acceptable performance for the safe restart of the Peach Bottom reactors.

4. PERSONS CONTACTED

PECo Employees, Consultants and Contractors

R. Andrews, Training Coordinator, Peach Bottom
 R. Bulmer, Superintendent Nuclear Training, PECo
 R. Helt, Branch Head, Limerick Training Center
 D. McClellan, Instructor, Peach Bottom
 C. Schwartz, Instructor, Peach Bottom
 J. Clupp, Shift Manager, Peach Bottom
 G. Gellrich, Shift Manager, Peach Bottom
 S. Mannix, Shift Manager, Peach Bottom
 T. Niessen, Shift Manager, Peach Bottom
 D. Warfel, Shift Manager, Peach Bottom
 T. Wasong, Shift Manager, Peach Bottom
 K. Brown, Consultant, MAC
 B. Redick, Consultant, MAC
 W. Thomas, Consultant, MAC

State of Pennsylvania

S. Maingi, Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation Protection, Nuclear Engineer

5. BRIEF CHRONOLOGY

March 31, 1987 - NRC issues shutdown order

July 1987 - PECo announces formation of new operating crews and the creation of the Shift Manager position

August 14, 1987 - NRC inspectors meet with the Peach Bottom Training Coordinator and members of his staff at the Limerick Simulator to review the physical fidelity and transient response fidelity of the Limerick simulator in order to determine the feasibility of using the Limerick simulator to perform Peach Bottom operating crew evaluations

September 21, 1987 - A letter is sent from Mr. William Russell, Regional Administrator to Mr. J. W. Gallagher, Vice President Nuclear Operations requesting information and formalizing a schedule

November 6, 1987 - NRC inspectors conduct familiarization tour of the Limerick simulator

November 13, 1987 - Assessments started

January 14, 1988 - Assessments completed

6. DESCRIPTION OF EVALUATIONS

Based on the results of the August 14 meeting it was determined that the Limerick simulator was suitable for assessment of the Peach Bottom operating crews but the assessment areas would be limited to those described in Section 3 of this report.

The Peach Bottom training staff provided the NRC copies of the Simulator Training Scenarios (STS) and an evaluation of how compatible these scenarios were for use on the Limerick simulator. Information on the cause and effect of simulator malfunctions were also provided. The STS's and other information were used by the NRC to develop scenarios for the crew evaluations. A typical scenario contained at least one each of the following: a normal evolution, a component failure not expected to cause a scram, an instrument or controller failure not expected to cause a scram, and a major failure causing a transient.

The Peach Bottom training staff provided the NRC with its team training learning objectives, its evaluation checklist (Enclosure 1), the administrative procedures which define the conduct of operations and position descriptions for the Shift Manager and the other members of the operating crew. From the information provided, NRC operator licensing examiner experience, and other sources, the NRC developed an evaluation guide for the assessments (Enclosure 2).

Each operating crew was evaluated during the performance of two NRC prepared simulator scenarios. Strengths and weaknesses are given in Section 7 of this report.

7. SUMMARY OF EACH CREW'S PERFORMANCE

A total of six (6) operating crews were assessed between November 13, 1987 and January 14, 1988. The original schedule was to evaluate one crew per week for six weeks. The schedule was revised when two of the crews were determined by the licensee to require additional training and were rescheduled for later dates.

The strengths, weaknesses, and general comments were provided to PECO during interim exit meetings held by the team leaders after the assessments. The information below is presented chronologically.

7.1 ASSESSMENT DATE: November 13, 1987

SHIFT 3 - J. Clupp, Shift Manager

STRENGTHS:

- Identification of off-normal conditions and actions to correct them
- Use of procedures and Technical Specifications

WEAKNESSES:

- Under accident conditions the Shift Technical Advisor (STA) gathered data and marked the Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) flowcharts including indicating decision steps. This activity gave the appearance that the STA was directing the Shift Supervisor (SS) through the steps related to the EOPs. In the post scenario exit meeting the Shift Manager (SM) stated that he had directed the STA to assist the SS in updating progress through the procedures.

GENERAL:

The command and control activities of the Shift Manager and overall crew communications were assessed as adequate. No significant generic problem areas were noted. Overall crew performance was assessed as adequate.

7.2 ASSESSMENT DATE: December 4, 1987

SHIFT 6 - T. Wasong, Shift Manager

STRENGTHS:

- Event diagnosis and response using procedures to stabilize the plant.

WEAKNESSES:

- On a few occasions the operators did not communicate, to other crew members and supervision, major equipment status changes and feedback on operator actions.

SUMMARY:

- Overall crew performance was assessed as adequate. The command and control of the Shift Manager and the Shift Supervisor were assessed as adequate.

7.3 ASSESSMENT DATE: December 11, 1987

SHIFT 1 - T. Niessen, Shift Manager

STRENGTHS:

- Crew communications and interaction. The Shift Manager and the Shift Supervisor worked well together. Decisions were well thought out.

WEAKNESSES:

- An individual weakness was noted for one Reactor Operator who became overly focused on the process computer information displays and did not review the panel indications (which were behind him) on a regular basis. This action continued throughout the evaluation.

GENERAL:

Overall crew performance, command and control of the Shift Manager and the Shift Supervisor and overall crew communications were assessed as good.

7.4 ASSESSMENT DATE: December 18, 1987

SHIFT 2 - G. Gellrich, Shift Manager

STRENGTHS:

- Use of procedures and Technical Specifications.
- Crew communication and coordination with the exception of one RO (see weakness No. 1.)
- Quick recognition and actions to mitigate off-normal conditions. This crew appeared particularly competent in this area.

WEAKNESSES:

- In one scenario, the RWCU non-regenerative heat exchanger had a leak, the Shift Supervisor (SS) directed the Control Operator (CO) to "swap the heat exchangers." The CO called the Plant Equipment Operator (PO) and directed him to place the standby RBCCW heat exchanger in service and to secure the operating RBCCW heat exchanger. The unit 3 Reactor Operator, who was at a table with no duties because the unit 3 panels are not simulated, notified the SS of the improper (ie, swapping the RBCCW heat exchangers vice the RWCU heat exchangers) direction from the CO to the PO. The SS then gave the CO more specific direction to swap the RWCU heat exchangers vice the RBCCW heat exchangers.
- On an individual level, one unique situation occurred while attempting to correct a stuck rod condition: the SS made a statement to an instructor who was acting as the Reactor Engineer to the effect "This is your rod now, take care of it." This statement was made with a disparaging tone and could have

the potential to create misunderstanding when interfacing with support groups.

GENERAL:

Overall crew performance, command and control of the Shift Manager and the Shift Supervisor, and overall crew communications were assessed as good. The weaknesses noted were individual and did not hamper team performance.

7.5 ASSESSMENT DATE: January 13, 1988

SHIFT 4 - D. Warfel, Shift Manager

STRENGTHS:

- Knowledge and use of Technical Specifications

WEAKNESSES:

- Knowledge and use of procedures. In one of the scenarios, an Operational Transient procedure was not entered when it should have been. In another scenario, the SS should have exited EOP-100 and entered EOP-101. Instead, he performed these procedures in parallel. Use of other procedures by the crew was assessed as adequate.
- In the first scenario with the reactor at high power, the Unit 2 Reactor Operator noted a high reactor water level. Following a check of other indications, he reported that a feed pump had tripped. The other crew members failed to question or correct this erroneous report. The erroneous report led to the occurrence of a reactor scram.

GENERAL:

Overall crew performance, and command and control of the Shift Manager and the Shift Supervisor were assessed as adequate. Performance in all areas evaluated improved during the second scenario.

7.6 ASSESSMENT DATE: January 14, 1988

SHIFT 5 - S. Mannix, Shift Manager

STRENGTHS:

- Knowledge and use of procedures and Technical Specifications
- Control of plant parameters during transients

WEAKNESSES:

- In the second scenario, the Unit 2 Reactor Operator reported that three control rods had failed to insert but he omitted the significant fact that these rods were adjacent. This is considered an individual weaknesses which impacted the flow of information to the Shift Manager when he was assessing the need to enter the Emergency Plan.
- During the second scenario, at the time the reactor scrambled, conditions for Emergency Plan implementation existed. The Shift Manager (SM) did not reference the Emergency Plan until nineteen (19) minutes after the scram. At this point the STA referenced it on his own initiative after noting high radiation levels on the air ejectors. The STA and the SM conferred. The SM called the Assistant Operations Superintendent for concurrence on the event classification prior to declaring the event. Some of the delay in entering the Emergency Plan is attributed to the lack of reporting that the three control rods which did not scram were adjacent. In the post assessment exit meeting, the PECO staff stated that the differences in the radiation detection instrumentation (between Limerick and Peach Bottom) added to the delay in entering the Emergency Plan.

GENERAL:

Overall crew performance was assessed as adequate. The command and control of the Shift Manager and the Shift Supervisor were assessed as adequate.

8. CONCLUSION AND FINDINGS

No violations or programmatic weaknesses were found as a result of this evaluation.

The evaluation team concluded that each operating crew exhibited satisfactory performance for the areas assessed and that the Shift Manager adequately controlled each shift.

Section 7 of this report characterizes the performance deficiencies and strengths for each crew and individual. General conclusions on weaknesses and strengths are given below.

Two concerns were related to individual performance weaknesses. The first concern relates to the individual communications weaknesses. As a result of these weaknesses the operators were sometimes delayed in their response to the events. This area should be reviewed by PECO to correct identified deficiencies.

The second concern relates to the attitude expressed when the stuck control rod problem was turned over to the Reactor Engineer (see Section 7.4). This is of concern because it has the potential to create misunderstanding between the operators and other departments on site. This attitude was observed on only one occasion.

In general, the crews responded very well to severe transients. Their recognition of events was quick and actions to mitigate the consequences were appropriate. The crews also demonstrated good knowledge and use of Technical Specifications and procedures.

The Shift Managers were assessed as being effective in their roles as crew supervisors and leaders. They called the operators' attention to conditions when appropriate; conducted shift briefings on existing conditions and planned actions; correctly implemented the Emergency Plan when warranted; and coordinated support from other organizations as necessary.

PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION
 FALL 1987 SIMULATOR TEAMWORK
 TRAINING EVALUATION CHECKLIST

CREW:

Date: _____

Shift Manager _____

Shift Technical
 Advisor _____

Shift Supervisor _____

Chief Operator _____

Control Room Operator
 (U/2) _____

Control Room Operator
 (U/3) _____

Evaluator(s): _____

STS #: _____

Pass (≥ 2.0) _____

Fail (< 2.0) _____

(Circle appropriate category for each statement)

1. Job Responsibilities

NOT TRUE VERY TRUE

- | | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| a. Team members perform their duties within their assigned roles. | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| b. Team members acknowledge the responsibilities assigned to other team members. | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| c. Given an abnormal plant condition, team members complete immediate actions within assigned scope of responsibility and report completion of these items to the supervisor. | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| d. When operating controls on panels other than those of primary responsibility, the team member communicates to those responsible <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o their intended action o this completed action | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

2. Participation

NOT TRUE

VERY TRUE

- | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|
| a. Team members ask questions amongst themselves to gather information or to clarify information not fully understood. | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| b. Team members respond in a timely manner with information requested by other team members. | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| c. Team members actively participate within their assigned roles during the training session. | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| d. Team members use approved procedures, as appropriate to operate the plant in a safe, organized manner. | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

3. Communication Skills

NOT TRUE

VERY TRUE

- | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| a. Team members inform other members of relevant information in a timely manner. | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| b. Team members ensure that information or instruction was received and understood. | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| c. Team members provide accurate information when requested and corrected erroneous communications. | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| d. Shift Supervision periodically ensures all team members are aware of the plant status. | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| e. Shift Supervision directs team members through appropriate procedures (ON's, OT's, TRIP's, etc.) | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| f. Team members inform outside groups/ organizations of relevant information in a timely manner. | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |

4. Task and Maintenance Behaviors

	<u>NOT TRUE</u>					<u>VERY TRUE</u>				
a. Team members actively seek and give information to accomplish the team goals.	0	1	2	3	4					
b. Team members provide input for diagnosis and implementation of corrective action.	0	1	2	3	4					
c. Team members coordinate their actions amongst themselves to control the plant in a safe, organized manner.	0	1	2	3	4					
d. Shift supervision directs actions of team members to accomplish TRIP objectives, as necessary.	0	1	2	3	4					
e. Shift supervision manages communication flow from team members ensuring relevant information is received/transmitted.	0	1	2	3	4					

5. Lack of Non Functional Behavior

	<u>NOT TRUE</u>					<u>VERY TRUE</u>				
a. Team members actively commit themselves to accomplishing the team goals.	0	1	2	3	4					
b. Team members support other members in accomplishing tasks, as necessary.	0	1	2	3	4					
c. Team members receive constructive critical comments in a nondefensive manner.	0	1	2	3	4					

6. Decision Making

	<u>NOT TRUE</u>					<u>VERY TRUE</u>				
a. Team members provide input to shift supervision for decision making.	0	1	2	3	4					
b. Shift supervision actively seeks input from team members for decision making.	0	1	2	3	4					
c. Team members avoid premature closing on decisions.	0	1	2	3	4					

<u>6. Decision Making (cont'd)</u>	<u>NOT TRUE</u>			<u>VERY TRUE</u>	
d. Team members recognize and accept decisions by shift supervision	0	1	2	3	4
e. Shift supervision ensures team members are aware of decisions, and reasons for decision, if conditions permit.	0	1	2	3	4

<u>7. Leadership Skills (Shift Manager)</u>	<u>NOT TRUE</u>			<u>VERY TRUE</u>	
a. Shift manager ensures the team members are aware of the team's goal(s).	0	1	2	3	4
b. Shift manager encourages team members participation in the decision making process, as appropriate.	0	1	2	3	4
c. Shift manager provides acknowledgement for good performance as well as constructive criticism for team members, as appropriate.	0	1	2	3	4
d. Shift manager provides direction for the team in the safe operation of the plant.	0	1	2	3	4
e. Shift manager coordinates with other departments/agencies, as appropriate.	0	1	2	3	4

<u>8. Feedback</u>	<u>NOT TRUE</u>			<u>VERY TRUE</u>	
a. Team members provide feedback to shift supervision in a timely manner, upon completion of a task/evaluation.	0	1	2	3	4
b. Shift supervision provide team members with plant status upon completion of an evolution, as appropriate.	0	1	2	3	4
c. Shift supervision provides outside groups/organization information, as appropriate (NRC, Load Disp. etc.)	0	1	2	3	4

9. Respect

	<u>NOT TRUE</u>					<u>VERY TRUE</u>				
a. Team members respect other members advice and opinions.	0	1	2	3	4					
b. Team members respect decisions/orders made by supervisory personnel.	0	1	2	3	4					
c. Team members respect outside organizations advice/decisions, as appropriate.	0	1	2	3	4					

10. Safe Operation of Plant

	<u>NOT TRUE</u>					<u>VERY TRUE</u>				
a. Team members participate to operate the plant in a safe, organized manner.	0	1	2	3	4					
b. Team members carry out proper operator actions, using approved procedures, in response to the simulator scenario, as appropriate.	0	1	2	3	4					
c. Team members ensure plant not placed in an unsafe condition.	0	1	2	3	4					

TOTAL POINTS _____ ÷ # applicable categories _____ = SCORE _____

ENTER SCORE ON COVER SHEET

Peach Bottom Operating Crews
NRC Operational Assessment

Date _____
Scenario # _____

Evaluator(s) _____

CREW: Shift Manager _____, Shift Supervisor _____, STA _____
Chief Operator _____, U/2 Operator _____, U/3 Operator _____

OVERALL CREW INTERACTION

Knowledge/Use of Procedures (COMMENTS ATTACHED: __ YES __ NO)

1 _____ 3 _____ 5 _____

Crew/individual activities were such that they:

- | | | |
|---|---|---|
| - could not locate procedures or could not follow procedures or missed steps | - located most procedures, and followed procedures correctly but slowly | - easily located procedures and followed them quickly and surely |
| - did not recognize when plant limits were exceeded | - recognized when plant limits were exceeded and took corrective action | - recognized when plant limits were approached and took corrective action |
| - did not verify automatic actions including safety functions when required | - verified most automatic actions including safety functions when required | - verified all automatic actions including safety functions when required |
| - did not perform or verify performed, req'd operator actions for immediate and subsequent procedure steps | - perform or verify performed, most required operator actions for immediate and subsequent procedure steps | - perform or verify performed, all required operator actions for immediate and subsequent procedure steps |
| - did not recognize entry conditions | - recognized almost all entry conditions | - recognized all entry conditions |
| - had incorrect actions/decisions for events not covered by procedures or where many choices were available | - usually had correct actions/decisions for events not covered by procedures or where many choices were available | - had correct actions/decisions for all events not covered by procedures or where many choices were available |
| - could not integrate procedures to combat multiple casualties | - correctly integrated procedures to combat multiple casualties | - effectively and correctly integrated procedures to combat multiple casualties |

Knowledge/Use of Technical Specifications (COMMENTS ATTACHED: __ YES __ NO)

1 _____ 3 _____ 5 _____

Crew/individual activities were such that they:

- | | | |
|---|---|---|
| - did not recognize when Tech Spec limits were exceeded | - recognized when Tech Spec limits were exceeded and took corrective action | - recognized when Tech Spec limits were approached and took corrective action |
| - could not locate correct Tech Spec or accurately interpreted them (SRO) | - located most Tech Specs in a reasonable time and correctly interpreted them (SRO) | - quickly located Tech Specs and correctly interpreted them (SRO) |
| | | - verified compliance with Tech Spec actions and limits (SRO) |

Communications (COMMENTS ATTACHED: __ YES __ NO)

1-----3-----5

Crew/individual communications were such that they:

- | | | |
|---|---|--|
| gave unclear, garbled, incomplete, or not relevant information/direction | - gave understandable and relevant information/direction | - gave clear, specific, concise and relevant information/direction |
| failed to verify information/direction given was understood | - usually ensured information/direction given was understood | - ensured information/direction given was understood by getting others' attention BEFORE communicating |
| failed to listen to input or indicate understanding | - listen to input and usually indicate understanding | - actively listen to input and indicate understanding |
| failed to ask for clarification of unclear or apparently erroneous messages | - sometimes asked for clarification of unclear or apparently erroneous messages | - asked for clarification of all unclear or apparently erroneous messages |
| failed to keep other crew members aware of actions taken or system status | - kept other crew members aware of actions taken and system status | - keep other crew members aware of actions taken, system status, and anticipated events |
| failed to ask for necessary information | | - asked for necessary information |
| failed to correct erroneous messages from self or others | | - corrected erroneous messages from self or others |
| fail to relay appropriate information/direction to/from outside sources | | - relayed appropriate information/direction to/from outside sources |

Supervisory Ability/Responsibility (COMMENTS ATTACHED: __ YES __ NO)

1-----3-----5

Crew/individual activities were such that they:

- | | | |
|---|---|--|
| did not set goals or priorities for crews' actions (SRO) | - set some goals or priorities for crews' actions (SRO) | - set clear goals and priorities to ensure the appropriate actions of the whole team (SRO) |
| failed to coordinate actions to ensure safe operations | - coordinated actions to ensure safe operations | - coordinated actions to ensure smooth and safe operations |
| failed to participate in the decision making process | - participated in the decision making process | - actively participated in the decision making process |
| failed to operate within their assigned roles or understand the roles of others | - operated within their assigned roles and understand the roles of others | - effectively operated within their assigned roles and understand the roles of others |
| failed to provide/accept appropriate feedback | - provided/accepted appropriate feedback | - provided timely and useful feedback, and respected the feedback of others |
| became completely distracted from primary role by less important activities | - became somewhat distracted from primary role by less important activities | - always kept primary role in focus |
| direction consistently lagged actions by crew (SRO) | - direction is appropriate for actions by crew (SRO) | - direction is appropriate and demonstrates foresight for future problems (SRO) |
| failed to coordinate actions amongst themselves to control the plant in a safe organized manner | | - coordinated actions amongst themselves to control the plant in a safe organized manner |

In addition to the previous areas, the Shift Manager will be evaluated in the following areas:

Emergency Plan Implementation (COMMENTS ATTACHED: __ YES __ NO)

1-----3-----5

The Shift Manager's activities are such that he:

- failed to implement the Emergency Plan in a timely manner
- implemented the Emergency Plan when warranted
- anticipated Emergency Plan implementation, makes preparation to implement the plan, and implements the plan when warranted
- failed to properly conduct himself as Emergency Director after entering the Emergency Plan
- ensured proper implementation of the Emergency Plan as the Emergency Director and coordinated activities of on site personnel and coordinated with other agencies as appropriate

Supervisory Ability/Leadership Skills (COMMENTS ATTACHED: __ YES __ NO)

1-----3-----5

The Shift Manager's activities are such that he:

- failed to maintain an overall perspective of plant operations during normal and emergency situations
- maintained an overall perspective of plant operations during normal and emergency situations
- maintained an overall perspective of plant operations during normal and emergency situations and effectively supervised all groups involved with maintaining smooth operations in normal situations and those involve with plant stabilization and recovery during transients
- failed to monitor crew performance
- monitored crew performance and provided some guidance
- monitored crew performance and provided instruction, guidance, counseling and/or praise as appropriate to improve operations
- failed to demonstrate a management style that evoked respect and cooperation from all crew members
- demonstrated a management style that evoked respect and cooperation from all crew members

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