

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Washington Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER (2) 050003977 PAGE (3) 1 OF 02

TITLE (4) Spurious Control Room Emerg. Filtration System Actuation - Unkown Cause

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER (8)
02	26	86	86	002	0	03	27	86			05000
THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)											

OPERATING MODE (9) 1	20.4(c)(2)(b)	20.4(c)(2)(a)	X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10) 72	20.406(a)(1)(i)	50.38(a)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(a)
	20.406(a)(1)(ii)	50.38(a)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
	20.406(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
	20.406(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
	20.406(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) NAME: W. S. Davison, Compliance Engineer TELEPHONE NUMBER: 509377-2501 AREA CODE: 509

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) Ext. 2726

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) YES (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO X

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15) MONTH DAY YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On February 26, 1986, at 1340 hours, the Control Room Emergency Filtration System automatically initiated on a High Chlorine signal for no apparent reason. After verification that no actual initiating condition existed, the Control Room Emergency Filtration System was returned to its normal lineup. No root cause has been able to be established since an investigation of the Chlorine Monitor, WOA-SR-15 (Radwaste Outside Air Sample Rack 15), did not reveal any malfunctions or abnormal conditions. As a result of an engineering study, the method of circulating water treatment will be changed from gaseous chlorination to chemical addition of sodium hypochlorite. This design change will result in removal of the requirement for the control room ventilation intake header chlorine detectors. The removal of the chlorine detectors will eliminate the problem of spurious Emergency Safety Feature (ESF) actuations from high chlorine signals due to unknown cause.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
			0 0 1 2	0 0 0	1 2	OF

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 388A's) (17)

Plant Conditions

- a) Power Level - 72%
- b) Plant Mode - 1

Event

On February 26, 1986, at 1340 hours, the Control Room Emergency Filtration System automatically initiated on a High Chlorine signal for no apparent reason.

No root cause has been able to be established since the investigation of the event did not reveal any malfunctions or abnormalities.

Immediate Corrective Action

After verification that no actual initiating condition existed, the Control Room Emergency Filtration System was returned to its normal lineup.

Further Evaluation and Corrective Action

- o An investigation of the Chlorine Monitor, WOA-SR-15 (Radwaste Outside Air Sample Rack 15), did not reveal any malfunctions or abnormal conditions. This unit has been operating continuously since the February 26, 1986, event with no spurious actuations. No further investigation is planned.
- o As a result of an engineering study, the method of circulating water treatment will be changed from gaseous chlorination to chemical addition of sodium hypochlorite. This design change will result in removal of the requirement for the intake header chlorine detectors to automatically isolate the Control Room and actuate the emergency filtration system. The removal of the chlorine detectors will eliminate the problem of spurious Emergency Safety Feature (ESF) actuations from high chlorine signals due to unknown cause.

Safety Significance

This event carries no safety significance as there was no actual high chlorine concentration and all equipment operated correctly to place the Control Room Ventilation System in an isolation condition.

Similar Events

Refer to LERs 84-057, 84-093, 84-128, and 85-026, and 86-001.

EIIS Information

Text Reference

EIIS Reference

WOA-SR-15
Control Room Emergency Filtration System

System	Component
VH	MON
VH	---

Washington Public Power Supply System

3000 George Washington Way P.O. Box 968 Richland, Washington 99352-0968 (509)372-5000

Docket No. 50-397

March 27, 1986

Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555


Subject: NUCLEAR PLANT NO. 2
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 86-002

Dear Sir:

Transmitted herewith is Licensee Event Report No. 86-002 for WNP-2 Plant. This report is submitted in response to the report requirements of 10CFR 50.73 and discusses the item of reportability, corrective action taken, and action taken to preclude recurrence.

This is the follow-up report to the verbal notification given at 1404 hours on February 26, 1986.

Very truly yours,


C. M. Powers (M/D 927M)
WNP-2 Plant Manager

CMP/WSD:db

Enclosure:

Licensee Event Report No. 86-002

cc: Mr. John B. Martin, NRC - Region V
Mr. R. C. Barr, NRC - Site (901A)
Ms. Dottie Sherman, ANI
INPO Records Center - Atlanta, GA
Mr. C. R. Bryant, BPA (M/D 399)

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