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Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station - Unit 3	as a Result of a
Loss-of-Power Caused by a Tie Breaker Malfunction	
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ALUE A	TELEPHONE NUMBER
W. C. Birely, Senior Engineer - Licensing Section	21115 814111-15101418
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT ITS	
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Abstract: On May 7, 1988 at 0904 hours, a PCIS Group II Reac Cleanup System (RWCU) isolation signal was generation of a loss-of-power to temperature switch (TS-3-12 monitors the Non-Regenerative Heat Exchanger outled The loss-of-power occurred when a tie breaker malfor resulted in two power supplies feeding the same else This established the necessary logic to trip power temperature switch. This event is reportable becaus engineered safety feature actuation. No valve move as a result of this isolation signal. There were consequences to this event because the RWCU System and out-of-service at the time of the event. All sources were reestablished by 0947 hours and the i was reset at approximately 1000 hours. The durati- was approximately 56 minutes. The tie breaker was service, inspected, and returned to service. Prev- maintenance will be performed on the three breaker A-42 ("Procedure for Control of Temporary Plant Al- been revised.	tor Water ed as a result 99) which t temperature. unction ectrical bus. to the use of the ement occurred no adverse was isolated normal power solation signal on of the event removed from entive s and Procedure terations") has
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Unit Conditions Prior to the Event:

- Unit 3 in Refueling Mode with core offloaded
- Reactor level at -410"
- Reactor Water Cleanup System (RWCU) was out-of-service with valves MO-68, MO-15 and MO-18 blocked closed
- Operator was attempting to perform a 480V Bus power source transfer

### Description of the Event:

On May 7, 1988 at 0904 hours, a Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group II RWCU isolation signal was generated as a result of a loss-of-power to the temperature switch (TS-3-12-99) which monitors the RWCU Non-Regenerative Heat Exchanger outlet temperature.

At 0900 hours, a Control Room Operator was attempting to remove the 13kV circuit breaker 3R4 (transformer breaker) from service in order to accommodate preventive maintenance of the breaker. This action was being accomplished by switching the power source for the 480V 3R4 Bus from the 3R4 bus breaker to the 4-3R4 tie breaker (Figure 1). While initiating the "dead bus transfer" of the 3R4 Bus, the Control Room Operator attempted to close the 4-3R4 tie breaker from the Control Room. However, the 4-3R4 tie breaker position light on the control panel indicated the breaker remained open. Assuming that the tie breaker had not closed, the Operator moved the tie breaker control switch to the "trip" position then reclosed the previously opened 3R4 bus breaker in order to restore power to the 3R4 Bus. Approximately one minute later, both the 3R4 and 4R4 bus breakers tripped, causing lossof-power to both the 3R4 and 4R4 480V Buses.

At the time of the event, the nonsafety-related 4R4 Bus was temporarily providing power to the safety-related E334-R-B Motor Control Center. The normal source (the E33 bus) was out-ofservice for maintenance. The E334-R-B Motor Control Center provides power to the 30C62 RWCU instrument panel which contains the power source for temperature switch TS-3-12-99. The loss-ofpower to temperature switch TS-3-12-99. The loss-ofpower to temperature switch TS-3-12-99 completed the necessary PCIS logic to cause a PCIS Group II RWCU isolation signal. No valve movement occurred as a result of the isolation signal since the RWCU System was out-of-service. The following alarms were received in the Control Room:

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1. Group II/III Inboard Isolation Relays Not Reset

2. Group II/III Outboard Isolation Relays Not Reset

The 4-3R4 tie breaker was initially racked in and out to ensure that all connections were making contact. Transfer of the power source from the 3R4 bus breaker to the 4-3R4 tie breaker was successfully completed at 0917 hours allowing removal of the 3R4 transformer breaker. The 4R4 and 3R4 bus breakers were closed reestablishing power to the 4R4 and 3R4 480V Buses by 0947 hours. The alarms and isolation signals were reset at approximately 1000 hours. The duration of this event was approximately 56 minutes.

### Consequences of the Event:

There were no adverse consequences as a result of this event. The RWCU System was out-of-service and isolated with valves MO-68, MO-15 and MO-18 blocked closed. No valve movement occurred as a result of the isolation signal. All systems functioned as designed.

At the time of the event, the nonsafety-related 4R4 Bud was providing power to safety related instrumentation which included temperature switch TS-3-12-99. This was being done because the normal power source (the E33 bus) was removed from service for maintenance. This temporary power source was permissible by Special Procedure 1109, "Deenergization of 4KV Bus E33". During normal operation, the nonsafety-related power supply would not be allowed to feed safety-related instrumentation, therefore, this event would not have occurred during normal plant operation.

### Cause of the Event:

The cause of the PCIS Group II RWCU isolation signal apparently resulted from a 4-3R4 tie breaker malfunction.

Inspection of the tie breaker did not reveal any sticking or binding of the mechanical linkage. During the inspection, loose nuts were tightened. It is unknown whether previous cycling of the tie breaker may have resolved any mechanical problems that existed. The circuit breaker is an ITE Imperial Corporation K-1600 (1600 amperes).

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US NUCLEAR REQULATORY COMMISSIO 50-0104

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#### Corrective Actions:

The 4-3R4 tie breaker was removed from service, inspected, and returned to service. Power was reestablished to the 3R4 and 4R4 Buses as previously described and the "dead bus transfer" was successfully completed.

## Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence:

Procedure A-42 ("Procedure for Control of Temporary Plant Alterations") has been revised to require information tags in the Control Room when temporary power feeds are being utilized. This will aid the Operator in assessing possible consequences of performing plant operations when off-normal plant configurations exist.

Maintenance Procedure M-55.1 ("480 Volt Load Center Circuit Breaker Maintenance") will be revised to ensure that the mechanical linkages associated with the auxiliary contacts are inspected. The procedure will also require the auxiliary contacts to be inspected and cleaned. This revision will be completed by October 1, 1988. This maintenance will be performed on the 4-3R4 tie breaker, 3R4 bus breaker and 4R4 bus breaker prior to restart of Unit 3.

### EllS Codes:

The EIIS codes for the affected systems are as follows: JM-Containment Isolation Control System, CE-Reactor Water Cleanup System, EC-Low Voltage Power System (600V and less). The EIIS codes for the affected components are as follows: BKR-breaker, MCBD-Control Board (Main), BU-Bus, ZIS-Switch, Indicating, Zone (Position), TIS-Temperature Indicating Switch.

### Previous Similar Occurrences:

There have been no LERs concerning a PCIS isolation signal resulting from a loss-of-power caused by a tie breaker malfunction.

Tracking Codes: X1 - Failure with unknown cause



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E. P. FOGARTY MANAGER NUCLEAR SUPPORT DIVISION

September 19, 1988 Docket No. 50-278

Document Control Lesk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

> SUBJECT: Licensee Event Report Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station - Unit 3

This LER concerns a Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group II Reactor Water Cleanup System isolation signal as a result of the loss-of-power to temperature switch TS-3-12-99. This loss-of-power was caused by a tie breaker malfunction. This revised LER is being submitted to reflect the removal of the commitment to revise Procedure A-23 ("Generation of Special Procedures") to require information tags in the Control Room when temporary power feeds are being utilized. During a review of the actions to prevent recurrence, plant staff determined that this procedure is a generic outline for writing special procedures and would not be the appropriate procedure to address this action. The use of information tags in the Control Room when temp rary power feeds are being utilized will be adequately addressed by the revision to Procedure A-42 as discussed in this LER.

Reference:	Docket No. 50-278
Report Number:	3-88-02
Revision Number:	01
Event Date:	May 7, 1988
Report Date:	September 19, 1988
Facility:	Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station

Revisions are indicated by a vertical bar in the right hand margin. This LER is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).

Very truly yours

E. P. Fogartý Manager Nuclear Support Division

CC: W. T. Russell, Administrator, Region I, USNRC T. P. Johnson, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector T. E. Magette, State of Maryland INPO Records Center