



October 23, 1998

GDP 98-1071

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region III
801 Warrenville Road
Lisle, Illinois 60532-4351

Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP) - Docket No. 70-7001 - 10CFR95.25 Report

In accordance with 10CFR95.25(i), this report summarizes actions taken as a result of the discovery of vault doors open and unattended in Building C-100. Attachment 1 are actions taken to preclude recurrence. Pursuant to 10CFR95.57(b), on October 6, 1998, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Division of Security, and NRC Region III Administrator Duty Officer were notified of this event.

On October 6, 1998, at approximately 1240 hrs., an employee assigned to work in a room through which vault access is gained, discovered the vault doors open and unattended. Subsequent to the discovery, the employee remained in the area and awaited the return of a second employee assigned to work in the area and informed the second employee of the discovery of the open vault. At approximately 1325 hrs., the employees notified their supervisor of the problem and the supervisor immediately notified Plant Security.

There are approximately 100,000 prints stored in the vault, in addition to numerous other documents. The highest classification of the information contained therein is Confidential Restricted Data; therefore, a document inventory was not conducted. The vault is a General Services Administration (GSA) approved vault with a three position combination lock on the vault door.

The Standard Form (SF) 702, "Security Container Checklist," indicates that on October 6, 1998, the vault was opened and closed on two occasions. On the second occasion, the vault was opened at 1107 hrs., while both employees were working in the room. At approximately 1150 hrs., one employee departed the room to conduct business at another location. The departing employee did not announce her intention to leave to the remaining employee. At approximately 1230 hrs., the second employee, after locking the access door to the room, departed to eat lunch. The second employee stated she believed the first employee was working in the vault; however, prior to leaving the room she did not confirm the presence of the first employee. The vault was left open and unattended for approximately 10 minutes.

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
Employees assigned to the room enter by opening a wooden door with a key actuated lock. The keys to the door are controlled by the employees and the door remains locked at all times. At the time of this event, the employees stated the door was locked. The room also has a separate entrance with a door that is normally unlocked. This entrance is utilized by plant employees requiring documents from the vault. Employees stand behind a counter that inhibits access to the room containing the vault and the vault itself.

The room through which the vault is accessed contains the employee's desk located in an alcove. When occupied, the location of the desk precludes visual observation of the vault; however, one of the employees performs the majority of her work away from her desk in close proximity to the vault. While at this location, visual observation of the vault and "customer" counter is maintained; however, visual observation between the two employees is lost. On the day of the event, one employee departed the room while the remaining employee stayed at her desk and was unaware of the first employee's departure. The second employee erroneously assumed her co-worker was working in the vault and departed the room for lunch, leaving the vault open.

During the approximately 10 minutes the vault was open and unattended, the possibility of compromise of classified information cannot be discounted, but is considered remote. Access to the plant is restricted to personnel having a valid security clearance; uncleared personnel are escorted at all times by cleared employees; the door utilized by employees assigned to the room was locked; and the height and width of the "customer" counter inhibits access by unauthorized personnel.

Any questions regarding this matter should be directed to Larry Jackson at (502) 441-6796.

Sincerely,


Howard Pulley
General Manager
Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant

Enclosure: As Stated

cc: NRC Division of Security
NRC Resident Inspector, PGDP
NRC Document Control Desk

C-100 UNLOCKED VAULT - ACTIONS TAKEN

1. On October 6, 1998, a crew briefing for all Records Management and Document Control (RM&DC) personnel was conducted. The briefing encompassed instructions relative to closing and locking the vault when work was not being performed inside the vault.
2. During the period from October 6, 1998 until October 18, 1998, RM&DC implemented an interim policy requiring closing and locking the vault anytime an employee was not working inside the vault. This policy applied even when employees were working in the room where the vault is located. On October 19, 1998, a permanent policy was implemented (see completed corrective action no. 5, below).
3. On October 7, 1998, Commitment Management published a synopsis of the event, via electronic media, calling attention to the plant populace that a major human error involving a security infraction occurred.
4. On October 8, 1998, the combination to the vault was changed, as required by 10CFR95.25(c)(2)(iii).
5. On October 19, 1998, RM&DC implemented a badge system in which the Custodian responsible for an open vault wears a distinctive badge that must be transferred to another Custodian prior to departing the vault area. The badge also contains instructions on actions to take to secure an open vault when a Custodian must leave the vault and cannot transfer custodial responsibility.