

Public Service
Electric and Gas
Company

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March 12, 1986

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
7920 Norfolk Avenue
Bethesda, Maryland 20814

Attention: Ms. Elinor Adensam, Director
Project Directorate 3
Division of BWR Licensing

Dear Ms. Adensam:


MAIN STEAM TUNNEL FLOODING ANALYSIS, REVISION 1
SER CONFIRMATORY ISSUE 28
HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION
DOCKET NO. 50-354

Main Steam Tunnel Flooding Analysis, Revision 1, is attached for NRC review as additional information for Public Service Electric and Gas Company's response to SER Confirmatory Issue 28 (see letter dated May 24, 1985, R.L. Mittl, PSE&G to W. Butler, NRC).

This revised analysis includes a feedwater cross-tie isolation valve which has been installed within the main steam tunnel subsequent to the May 24, 1985 submittal.

This valve will be included in the appropriate equipment qualification section of the HCGS FSAR in a future amendment.

Sincerely,



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Attachment

C D.H. Wagner
USNRC Licensing Project Manager

R.W. Borchardt
USNRC Senior Resident Inspector

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SER ISSUE C-28 (SER SUPP. 3, SECTION 8.3.3.1.4)
MAIN STEAM TUNNEL FLOODING ANALYSIS

In Section 8.3.3.1.4 of the SER, the staff documented the applicant's commitment to perform an analysis to verify that Hope Creek could be shut down safely after a main steam tunnel flooding event.

The applicant submitted the main steam tunnel flooding analysis by letter dated May 24, 1985. This analysis identifies all Class 1E equipment and components in the main steam tunnel, Room 4316, that will be subject to the worst-case submergence that results from a break in a main feedwater line. (Flood level is elevation 126 ft of this room.) Also, this report analyzes whether the equipment or component is qualified for submergence. If not qualified, a determination is made whether the equipment or component circuitry has primary and backup protective devices located in a hazard-free area. The purpose of this analysis is to demonstrate that the plant can be safely shut down after both the primary and backup protective device open as a result of the failure of unprotected equipment or component together with the worst-case single failure.

The results of the analysis show that none of the components that are flooded and are not qualified for submergence are required for safe shutdown of the plant, nor will their failure prevent safe shutdown. Because of the redundancy of the equipment/systems that are required to safely shut down the plant, no single failure can prevent safe shutdown. On the basis of its evaluation of this report, the staff finds that the analysis satisfies its concerns and, therefore, this confirmatory item is acceptably resolved.

RESPONSE

The attached report entitled, "Main Steam Tunnel Flooding Analysis", Revision 1, for Hope Creek Generating Station, dated February 1986 includes the flooding analysis of motor operated feedwater crosstie isolation valve, 1AE-HV-4144, which has been installed subsequent to the May 24, 1985 submittal discussed above. As discussed in the attached revision of the main steam tunnel flooding analysis, this valve has primary and backup protective devices and is not required for safe shutdown following a feedwater line break in the steam tunnel.