



Commonwealth Edison

Dresden Nuclear Power Station
R.R. #1
Morris, Illinois 60450
Telephone 815/942-2920

March 3, 1986

DJS LTR: 86-154

James G. Keppler
Regional Administrator
Director of Inspection and Enforcement
Region III
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Reference: DJS Ltr. 86-80 to J. G. Keppler from D. G. Scott, dated
February 4, 1986.

Dear Sir:

This letter is in reference to the Conformatory Action Letter 85-04 regarding the Main Steam Line Snubber Monitoring System for Dresden Unit 2. Item 2 of this Confirmatory Action Letter requires a verbal notification to Region III within 2 working days followed by a written report and safety evaluation within 30 calendar days.

Two occurrences have been identified during this reporting period:

Occurrence #31 Notification made to J. Harrison by G. Smith
on February 5, 1986.

Occurrence #32 Notification made to D. Danielson by J. Achterberg
on February 10, 1986.

The written reports and safety evaluations when required for these occurrences are attached.

Sincerely,

D. J. Scott
Station Manager
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

DJS:JW:hjb

Enclosure

cc: J. Almer
J. Welch
J. Achterberg
J. Williams
File/Misc.
File/Numerical

50-237

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Occurrence #31

On February 4, 1986 at 0353, Unit 2 was at 26.5% (670 MWt) power and a load of 180 MWe decreasing 200 MWe/hr to hot standby for repair of a packing leak in a steam line drain valve. During the unit shutdown, several instrumentation monitor actuations were noted. After reviewing the sequence of events during shutdown, it was determined that the snubber instrumentation triggers occurred during the insertion of the source range monitors (SRM's) and intermediate range monitors (IRM's). These traces were compared and similarities noted to those obtained during testing on June 3, 1985, which is described in Occurrence #5. That occurrence was attributed to electrical interference generated from the movement of SRM's and IRM's. Since the unit shutdown progressed normally, no steam line transients were identified and the source of these traces have been attributed to specific plant evolution (SRM/IRM movement), the safety significance of this event is minimal.

Occurrence #32

On February 6, 1986, following the repair of the packing leak on the main steam line drain valve, an orderly startup was commenced. Unit 2 was placed in the run mode at 2131 on February 7, 1986 and synchronized to the system grid at 0244 hours on February 9, 1986.

During the unit startup several snubber instrumentation monitor actuations were noted. After reviewing the sequence of events during the startup, it was determined that the snubber instrumentation triggers occurred during the withdrawal of the source range monitors (SRM's) and the intermediate range monitors (IRM's). These traces were compared and similarities noted to those obtained during testing on June 3, 1985 which is described in Occurrence #5. That occurrence was attributed to electrical interference generated from the movement of the SRM's and IRM's. Since the unit startup progressed normally, no steamline transients were identified and the source of the traces have been attributed to a specific plant evolution (SRM/IRM movement), the safety significance of this event is minimal.

On February 24, 1986, notification was made by telephone, as required by the Confirmatory Action Letter, that on February 21, 1986 the strain gage (SG) associated with snubber #51 and the linear variable displacement transformer (LVDT) associated with snubber #50 were taken out of service for preliminary testing and calibration of the OPTIM Megedec Data Acquisition system. The C main steam line (MSL) has three monitored snubbers (44, 50, 51). The LVDT associated with snubber #50 and the SG associated with snubber #51 were chosen for testing of the new monitoring system because they are located on the C MSL. The C MSL still has sufficient snubber monitoring since the LVDT on snubber #51 and the SG on snubber #50 located at the same node on the MSL are operable. The third monitored snubber #44 allows verification of any transients noted on C MSL during the out of service period. Taking these particular instruments out of service for testing and calibration reduces the safety significance because the possibilities of transients going undetected are minimized.