

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-266/88011(DRS); 50-301/88010(DRS)

Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301

Licenses No. DPR-24; DPR-27

Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Power Company  
231 West Michigan  
Milwaukee, WI 53203

Facility Name: Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2

Inspection At: Point Beach Site, Two Creeks, Wisconsin

Inspection Conducted: May 3-5, 1988

Inspector: *J. A. Gavula*  
J. A. Gavula

5/26/88  
Date

Approved By: *D. H. Danielson*  
D. H. Danielson, Chief  
Materials and Processes Section

5/26/88  
Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection on May 3-5, 1988 (Reports No. 50-266/88011(DRS); No. 50-301/88010(DRS))

Areas Inspected: Special Safety inspection of licensee action on IE Bulletin 79-14 and snubber functional testing and surveillance. (92703, 70370)

Results: No violations or deviations were identified.

## DETAILS

### 1. Persons Contacted

#### Wisconsin Electric Power Company

- \*J. Zach, Plant Manager
- \*J. Knorr, Regulatory Engineer - EQRS
- \*S. Cartwright, Senior Project Engineer
- D. Duenkel, Maintenance Engineer

\*Denotes those attending the exit meeting on May 5, 1988.

### 2. Licensee Action on IE Bulletin (IEB)

- a. (Open) IEB 79-14 (266/79014-BB, 301/79014-BB; 266/79014-B1, 301/79014-B1; 266/79014-B2, 301/79014-B2; 266/79014-B3, 301/79014-B3): Seismic Analysis for As-built Safety Related Piping Systems.

#### (1) Background

During three previous NRC inspections portions of the licensee's actions for IEB 79-14 were reviewed. NRC Inspection Reports No. 50-266/81009, 50-301/81010; 50-266/80011, 50-301/80011; and 50-266/80003, 50-301/80002 documented the reviews of work performed by Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel). The reviews included verification of personnel qualification requirements, computer modeling techniques, structural deflection limit criteria, load combinations for common anchor points, and piping stress calculations. It was noted during these inspections that several flued head anchors were overstressed and that additional corrective actions would be taken to resolve the overstress problems.

#### (2) Current Inspection Activities

Four subsystems were walked-down by the NRC inspector to verify the accuracy of the information given on the as built isometric drawings.

- Isometric P-138, "Service Water Return From Containment Cooler IHX-15B and IHX-15D", Revision 3, October 14, 1981.

Subsystem D: The following discrepancies were noted.

- Support H216 - the isometric drawing denotes this support as an anchor. The existing configuration is a vertical support with no uplift capacity and an axial restraint.

- Support R204 - dimensional deviation of 13 inches from elbow location. Support is noted as vertical but existing configuration also provides horizontal restraint.
- Support R307 - two way restraint mislocated by approximately 4.5 feet. Location change puts support on the other side of an elbow such that the support does not provide restraint in assumed direction.

Subsystem B: The following discrepancy was noted.

- Anchor HB-4B - dimensional deviation of three feet.
- Isometric P-115, "Service Water Supply Header to Containment Cooler 1HX-15B and 1HX-15D", Revision 4, June 24, 1986.

Subsystem D: The following discrepancies were noted.

- Support H-125 - dimension deviation of approximately six feet. The existing configuration is an anchor but isometric drawing denotes it as a two way restraint.
- Support R207 - dimensional deviation of approximately 4.5 feet. As a result restraint direction changed.

Subsystem B: The following discrepancies were noted.

- Support HB-18 - dimensional deviation of approximately 10 inches.
- Support HB-3 - although isometric showed a support, no restraint exists in the field.
- Anchor HB-48 - dimensional deviation of approximately three feet.

Based on the above discrepancies, there is some question as to the accuracy of the as-built isometric documentation. Preliminary evaluations performed by the licensee prior to the end of the exit indicated that the above discrepancies did not cause any safety significant overstress situations. However, it appears that at least some of the incorrect field information was utilized in the IEB 79-14 reconciliation process. Pending additional evaluations by the licensee into the significance and prevalence of these types of discrepancies the item will continue to be carried as Open.

### 3. Snubber Functional Testing

#### a. Background

Point Beach, Unit 1, has approximately 26 safety related snubbers controlled by Technical Specification requirements. Ten of the snubbers are large bore Anker - Holths with rated capacities of 500 kips and 900 kips. The remaining snubbers are small bore Grinnells located on various subsystems.

#### b. Procedure and Documentation Review

Relevant portions of the following Point Beach procedures were reviewed by the NRC inspector relative to compliance with the licensee's commitments and NRC requirements.

- Routine Maintenance Procedure No. 60, "Safety Related Snubber Inspection, Unit 1", Revision 1, September 24, 1987.
- Routine Maintenance Procedure No. 61, "Hydraulic Snubber Surveillance and Testing, Unit 1(2)", Revision 1, April 13, 1988.
- Bergen Paterson Snubber Test Stand, Model No. 25000, Serial Number 018, Calibrated April 5, 1988.

No violations or deviations were identified.

#### c. Test Results and Visual Inspections

The 10% samples of safety related small bore snubbers consisted of two hydraulic snubbers. Both snubbers met all functional acceptance criteria. The visual inspection results did not reveal any inoperable snubbers. One snubber was noted as being less than full and a functional test was subsequently performed. The snubber met all functional acceptance criteria.

One large bore snubber was functionally tested. All acceptance criteria were met. The snubber was then dismantled in order to replace the snubber's seals. The NRC inspector observed the in-process maintenance work. The seal materials removed from the snubber appeared to be in relatively good condition with no apparent deterioration or degradation. The snubber body assembly appeared to be in good condition with no observed corrosion or other signs of wear.

No violations or deviations were identified.

4. Exit Interview

The Region III inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on May 5, 1988. The inspector summarized the purpose and findings of the inspection. The licensee representatives acknowledged this information. The inspector also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed during the inspection. The licensee representatives did not identify any such documents/processes as proprietary.