PETER E. KATZ
Plant General Manager
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant

Baltimore Gas and Electric Company
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant
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BGE

October 21, 1998

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

ATTENTION: Document Control Desk

SUBJECT: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant
Unit No. 1; Docket No. 50-317
Special Report - Wide Range Noble Gas Monitor

The attached special report is submitted in accordance with Calvert Cliffs Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Section 15.3.1, Contingency Measure B.2.2. The report is required due to the Unit 1 Wide Range Noble Gas Monitor having less than the required minimum number of operable channels.

Should you have questions regarding this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Very truly yours,

for
Peter E. Katz
Plant General Manager

PEK/KRE/dlm

Attachment

cc: R. S. Fleishman, Esquire
J. E. Silberg, Esquire
S. S. Bajwa, NRC
A. W. Dromerick, NRC
H. J. Miller, NRC
Resident Inspector, NRC
R. I. McLean, DNR
J. H. Walter, PSC

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ATTACHMENT (1)

UNIT 1 WIDE RANGE NOBLE GAS MONITOR SPECIAL REPORT

Baltimore Gas and Electric Company submits this Special Report concerning the inoperable Unit 1 Wide Range Noble Gas Effluent Radiation Monitor (WRNGM) Channel as required by Calvert Cliffs Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Section 15.3.1, Contingency Measure B.2.2.

ACTION TAKEN

The Unit 1 WRNGM was removed from Operable status on September 23, 1998, at approximately 1400, to support troubleshooting of the process flow transducer. The transducer was giving errant process flow signals that resulted in the WRNGM defaulting to "spec form" vice isokinetic flow control. It was determined that the transducer had failed hard and required replacement. Due to the unavailability of replacement parts, Calvert Cliffs defeated the input from the transducer to the WRNGM microprocessor, which forces the WRNGM to use "spec form" control under all operating conditions. A formal Operability Evaluation was written in accordance with plant procedures justifying operability under these conditions.

EFFECT ON OPERATION

In accordance with the Contingency Measure B.1 of Calvert Cliffs Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Section 15.3.1 and our Accidental Radioactivity Release Monitoring and Sampling Methods procedure (ERPIP-821), the preplanned alternate monitoring method was implemented. During the period that the Unit 1 WRNGM was not Operable, the Unit 1 Main Vent Radiation Monitor remained Operable. The inoperability of the WRNGM did not affect Unit 1 operation.

CAUSES OF INOPERABILITY

The initial cause of the inoperability was the failure of the process flow transducer. The inoperability period was extended beyond the seven-day restoration time requirement due to the need to implement design changes to remove the input from the process flow transducer to the WRNGM microprocessor and to prepare the necessary operability evaluation.

PLANS AND SCHEDULES FOR RESTORING THE SYSTEM TO OPERABLE STATUS

The Unit 1 WRNGM was returned to Operable status on October 9, 1998, following the completion of the maintenance to remove the process flow transducer input to the WRNGM microprocessor and the completion of the formal operability evaluation. The WRNGM will operate in "spec form" control until the completion of additional design changes, which will, in part, replace the process flow transducer. The estimated completion date of these design changes is August 31, 1999.

The WRNGM was inoperable for approximately 16 days.