

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000275	PAGE (3) 1 OF 04
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TITLE (4) MISSED SURVEILLANCE OF A CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM HEATER
DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		
10	10	85	85	039	00	03	27	86			
									DOCKET NUMBER(S) 05000		

OPERATING MODE (9) 1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)									
POWER LEVEL (10) 100	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(c)	<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(e)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(e)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(e)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(vi)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 385A)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(iii)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)							
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)							
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(x)								

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME DAVID P. SISK, REGULATORY COMPLIANCE ENGINEER	TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE: 81015 519151-17131511
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH DAY YEAR
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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On October 10, 1985, the allowable time limit for the performance of the surveillance required by Technical Specification (T.S.) 4.7.5.1.e.4) was exceeded for redundant heater 1-EH-27A located on one of two redundant control room ventilation system trains.

This event was discovered during a QA audit of Electrical Maintenance surveillance records on February 25, 1986. The surveillance was completed February 25, 1986.

The surveillance was missed due to personnel error (cognitive). The plant maintenance foreman responsible for ensuring that the surveillance was properly completed did not ensure that redundant heater 1-EH-27A had passed the surveillance test. The error was not identified when the Planned Maintenance and Testing Schedule (PMTS) was updated because the reviewer noted a completed and signed-off data sheet but failed to observe that this surveillance requires the completion of identical data sheets for each heater.

To prevent recurrence, the PMTS will be revised to list the testing of heaters 1-EH-27 A and B as separate maintenance items. In addition, Electrical Maintenance has reviewed all electrical Surveillance Test Procedures (STPs) on both units to identify any STPs during performance of which a similar event could occur; none were found.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

I. Plant Conditions

The plant was in Mode 1 (Power Operation).

II. Description of Event

A. The event:

The control room ventilation system (CRVS) is composed of two complete redundant trains: a north train and a south train. Each train has two heaters that can only be operated one at a time (North Train heaters are designated as 1-EH-27A and B).

On October 10, 1985, the allowable time limit for the performance of the surveillance required by Technical Specification (T.S.) 4.7.5.1.e.4) was exceeded for CRVS heater 1-EH-27A. On May 23, 1985, Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) M-6B, "Control Room Ventilation System Charcoal Preheater Test," was completed for CRVS north train heater 1-EH-27B and erroneously logged in the Planned Maintenance and Testing Schedule (PMTS) for completion of STP M-6B for both north train heaters (1-EH-27A and B).

This event was discovered during a QA audit of maintenance surveillance records on February 25, 1986. The surveillance was completed on February 25, 1986.

B. Inoperable structures, components, or systems that contributed to the event:

None

C. Dates of major occurrences:

- November 13, 1983: Successful completion of STP M-6B for CRVS north train heater 1-EH-27A and B.
- May 23, 1985: STP M-6B erroneously logged as completed on PMTS.
- October 10, 1985: Event Date - Surveillance Test interval of T.S. 4.7.5.1.e.4) including the allowable extension of T.S. 4.0.2 was exceeded for heater 1-EH-27A.
- February 24, 1986: The CRVS north train was removed from service for maintenance.

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- 5. February 25, 1986: Event discovery date.
- 6. February 25, 1986: STP M-6B completed for CRVS north train heater 1-EH-27A.
- 7. February 28, 1986: Maintenance completed on the CRVS north train.
- D. Other systems or secondary functions affected:
None
- E. Method of discovery:
This event was discovered by plant QA personnel conducting an audit of Electrical Maintenance surveillance test records.
- F. Operator actions:
Upon discovery of the event, heater 1-EH-27A was logged as inoperable until the surveillance was completed.
- G. Safety system responses:
None

III. Cause of Event

- A. Immediate cause:
 - 1. The surveillance was missed due to personnel error (cognitive), the STP adequately specifies that the surveillance is required on both A & B heaters.
 - 2. The missed surveillance was not identified during review of the completed STP, and the STP was entered in the PMTS as complete.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

B. Root Cause:

1. The plant maintenance foreman responsible for ensuring that the surveillance was properly completed did not ensure that both heaters had passed the surveillance test.
2. STP M-6B required the completion of identical data sheets for each heater. The completed, signed, and reviewed data sheet for heater 1-EH-27B was erroneously recorded as completing the requirements of STP M-6B for both heaters.

IV. Analysis of Event

Preheaters are required to prevent moisture buildup on the charcoal filters. Under all known conditions of operation for this system, moisture buildup has not been a problem and is not expected to be a problem.

Only one heater, 1-EH-27A or B, can operate at a time. During the period from October 10, 1985, until February 24, 1986, redundant Unit 1 train heater 1-EH-27B was operable and capable of performing its intended function. In addition, from February 24, 1986, until February 28, 1986, the redundant CRVS south train was operable. Thus no adverse safety consequences or implications resulted from this event.

V. Corrective Action

The PMTS will be revised to list the testing of heaters 1-EH-27A and B as separate surveillance items. In addition, Electrical Maintenance has reviewed all electrical STPs on both units to identify STPs during performance of which similar events could occur; none were found.

VI. Additional Information

A. Failed components:

None

B. Previous LERs on similar events:

None

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PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

PG&E



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JAMES D. SHIFFER
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION

March 27, 1986

PGandI Letter No.: DCL-86-084

Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Re: Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-90
Diablo Canyon Unit 1
Licensee Event Report 1-85-039-00
Missed Surveillance of a Control Room Ventilation System
Heater Due to Personnel Error


Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i), PGandE is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report concerning missed surveillance of a control room ventilation system heater.

This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.

Kindly acknowledge receipt of this material on the enclosed copy of this letter and return it in the enclosed addressed envelope.

Sincerely,


for J. D. Shiffer

Enclosure

cc: L. J. Chandler
R. T. Dodds
J. B. Martin
B. Norton
H. E. Schierling
CPUC
Diablo Distribution
INPO

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