



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 153 TO

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-57

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY
OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION
MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA
CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA

EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1

DOCKET NO. 50-321

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated July 11, 1988, Georgia Power Company (the licensee) proposed changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit 1. The requested changes would (1) provide for a modified secondary containment boundary during periods of plant shutdown, provided certain conditions are met, and (2) make several editorial corrections to the TS.

2.0 BACKGROUND

The secondary containment for Unit 1, as now defined in the TS, includes the Unit 1 reactor building area below the refueling floor and the common Unit 1 and Unit 2 areas above the refueling floor. The TS require that secondary containment integrity be maintained at all times except when Unit 1 is in cold shutdown and certain other conditions are met and at all times except when Unit 2 is in cold shutdown. Fuel handling may not be conducted unless secondary containment is maintained.

Planning and scheduling maintenance work during Unit 1 refueling outages is a difficult task due to the inability to perform simultaneous work on the Unit 1 main steam isolation valves and the turbine stop valves without breaching secondary containment. Simultaneous work on both groups of valves could introduce a leakage path through the reactor building, thus breaching secondary containment.

To avoid this problem, the licensee proposes to designate the present TS requirements as being those for "normal" secondary containment, and add a new set of requirements for a "modified" secondary containment for use during refueling operations. Basically, the "modified" secondary containment would exclude that portion of the Unit 1 reactor building below the refueling floor. Valves that would permit suction from the Unit 1 reactor building, drywell or torus to the

standby gas treatment system (SGTS) will be closed and administratively controlled in the closed position. The main equipment hatch located on the refueling floor will be closed and sealed. A personnel airlock, with interlocked doors, will be constructed to permit access to the refueling floor.

Other accesses will be closed and locked or sealed as appropriate. As a result, the "modified" secondary containment would be limited only to the refueling floor area. Surveillance would be conducted to ensure that the SGTS can maintain the "modified" secondary containment at a minimum $\frac{1}{2}$ -inch of water vacuum.

The requested change is identical to a temporary change that was granted by Amendment No. 91 to the Unit 1 TS for use during the 1982 refueling outage.

3.0 EVALUATION

(1) In its review of the temporary change granted by Amendment No. 91, the staff reviewed the analyses for Hatch Unit 1 pertaining to fuel handling accidents and functional capabilities of the secondary containment. As a result of that review, the staff concluded that the modification authorized by the amendment did not alter or negate any assumptions or conditions used in the fuel handling accident analyses, nor was there any degradation of the functional capability of the "modified" secondary containment to mitigate the consequences of a fuel handling accident. The staff also concluded that the proposed tests and surveillance procedures were adequate to demonstrate and maintain the integrity of the "modified" secondary containment.

Since the issuance of Amendment No. 91, there have been no plant modifications that would change the secondary containment boundary or the controls on maintaining containment integrity. Thus, there have been no changes that would affect the staff's evaluation performed in support of Amendment No. 91. On this basis, the staff concludes that the permanent change now requested by the licensee is acceptable.

(2) The licensee also proposed to make three editorial changes to the TS, as follows:

- a. Specifications 4.7.C.1.a and 4.7.C.2.a would be revised to delete the word "preoperational" which connotes a preoperating license condition. Deletion of the word "preoperational" does not change the requirements of these TS sections, but it does eliminate a possible source of confusion. It is, therefore, acceptable.
- b. Specification 4.7.C.1.b appears twice in the TS and one of these entries would be deleted. This is strictly editorial in nature and is acceptable.
- c. Existing specifications 3.7.C.2 and 4.7.C.2 on page 3.7-13 are incorrectly numbered. They should be 3.7.C.3 and 4.7.C.3, respectively. The licensee's proposal to correct this error is acceptable.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

This amendment involves changes to the installation or use of facility components located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission made a proposed determination that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration which was published in the Federal Register on August 10, 1988 (53 FR 30133), and consulted with the state of Georgia. No public comments were received, and the state of Georgia did not have any comments.

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: Lawrence P. Crocker, PDII-3/DRP-I/II

Dated: September 29, 1988