

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Facility Name (1) Braidwood, Unit 2 Docket Number (2) 0 5 0 0 0 4 5 6 Page (3) 1 6 9 3

Title (4) Loss of Pulses to Fuel Handling Incident Monitor ORT-AR056 for Unknown Reasons

Event Date (5)			LER Number (6)			Report Date (7)			Other Facilities Involved (8)	
Month	Day	Year	Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number	Month	Day	Year	Facility Names	Docket Number(s)
0	1	3	8	8	---	0	1	8	NONE	0 5 0 0 0 1 1
0	1	3	8	8	---	0	1	8		0 5 0 0 0 1 1

OPERATING MODE (9) 5

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11)

<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(c)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vi)	<input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	in Abstract
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	below and in
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)	Text)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

Name: Paul Stanczak, Technical Staff Engineer Ext. 2486

TELEPHONE NUMBER: AREA CODE 8 1 5 4 5 8 - 2 8 0 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS
X	Z	L	D E T	No					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

Expected Submission Date (15) _____

[Yes (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)] NO

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At 1910 on January 13, 1988, Fuel Handling Building Incident Monitor ORT-AR056 went into an alarm condition due to a loss of pulses.

The root cause of the event was not immediately known. An investigation revealed no work activities in the vicinity of monitor ORT-AR056. The detector was inspected, and no physical damage was found. The detector cable was checked for tightness and was able to be tightened two turns. The cable slackness is not considered to have caused the loss of pulses which resulted in the fuel handling building to shift to its emergency makeup mode of operation. The loss of pulses immediately cleared and has not recurred. After further investigation of the monitor, it was decided to replace the monitor.

There has been one previous occurrence.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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		Year	Sequential Number	Revision Number			
Braidwood Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 4 5 6	1 8	- 0 0 3	- 0 1	0 2	OF	0 3
TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIS) codes are identified in the text as [xx]							

A. PLANT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT:

Unit: Braidwood 1 Event Date: January 13, 1988 Event Time: 1910
 Reactor Mode: 5 Mode Name: Cold Shutdown Power Level: 0%
 RCS [AB] Temperature/Pressure: 100°F/0 psig

Unit: Braidwood 1 Event Date: February 19, 1988 Event Time: 2345
 Reactor Mode: 4 Mode Name: Hot Shutdown Power Level: 0%
 RCS [AB] Temperature/Pressure: 339°F/510 psig

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

There were no systems or components inoperable at the beginning of the event which contributed to the severity of the event.

At 1910 on January 13, 1988 and on February 19, 1988 at 2345, the Fuel Handling Building Incident Radiation Monitor ORT-AR056 [IL] went into an alarm condition on a loss of pulses as indicated at the control room radiation monitor console (RM-11). This started the Auxiliary Building Ventilation [VF] Fuel Handling Building Charcoal Booster Fan 0VA04CA with the flow through the Train B Fuel Handling Building Charcoal Filter. The loss of pulses immediately cleared and was considered spurious. Equipment operation was immediately returned to normal.

Operator action neither increased nor decreased the severity of the event. Plant conditions remained stable throughout the events.

The appropriate NRC notification via the ENS phone system were made at 1951 on January 13, 1988 and at 0330 February 20, 1988 pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii).

These events are being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) - Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature, including the Reactor Protection System.

C. CAUSE OF EVENT:

The root cause of the events was not immediately known. An investigation revealed no work activities in the vicinity of monitor ORT-AR056. The detector was inspected, and no physical damage was found. The detector cable was checked for tightness and was able to be tightened two turns. This cable slackness is not considered to have caused the loss of pulses which resulted in the fuel handling building ventilation to shift to its emergency makeup mode of operation. The loss of pulses immediately cleared and has not recurred.

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D. SAFETY ANALYSIS:

There was no effect on the safety of the plant or the public. There is no fuel in the fuel handling building. Both Unit 1 and 2 are in Mode 5.

Had these events occurred under worst case conditions of the units operating with spent fuel in the pool, there would be no effect on plant or public safety. The charcoal booster fans and filter are designed to activate on a failure of ORT-AT056 or the presence of actual radiation. Redundant monitor ORT-AR055 was available throughout the events.

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

The immediate corrective action was to determine that the source of the actuation was spurious in nature and not due to actual radioactivity.

Work Request A19066 was written to further inspect the monitor. Even though a calibration check found the detector to be within station tolerance, the detector was replaced. There have been no occurrences since.

F. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES:

<u>DVR/LER NUMBER</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
DVR 20-1-87-009 LER 87-003	Containment Ventilation Isolation Signal Due To Loss Of Pulses From IRE-AR012

This has been the only previous occurrence of a loss of pulses to a radiation monitor. However, this event was due to a failure of the monitor's sensor as a result of construction activity which physically damaged it.

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

<u>MANUFACTURER</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>MODEL NUMBER</u>	<u>MFG PART NUMBER</u>
Sorrento Electronics	Detector	RD-10	02810760-002

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Sorrento Electronics	Detector	RD-10	02810760-002



Commonwealth Edison
Braidwood Nuclear Power Station
Route #1, Box 84
Braceville, Illinois 60407
Telephone 815/458-2801

BW/88-1135

September 19, 1988

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

The enclosed Licensee Event Report from Braidwood Generating Station is being transmitted to you as a Supplemental Report to LER 88-003-00.

This report is number 88-003-01; Docket No. 50-456.

Very truly yours,

R. E. Querio
Station Manager
Braidwood Nuclear Station

REQ/AJS/jab
(7126z)

Enclosure: Licensee Event Report No. 88-003-01

cc: NRC Region III Administrator
NRC Resident Inspector
INPO Record Center
CECo Distribution List

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