

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No. 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 5	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2
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TITLE (4)
Diesel Damper Design Deficiency

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)									
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)								
0	8	16	8	8	—	0	1	9	—	0	0	9	1	5	8	8	N	0 5 0 0 0 0
THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																		

OPERATING MODE (9) 1	POWER LEVEL (10) 18.0	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(e)(1)	X 50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(e)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(e)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vi)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 305A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(f)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(g)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(h)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Larry L. Lehman, Shift Technical Advisor	TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE: 410 12 51 3131-16 16 10 10
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On August 16, 1988, at 1745, OPPD personnel discovered a condition which potentially could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety functions needed to maintain the reactor in a safe shutdown condition. An analysis completed for the reconstitution of the design basis of the diesel generator (DG-2) revealed that the circuitry for the inlet and outlet dampers for the diesel generator could not be isolated from the control room by a local means. This implies that if a fire forced the evacuation of the control room and the DG-2 circuitry were isolated, the control circuitry to the dampers would not be isolated. If the fire is assumed to be intelligent, causing a signal which would close the dampers, the diesel generator would then be rendered inoperable. This condition was reported under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iii) on August 16, 1988, at 1838. At 1905 the same day, the breaker that energized the control circuitry for the dampers was opened allowing the dampers to fail open. This ensured that a "smart" fire would not render the diesel inoperable.

Short term corrective actions included the opening of the breaker that powered the circuitry for the dampers and changing the emergency procedure that addresses a forced evacuation of the control room. The change instructs the operator to open the breaker which powers the damper control circuitry. This ensures that the diesel generator would remain operable throughout the event. Long term corrective action includes a design modification to change the damper circuitry so that it also may be isolated from control room circuitry at the local diesel generator operating panel. This modification is scheduled for the 1988 refueling outage.

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PDR ADOCK 05000285
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No. 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 5	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR 8 8	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER - 0 1 9	REVISION NUMBER - 0 0	0 2	OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

On August 16, 1988, at 1745, OPPD personnel discovered a condition which potentially could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety functions needed to maintain the reactor in a safe shutdown condition. An analysis completed for the reconstitution of the design basis of the diesel generator (DG-2) revealed that the circuitry for the inlet and outlet dampers for the diesel generator could not be isolated from the control room by a local means. This implies that if a fire forced the evacuation of the control room and the DG-2 circuitry were isolated, the control circuitry to the dampers would not be isolated. If the fire is assumed to be intelligent, causing a signal which would close the dampers, the diesel generator would then be rendered inoperable. This condition was reported under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iii) on August 16, 1988, at 1838. At 1905 the same day, the breaker that energized the control circuitry for the dampers was opened allowing the dampers to fail open. This ensured that a "smart" fire would not render the diesel inoperable.

The plant has been operated since the initial start-up with this damper circuit configuration. This configuration could have rendered the diesel generator inoperable during a control room fire that required evacuation; however, the problem could have been rectified by failing the instrument air to the damper operators or opening the breaker that powers the damper control circuitry. This would allow the dampers to fail open, thereby restoring operability of the diesel generator. Although this condition could have rendered DG-2 inoperable, the ability to regain operability of the diesel generator still remained. Hence, this condition did not present a significant threat to the overall safety of Fort Calhoun Station.

Short term corrective actions included the opening of the breaker that powered the circuitry for the dampers and changing the emergency procedure that addresses a forced evacuation of the control room. The change instructs the operator to open the breaker which powers the damper control circuitry. This ensures that the diesel generator would remain operable throughout the event. Long term corrective action includes a design modification to change the damper circuitry so that it also may be isolated from control room circuitry at the local diesel generator operating panel. This modification is scheduled for the 1988 refueling outage.

This is the first reportable event at Fort Calhoun Station involving the diesel generator damper control circuitry.

Omaha Public Power District
1623 Harney Omaha, Nebraska 68102-2247
402/536-4000

September 15, 1988
LIC-88-808

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Mail Station P1-137
Washington, D. C. 20555


Reference: Docket No. 50-285

Gentlemen:

SUBJECT: Licensee Event Report for the Fort Calhoun Station

Please find attached Licensee Event Report 88-019 dated September 15, 1988.
This report is being submitted per requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.

Sincerely,


K. J. Morris
Division Manager
Nuclear Operations

KJM/rh

Attachment

cc: R. D. Martin, NRC Regional Administrator
D. D. Milano, NRC Project Manager
P. H. Harrell, NRC Senior Resident Inspector
INPO Records Center
American Nuclear Insurers
SARC Chairman
PRC Chairman, % Becky Ellis
Fort Calhoun File (2)
L. L. Lehman
Fort Calhoun Station Training, % J. J. Fluehr

IE22
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