LICEN	NSEE EVENT REP	ORT (LER)		UCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 XPIRCS: 8/31/85
FACILITY NAME (1)			DOCKET NUMBER	(2) PAGE (3)
Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station			0   5   0   0	10131915 1 OF 01
TITLE (4)	Polay Poom Du	to Porsonn	al Error	
Failure to Establish Fire Watch for	REFORT DATE (7)		R FACILITIES INVO	NLVED (8)
	ONTH DAY YEAR	FACILITY N		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
				0   5   0   0   0   1
	0 5 2 6 8 8			0 15 0 0 0 0 1
OPERATING MODE (8) 1 20.402(5) 2	THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 C	50,73(a)(2)(iv)	of the following/ (1	73,71(b)
and a second	50.38(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(y)		73.71(e)
EL 1 0 0 20.405(a)(1)(0) 50.36(e)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii)			OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form	
	50,73(s)(2)(i)	50.73(x)(2)(viii		366A)
	50.73(a)(2)(0) 50.73(a)(2)(0)	50.73(a)(2)(viii 50.73(a)(2)(x)		
manuna and the second se	ENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS L	ER (12)		1
NAME			AREA CODE	TELEPHONE NUMBER
W. R. Higgins, Supervisor, Regulator	the local data in the second data and the second d	PERDIBLY IN THIS DEBY	8,0,3	3 4 5 - 4 0 4
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUPAC REPORTABLE TURER TO NPROS	CAUSE 1		MANUFAC- TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS
			111	
		1	1114	1.163
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EX	PECTED (14)			MONTH DAY YEAR
			EXPECT	
YES (IF yes, complete EXPECTER SUBMISSION DATE) ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 speces 1 e approximately fifteen single spece typewri	tten lines/ (16)		EXPECT SUBMISS DATE (	ED ION
At approximately 0715 hours on Ap Supervisor identified that a cont equipment had not been established Specification 3.7.9.3.a. The requ implemented at 0635 hours following protection for the Relay Room equ	ril 26, 1988, t inuous fire wat d for the Relay uirements of th ng isolation of ipment.	tch with back Room as req nis Action St f the CO2 sys	Operatio up fire s uired by atement s tem, whic	ns' Shift uppression Technical hould have been h provides fire
At approximately 0715 hours on Ap Supervisor identified that a cont equipment had not been established Specification 3.7.9.3.a. The req implemented at 0635 hours following	ril 26, 1988, t inuous fire wat c for the Relay uirements of th ng isolation of ipment. adequate review ce the duration	tch with back Room as req his Action St f the CO2 sys w of paperwor h of the nonc	Operatio up fire s uired by atement s tem, whic k due to ompliance	ns' Shift uppression Technical hould have been h provides fire personnel error. was
At approximately 0715 hours on Ap Supervisor identified that a cont equipment had not been established Specification 3.7.9.3.a. The requ implemented at 0635 hours following protection for the Relay Room equ The cause of this event was an int The consequences were minimal sint approximately 50 minutes and an his	ril 26, 1988, t inuous fire wat d for the Relay uirements of th ng isolation of ipment. adequate review ce the duration ourly fire watc	tch with back Room as req his Action St f the CO2 sys w of paperwor h of the nonc ch patrol rou	Operatio up fire s uired by atement s tem, whic k due to ompliance tinely in	ns' Shift uppression Technical hould have been h provides fire personnel error. was spected the
At approximately 0715 hours on Ap Supervisor identified that a cont equipment had not been established Specification 3.7.9.3.a. The requiremented at 0635 hours following protection for the Relay Room equ The cause of this event was an int The consequences were minimal sind approximately 50 minutes and an ho area.	ril 26, 1988, t inuous fire wat c for the Relay uirements of th ng isolation of ipment. adequate review ce the duration ourly fire watc were initiated duling personne	tch with back Room as req his Action St f the CO2 sys of paperwor h of the nonc ch patrol rou as a result el discontinu	Operatio up fire s uired by atement s tem, whic k due to ompliance tinely in of this e ed assign	ns' Shift uppression Technical hould have been h provides fire personnel error. was spected the vent: ing Removal and
At approximately 0715 hours on Ap Supervisor identified that a cont equipment had not been established Specification 3.7.9.3.a. The requiremented at 0635 hours following protection for the Relay Room equiremented the Relay Room equiremented at 0635 hours following protection for the Relay Room equiremented at 0635 hours following protection for the Relay Room equiremented at 0635 hours following the cause of this event was an interproximately 50 minutes and an his area. The following corrective actions in 1. Effective May 13, 1988, Schere Restoration numbers to paper	ril 26, 1988, t inuous fire wat d for the Relay uirements of th ng isolation of ipment. adequate review ce the duration ourly fire wat were initiated duling personne work. Control	tch with back Room as req his Action St the CO2 sys of paperwor of the nonc ch patrol rou as a result el discontinu Room personn	Operatio up fire s uired by atement s tem, whic k due to ompliance tinely in of this e ed assign el will p	ns' Shift uppression Technical hould have been h provides fire personnel error. was spected the vent: ing Removal and erform this
At approximately 0715 hours on Ap Supervisor identified that a cont equipment had not been established Specification 3.7.9.3.a. The requiremented at 0635 hours following protection for the Relay Room equ The cause of this event was an in The consequences were minimal sind approximately 50 minutes and an hi area. The following corrective actions of 1. Effective May 13, 1988, Sched Restoration numbers to paper function in the future. 2. Involved personnel are to red July 10, 1988. 3. Operations will establish an Protection Officer for the re 1988. 88050101	ril 26, 1988, to inuous fire wat d for the Relay uirements of the ng isolation of ipment. adequate review ce the duration ourly fire watch were initiated duling personne work. Control view this incice improved inter	tch with back Room as req his Action St f the CO2 sys of paperwor h of the nonc ch patrol rou as a result el discontinu Room personn dent with eac	Operatio up fire s uired by atement s tem, whic k due to ompliance tinely in of this e ed assign el will p h Operati e on-shif	ns' Shift uppression Technical hould have been h provides fire personnel error. was spected the vent: ing Removal and erform this ons shift by t Fire

NRC Form 366A (9-83)	EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONT	INUATIO	N		U.S	AP	PROVED O	Me NO			
FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)		LER NUMBER (6)				PAGE (3)				
	성격이 많은 것을 잘 못 했다. 여기	VEAR	1	SEQ	UENTIAL	1	REVISION NUMBER		T	T	
Virgil C. Summer Nuclear St	ation 0 15 10 10 10 1 3 19	5 8 8	-	0	015	-	010	012	2 0	FO	14

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

## PLANT IDENTIFICATION:

Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor

### EQUIPMENT IDENTIFICATION:

Fire Service System - EIIS-KP

## IDENTIFICATION OF EVENT:

At approximately 0715 hours on April 26, 1988, the oncoming Operations' Shift Supervisor identified that a continuous fire watch with backup fire suppression equipment had not been established for the Relay Room as required by Technical Specification 3.7.9.3.a. The requirements of this Action Statement should have been implemented within one hour (0635 hours) following isolation of the CO2 system, which provides fire protection for the Relay Room equipment.

#### EVENT DATE:

April 26, 1988

# REPORT DATE: May 26, 1988

This report was initiated by Off-Normal Occurrence Number 88-021.

## PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS:

LER 85-018, dated August 23, 1985 LER 87-018, dated August 27, 1987

### CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT:

Mode 1 - Reactor Power 100%

NRC Form 366A (9.83)	LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION					U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB MO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 8/01/85						
FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	1	LE	R NUMBER (6)		PAGE (3)						
the distance of the second second		YEAR		NUMBER	REVISION		TT					
Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station	0 5 0 0 0 3 9 5	8 8	_	0 1015	- 0 10	0 3	OF (	0 14				

## DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

On April 25, 1988, Fire Protection Services personnel contacted the Operations representative in Scheduling to coordinate a tagout of the CO2 system for the performance of a surveillance test. Scheduling was told at this time that the tags should not be hung prior to the test groups arrival on the following day so that they could provide the continuous fire watch with backup fire suppression equipment as required by the Technical Specifications.

During Scheduling review of the paperwork, a Removal and Restoration (R&R) number 870831 was observed on the Surveillance Test Task Sheet for the test. R&R's are used at the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station to denote when a safety system or component is removed from service. Scheduling contacted the Control Room Supervisor and verified that the R&R was active, however, he failed to confirm that the R&R specifically addressed the CO2 system or if any additional actions were required by Technical Specifications.

The active R&R was actually against the Integrated Fire Computer System (IFCS) which had been removed from service on December 29, 1987, due to erratic operation. This system's inoperability affected Control Room alarms and was reported in Special Reports dated January 28 and March 22, 1988 under the requirements of Technical Specification 3.3.3.7.a, "Fire Detector Instrumentation." A roving fire watch was established due to this inoperability and remained in effect until May 6, 1988.

Scheduling associated the tagout to the existing R&R and forwarded the work package to the Control Room without noting the request of the Fire Protection Services group that the tags should not be hung until the following day shift. The Duty Shift Supervisor gave the tagout to the tagging desk operator at approximately 0400 hours on April 26, 1988 and directed him to initiate the necessary paperwork for the tagout.

The tagging desk operator noticed the R&R number already on the tagout package and went to the Control Room to verify that the R&R was active. The Control Room Supervisor verified the active status and told the operator that the R&R was against the IFCS Panel. The tagging desk operator knew that the test associated with the tagout was a retest and, therefore, considered the tagout to be covered under the existing R&R. The tagout, which was hung and verified at approximately 0535 hours, rendered the Relay Room CO2 fire suppression system inoperable with a roving (hourly) fire watch as the only established compensatory action.

LICENSEE	EVENT	REPORT	(LER) TEXT	CONTINUATION	

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OM8 NO 3150-0104 EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)		LER NUMBER (6)	PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER			
Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station	0 15 10 10 10 13 19 1	5 8 8	0 1 01 5 010	014 0F 0 14		

At approximately 0715 hours the oncoming Shift Supervisor noticed that the CO2 system had been tagged out and questioned if a continuous fire watch with backup fire suppression equipment had been established. On discovery that the fire watch had not been established, the Shift Supervisor dispatched the Fire Protection Officer (FPO) with directions to establish the fire watch. The continuous fire watch with backup fire suppression equipment was established at approximately 0725 hours. The rooms were not compensated, as required by Technical Specification 3.7.9.3.a. "CO2 System," for a period of approximately 50 minutes.

## CAUSE OF EVENT:

IRC Form 366A

The event was due to Operations personnel errors resulting from a lack of attention to detail. The involved personnel failed to do an adequate review of the paperwork during the performance of the system tagout to ensure compliance with the action statement of Technical Specification 3.7.9.3.a.

## ANALYSIS OF EVENT:

The consequences due to this event were minimal. The duration of the noncompliance was approximately 50 minutes and an hourly fire watch patrol routinely inspected the area.

### CORRECTIVE ACTION:

A Management Review Board (MRB) meeting, chaired by the Director, Nuclear Plant Operations, was convened on April 28, 1988, to review this event. As a result of the MRB meeting, the following corrective actions were identified and initiated in response to this incident:

- Scheduling discontinued assigning R&R numbers to paperwork on May 13, 1988. Control room personnel will perform this function to ensure appropriate actions are taken during the removal from service of plant systems.
- The personnel involved in the Technical Specification noncompliance will review the incident with each Operations shift by July 10, 1988. This review will emphasize the need for attention to detail during paperwork review.
- 3. Operations will establish an improved interface with the on-shift FPO for the review of fire service related paperwork by June 15, 1988. The FPO position was previously established (March 28, 1988) at V. C. Summer Nuclear Station to provide added attention to the daily fire protection activities and allow single point accountability regarding fire protection. The additional involvement with Operations paperwork will increase the FPO's knowledge of all fire service activities and provide another line of defense on Fire Service problems.

AC FORM 366A

# 10CFR50.73



South Carolina Electric & Gas Company P.O. Box 88 Jentrinsville, SC 29065 (803) 345-4041 Dan A. Nauman Vice President Nuclear Operations

May 26, 1988

Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

> SUBJECT: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Docket No. 50/395 Operating License No. NPF-12 LER 88-005

Gentlemen:

Attached is Licensee Event Report No. 88-005 for the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station. This report is submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).

Should there be any questions, please call us at your convenience.

Very truly yours,

lam lo D. A. Nauman

CJM/DAN:1cd Attachment

J. G. Connelly, Jr./O. W. Dixon, Jr./T. C. Nichols, Jr. pc: E. C. Roberts W. A. Williams, Jr. J. C. Snelson J. Nelson Grace G. O. Percival J. J. Hayes, Jr. R. L. Prevatte General Managers J. B. Knotts, Jr. C. A. Price INPO Records Center G. G. Soult ANI Library J. R. Proper Marsh & McLennan R. B. Clary NSRC RTS (LER 880005) W. R. Higgins NPCF T. L. Matlosz R. M. Campbell, Jr. Files ( 818.05 & 818.07) K. E. Nodland