NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/88

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Turkey Point Unit 3	0 5 0 0 0 2 5 0	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)
Component Cooling Water System

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
									Turkey Point Unit 4	0 5 0 0 0 2 5 1
0 2	2 4	8 6	8 6	0 0 9	0 0	0 3	2 6	8 6	N/A	0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	POWER LEVEL (10)	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
1	1 0 0	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	X 50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Randall D. Hart, Licensing Engineer	AREA CODE 3 0 5 2 4 5 - 2 9 1 1 0

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

Event: On February 24, 1986, while Unit 3 was at 100% power and Unit 4 in a scheduled refueling outage with the core off-loaded, as part of an in depth review of important plant systems, it was determined that a potential concern existed associated with the component cooling water (CCW) flow through the residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchangers. The concern was that the throttled position of the CCW discharge isolation valves for the RHR heat exchangers 748A and 748B, might not allow sufficient flow through the RHR heat exchangers assuming one CCW pump and one RHR heat exchanger available. On February 21, 1986, plant management decided to open valves 748A and 748B fully, based on preliminary information from Engineering until additional tests and evaluations could be performed. A special test was performed on March 3 and 4, 1986, on Unit 4 to measure CCW system flows with the system aligned as per normal operating procedures. The results indicated that the CCW system flows to various components including the emergency containment coolers (ECCs) were potentially less than minimum flow requirements during the recirculation phase of a design basis accident. Based on these results, plant management decided to shutdown Unit 3 on March 4, 1986 to perform additional tests and evaluations on Unit 3.

Cause of Event: A safety system review identified that the current CCW system flow balance had the potential for not providing the required flow during the recirculation phase of a design basis accident.

Corrective Actions:

1)Tests and evaluations were done on the CCW system to determine the optimum system alignment for both normal and design basis conditions.

2)Applicable plant procedures will be revised to reflect the results of the tests and evaluations that have been completed.

3)These procedure revisions along with a safety evaluation for the final CCW system alignment will be reviewed by the Plant Nuclear Safety Committee prior to restart of Unit 3.

4)Similar tests and evaluations will be done on Unit 4 prior to restart of the unit after completion of the refueling outage.

NRC Form 366
(9-83)

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Turkey Point Unit 3	0 5 0 0 0 2 5 0	8 6	— 0 0 9	— 0 0	0 2 OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Event: On February 24, 1986, while Unit 3 was at 100% power and Unit 4 in a scheduled refueling outage with the core off-loaded, as part of an in depth review of important plant systems, it was determined that a potential concern existed associated with the component cooling water (CCW) flow through the residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchangers. The concern was that the throttled position of the CCW discharge isolation valves for the RHR heat exchangers, 748A and 748B, might not allow sufficient flow through the RHR heat exchangers assuming one CCW pump and one RHR heat exchanger available. On February 21, 1986, plant management decided to open valves 748A and 748B fully, based on preliminary information from Engineering until additional tests and evaluations could be performed.

On March 3 and 4, 1986, Special test No. 86-01 was performed on Unit 4 to measure CCW system flows with the system aligned per normal operating procedures. Results of this test indicated that CCW system flows to various components including the emergency containment coolers (ECCs) were potentially less than the minimum flow requirements during the recirculation phase of a design basis accident. On March 4, 1986 at 2215, based on these preliminary results, plant management decided to declare the ECCs out of service and began a shutdown of Unit 3 following the guidance of Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.1. An unusual event was declared in accordance with the Turkey Point Emergency Plan and the required notifications were made. The unusual event was terminated at 1505 on March 5, 1986 when Unit 3 was placed in cold shutdown (Mode 5).

Cause of Event:

A safety system review identified that the current CCW system flow balance had the potential for not providing the required flow during the recirculation phase of a design basis accident.

Analysis of Event:

During the event, Unit 4 was in a scheduled refueling outage. Upon determination that this concern was valid, a shutdown of Unit 3 was commenced. Additional CCW system testing has been performed and an analysis of this data is continuing. Results of these tests will be used to determine the CCW system alignment which will assure adequate flow to safety related components during normal plant operation and a design basis accident. This alignment will be done prior to restart of Unit 3. Based on the above, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

Corrective Actions:

1) CCW system tests have been performed to gather data utilizing various system configurations for use in determining optimum CCW system alignment for Unit 3.
2) This data was evaluated to determine the optimum CCW system alignment for Unit 3 and a test has been run to verify that the alignment is correct.
3) Applicable plant procedures will be revised to reflect the results of the tests and evaluations that have been completed.
4) These procedure revisions along with a safety evaluation for the final CCW system alignment will be reviewed by the Plant Nuclear Safety Committee prior to restart of Unit 3.
5) Similar tests and evaluations will be done on Unit 4 prior to restart of the unit after completion of the refueling outage.

Additional Details:

Similar occurrences: LERs 250-86-008 and 250-85-025.

P.O. BOX 029100 MIAMI, FL 33102

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

MAR 2 6 1986

L-86-134

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Re: Reportable Event 86-9
Turkey Point Unit 3
Date of Event: February 24, 1986
Component Cooling Water System

The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR to provide notification of the subject event.

Very truly yours,

C. O. Woody
Group Vice President
Nuclear Energy

COW/SAV:dee

Attachment

cc: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Region II, USNRC
Harold F. Reis, Esquire
File 933.1
PNS-LI-86-98

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