NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 8/31/85

# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

| FACILITY NAME (1) | DOCKET NUMBER (2) | PAGE (3) |
|---|---|---|
| Hope Creek Generating Station | 0 5 0 0 0 3 5 4 | 1 OF 0 3 |

TITLE (4) Discovery of Non-Seismically Qualified Instrumentation Tubing Installation on 1E Instrument Racks - Personnel Error

| EVENT DATE (5) | | | LER NUMBER (6) | | | REPORT DATE (7) | | | OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MONTH | DAY | YEAR | YEAR | SEQUENTIAL NUMBER | REVISION NUMBER | MONTH | DAY | YEAR | FACILITY NAMES | DOCKET NUMBER(S) |
| 0 4 | 2 6 | 8 8 | 8 8 | — 0 1 1 | — 0 0 | 0 5 | 2 5 | 8 8 | | 0 5 0 0 0 |
| | | | | | | | | | | 0 5 0 0 0 |

| OPERATING MODE (9) | POWER LEVEL (10) | THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11) | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 1 0 0 | 20.402(b) | 20.405(c) | 50.73(a)(2)(iv) | 73.71(b) |
| | | 20.405(a)(1)(i) | 50.36(c)(1) | X 50.73(a)(2)(v) | 73.71(c) |
| | | 20.405(a)(1)(ii) | 50.36(c)(2) | 50.73(a)(2)(vii) | OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A) |
| | | 20.405(a)(1)(iii) | 50.73(a)(2)(i) | 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | |
| | | 20.405(a)(1)(iv) | 50.73(a)(2)(ii) | 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | |
| | | 20.405(a)(1)(v) | 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | 50.73(a)(2)(ix) | |

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

| NAME | TELEPHONE NUMBER |
|---|---|
| A. M. Ervin, Lead Engineer - Technical | AREA CODE 6 0 9 3 3 9 - 5 2 3 9 |

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

| CAUSE | SYSTEM | COMPONENT | MANUFACTURER | REPORTABLE TO NPRDS | | CAUSE | SYSTEM | COMPONENT | MANUFACTURER | REPORTABLE TO NPRDS | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

| | EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15) | MONTH | DAY | YEAR |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) | X NO | | | |

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)


On April 26, 1988 at 1650 hours, the Plant was in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 (Power Operation) at 100% power generating 1100 MWe when the control room was informed that seismically unqualified tubing spans had been installed on two local instrument racks. The drain valves located upstream of the tubing were closed and tagged out of service, thereby isolating the seismically unqualified tubing from the primary system coolant and restoring the "Q" boundary. The root cause of this occurrence was the faulty preparation of the design change which installed the tubing without specific tubing support requirements - a personnel error. Corrective actions include isolation of the tubing from primary coolant, either seismically qualify the tubing or remove the temporary instrumentation and subsequent revision of the design change procedure.



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(9-83)

| FACILITY NAME (1) | DOCKET NUMBER (2) | LER NUMBER (6) | | | PAGE (3) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | YEAR | SEQUENTIAL NUMBER | REVISION NUMBER | |
| | 0 5 0 0 0 3 5 4 | 8 8 | — 0 1 1 | — 0 0 | 0 2 OF 0 3 |

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor (BWR/4)
Nuclear Boiler and Reactor Recirc (EIIS Designator:AD)

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

Discovery of Non-Seismically Qualified Instrumentation Tubing Installation on 1E Instrument Racks - Personnel Error

Event Date: April 26, 1988
Event Time 1650 Hours
This LER was initiated by Incident Report No. 88-081

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

The Plant was in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 (Power Operation) at 100% power generating 1100 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

On April 26, 1988 at 1650 hours, the control room was informed that seismically unqualified tubing spans had been installed on two local instrument racks. The drain valves located upstream of the tubing were closed and tagged out of service, thereby isolating the seismically unqualified tubing from the primary system coolant and restoring the "Q" boundary.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE

The root cause of this occurrence was the faulty preparation of the design change which installed the tubing without specific tubing support requirements - a personnel error.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE

As a result of a walkdown of another installed design change to the reactor vendor-supplied local instrument racks, it was discovered that several tubing runs exceeded 42 inches, the maximum unsupported span specification. These tubing runs were part of a design change which installed several test transmitters used for data collection during power ascension. This design change instructed that the instrumentation tubing be "run to suit" and failed to provide locations or guidelines for the installation of tubing supports.

A review of all other reactor vendor-supplied instrument racks determined that no other installed design changes had created similar deviations from seismic requirements.

PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES

There have been no previous events involving seismically unqualified tubing installations on 1E instrument panels.

SAFETY ASSESSMENT

A seismic analysis has been performed which demonstrates that, in the event of a design basis seismic event, the incorrectly installed tubing would not have exceeded its ultimate tensile stress, thereby not rupturing. Based on this analysis, the health and safety of the public were not compromised by this event.

REPORTABILITY

This report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v).

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. As stated above, the seismically unqualified tubing was isolated from the primary coolant and safety tagged to prevent operation thereby maintaining the "Q" boundary.

2. A design change will be issued to either seismically qualify the tubing installation or remove the temporary instrumentation.

3. Subsequent revisions to the design change procedure used for the installation of the test transmitters now provide mechanisms which the licensee believes are adequate to prevent errors of this type.

Sincerely,

S. LaBruna
General Manager -
Hope Creek Operations

AME:

SORC Mtg. 88-076

PSEG

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box L Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Hope Creek Operations

May 25, 1988

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION
DOCKET NO. 50-354
UNIT NO. 1
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 88-011-00

This Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v).

Sincerely,

S. LaBruna

S. LaBruna
General Manager -
Hope Creek Operations

AME:

Attachment
SORC Mtg. 88-076

C Distribution

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