

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory information collection request: 50 hrs. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Records Management Branch (T-6 F33), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and to the Paperwork Reduction Project (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information

FACILITY NAME (1)

South Texas, Unit 1

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

05000 498

PAGE (3)

1 of 3

TITLE (4)

Failure to fully meet the requirements of Technical Specification Surveillance 4.6.1.5 for containment average air temperature.

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER	
09	24	98	98	009	00	10	23	98		05000	
										05000	
<p>OPERATING MODE (9) 1</p> <p>POWER LEVEL (10) 100</p> <p>THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)</p>											
			20.2201(b)			20.2203(a)(2)(v)			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)
			20.2203(a)(1)			20.2203(a)(3)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)
			20.2203(a)(2)(i)			20.2203(a)(3)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)		73.71
			20.2203(a)(2)(ii)			20.2203(a)(4)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)		OTHER
			20.2203(a)(2)(iii)			50.36(c)(1)			50.73(a)(2)(v)		Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A
			20.2203(a)(2)(iv)			50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

Scott Head - Licensing Supervisor

TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

(512) 972-7136

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES

(If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).

NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH DAY YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On September 24, 1998, Unit 1 was operating in Mode 1 at 100% power. On September 21st and 22nd of 1998, the inlet temperature channel instrument for operating reactor containment fan cooler 12A was failed. On these dates, inlet temperatures from three operating and two idle reactor containment fan coolers were recorded and used to determine the containment average air temperature. An evaluation of this condition completed on September 24, 1998 determined that inlet temperatures from idle reactor containment fan coolers do not accurately reflect containment air temperature. The cause of this incident was that the Control Room Log format did not clearly specify reactor containment fan cooler inlet temperature readings were to be taken from running fan coolers and it allowed for two ways of verifying temperature readings satisfactorily. Corrective actions include revising Control Room logs and providing a briefing on the basis for the Containment Average Air Temperature Surveillance.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

On September 24, 1998, Unit 1 was operating in Mode 1 at 100% power. Technical Specification surveillance requirement 4.6.1.5 states that primary containment average air temperature be determined by the arithmetic average of a minimum of four reactor containment fan cooler inlet temperatures at least once every 24 hours. On September 21st and 22nd of 1998, the inlet temperature channel instrument for operating reactor containment fan cooler 12A was failed. On these dates, inlet temperatures from three operating and two idle reactor containment fan coolers were recorded and used to determine the containment average air temperature. A reportability evaluation of this condition completed on September 24, 1998 determined that inlet temperatures from idle reactor containment fan coolers do not accurately reflect containment air temperature. Therefore, it was determined that the intent of Technical Specification surveillance requirement 4.6.1.5 had not been met on September 21st and 22nd, 1998.

The requirements of Technical Specification surveillance 4.6.1.5 are met by performance of the plant procedure OPSP03-ZQ-0028, "Operator Logs". The procedure requires that the primary containment average air temperature be calculated as the average of the four highest operating reactor containment fan cooler inlet temperatures. Primary containment average air temperature is calculated twice daily in the operator logs, first between the hours of 0000 and 0200 and second between the hours of 1200 and 1400. The inlet temperature channel instrument for operating reactor containment fan cooler 12A failed at 0243 hours on September 21, 1998. During subsequent log recording, this instrument was noted as out of service. However, it was not noted that this condition affected meeting the Limiting Condition for Operation 3.6.1.5 for primary containment air temperature. Therefore, action was not taken to start an idle reactor containment fan cooler.

On September 23, 1998 during the time that the 0000 to 0200 logs were being taken, it was determined that temperature indication, from an idle reactor containment fan cooler does not support meeting the requirements for calculating primary containment average air temperature. Reactor containment fan coolers were realigned so that four operating units had operating inlet temperature channel instruments. The primary containment average air temperature was verified to meet Limiting Condition for Operation 3.6.1.5.

CAUSE OF EVENT:

The cause of this incident was that the Control Room Log format did not clearly specify reactor containment fan cooler inlet temperature readings were to be taken from running fan coolers and it allowed for two ways of verifying temperature readings satisfactorily. South Texas Project has determined that performance of the surveillance 4.6.1.5 requires inlet temperatures used for the containment average air temperature be associated with operating reactor containment fan coolers.

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ANALYSIS OF EVENT:

Failure to meet the requirements of Technical Specifications is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

Primary containment average air temperature is limited to ensure that the overall containment average air temperature does not exceed the initial temperature condition assumed in the safety analysis for a loss of coolant accident or steam line break accident. During the time that the Technical Specifications were not met, measured primary containment temperatures did not exceed 94°F. The limiting temperature is 110°F.

Therefore, the safety significance and potential consequences of this event are minimal.

There were no adverse safety or radiological consequences from this event.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

1. Control Room logs will be revised to clearly identify the information required to determine containment average air temperature. This will be completed by November 5, 1998.
2. Shift Supervisors will provide a briefing for their crews on the basis for the Containment Average Air Temperature Surveillance. This will be completed by December 10, 1998.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

There have been no Licensee Event Reports submitted in the last three years by South Texas Project to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regarding ambiguous Control Room Logs.