



Nebraska Public Power District

GENERAL OFFICE
P.O. BOX 499, COLUMBUS, NEBRASKA 68601-0499
TELEPHONE (402) 564-8561

NLS8800267
June 3, 1988

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Gentlemen:

Subject: Primary Containment Air Systems
Cooper Nuclear Station
NRC Docket No. 50-298, DPR-46


Reference: Letter from J. M. Pilant to D. B. Vassallo dated July 17, 1985,
"Response to Request for Additional Information - Hydrogen
Recombiner Capability, Cooper Nuclear Station" (Generic Letter
84-09)

In the above reference, information was submitted on the use of pressurized atmospheric air systems within the containment during operation. One of the listed components (RR-741AV, Inboard Sample Line Isolation Valve) has been changed to a nitrogen motive supply and no longer utilizes atmospheric air. This modification was performed during the Fall 1986 refueling outage as discussed in the reference. The information presented in the reference has been updated to reflect this change and is attached for information.

The revised information also includes the twelve actuator lines to the torus-drywell vacuum breakers that utilize instrument air. These lines penetrate the torus shell and were inadvertently left off the original list. The lines will normally be isolated during operation except for performance of the monthly Technical Specification operability surveillances.

If you have any questions, please call.

Sincerely,


E. A. Trevors

Division Manager
Nuclear Support

GAT/grs:jw
Attachment

cc: NRC Regional Office
Region IV
Arlington, Texas

NRC Resident Inspector Office
Cooper Nuclear Station

A001
1/1

8806100036 880603
PDR ADDCK 05000299
DCD

RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

HYDROGEN RECOMBINER CAPABILITY

COOPER NUCLEAR STATION

REQUEST 1. Provide a list of all pressurized systems within the containment using atmospheric air. Include the volumes and flow rates of air that could be released into the containment in case of system failure. Describe the isolation provisions for these systems and provide a reference to relevant drawings. In general, justify the use of atmospheric air within the containment.

RESPONSE 1:

| SYSTEM | COMPONENT SUPPLIED BY AIR | COMPONENT DESCRIPTION | FLOWRATES (SYSTEM FAILURE) | DRAWINGS | NOTES |
|-----------------------|---------------------------|---|----------------------------|-----------------------|---------|
| Residual Heat Removal | RHR-512AV | Testable Check Loop A | 1880 SCFH | Burns & Roe Dwg. 2040 | B, C, D |
| Residual Heat Removal | RHR-532AV | Testable Check Loop B | 1880 SCFH | Burns & Roe Dwg. 2040 | B, C, D |
| Core Spray | CS-684AV | Testable Check Loop A | 1880 SCFH | Burns & Roe Dwg. 2045 | B, C, D |
| Core Spray | CS-678AV | Testable Check Loop B | 1880 SCFH | Burns & Roe Dwg. 2045 | B, C, D |
| Primary Containment | PC-NRV-20 thru 31 | Torus-Drywell Vacuum Breaker (12 total) | 1880 SCFH (each) | Burns & Roe Dwg. 2027 | B, C, D |

NOTES:

- A. Deleted
- B. Instrument air to the valve inside primary containment is normally isolated, except for performance of monthly Technical Specification operability surveillances.
- C. Air supply is provided with manual valve isolation.
- D. The volumes apply only to tubing runs and are considered insignificant in relation to total drywell or torus volume.