

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY  
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant  
Post Office Box 2000  
Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379

May 24, 1988

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555

Gentlemen:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 - DOCKET NO.  
50-328 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-79 - SPECIAL REPORT 88-10

The enclosed special report provides details concerning fire detectors inoperable for greater than 14 days. This event is reported in accordance with action statement (b) of Limiting Conditions for Operation 3.3.3.8.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

  
S. J. Smith  
Plant Manager

Enclosure  
cc (Enclosure):

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SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT  
UNIT 2  
SPECIAL REPORT 88-10

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On April 28, 1988, with unit 2 in mode 5 (0 percent power, 25 psig, 127 degrees F), fire detectors for fire zones 112 and 113 (Auxiliary Building elevation 690, column line A-8 to A-15 and U to Q) were inoperable. Modification of motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump (MDAFWP) and boric acid tank (BAT) area coolers duct system and supports (Workplan No. 0177-01) located in the above specified fire zones involved extensive welding and grinding. To prevent spurious fire alarms which could result due to smoke produced by the welding activity, the fire detectors of the fire zones 112 and 113 were made inoperable by wrapping plastic sheets over the fire detectors.

Technical specifications (TSs) require that the fire detectors be operable whenever any equipment that the detectors protects is required to be operable. Some portion of chemical and volume control system equipment are located in these fire zones and are required operable during mode 5. Thus, the detectors were required operable.

The action statement of Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.3.3.8 was entered at 1030 EDT on April 14, 1988, and continuous fire watch was established. The LCO was exited on May 13, 1988. Thus, the detectors were inoperable for approximately 29 days. The action of LCO 3.3.3.8 requires submittal of a special report if the detectors are inoperable for longer than 14 days.

CAUSE OF EVENT

The modification of MDAFWP and BAT area coolers duct system and supports was not completed within 14 days due to complexity of the work involved and it was decided to leave the fire detectors inoperable until the completion of the modification work.

ANALYSIS OF EVENT

This special report is being submitted as required by the action of LCO 3.3.3.8.

The fire detectors were inoperable for approximately 29 days. The fire suppression system in the affected area was operable and would be manually actuated by the plant operators in case of a fire detected by the continuous fire watch. Thus, if a fire had indeed started in the area protected by these detectors, the mitigating effects of the fire protection system would not have been lessened by the inoperable detectors.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

A continuous fire watch was established and was maintained until the modification (welding) of MDAFWP and BAT area coolers duct system and supports was completed, and the detectors were declared operable on May 13, 1988.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

None.

COMMITMENTS

None.

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