U.S. NUCLEAR PEGULATORY COMMISSIO APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104

							LIC	ENSE	EEVE	NI ME	PURI	(LEN)							
FACILITY	LAMES A SITTOATBICK HIGHEAD DOWED DIANT													OCKET NUMBER (2)					
TITLE (4)	1175		res fai	sur lur	e Coo	lar	t In	ject t of	ion	made	inog re de	perable eficienc	due to			1 of	-		
(vt	NT DATE	(6)		L	ER NUMBER	(6)		REF	PORT DAT	TE (7)		OTHER	FACILITIES INVO	LVED	(8)				
MONTH	MONTH DAY YEAR		YEA	EAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER			REVISION	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES			DOCKET NUMBER(S)					
						1								0	0 5 0 0 0 1				
0 3	1 0	8 8	8	8 -	0 0 1	-	0 1	0 5	1 3	8 8				0	151010	101	1 1		
	RATING	N	THIS	REPORT	T IS SUBMITT	ED P	URBUANT 1	TO THE RE	OUIREM	ENTS OF 1	0 CFR & /	Check one or more	of the following) (1	1)					
MODE (R)			-	20.402(e)		-	60.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)					
LEVE!				20,406(a)(1)(i) 20,406(a)(1)(ii)					(1) (2)	X	50.73(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	73.71(c) OTHER (Specify in Abs							
			H	20.406 (a	#3(1)(iii) #3(1)(iv)			80.73(a)(2)(ii) 80.73(a)(2)(vi 80.73(a)(2)(ii) 90.73(a)(2)(vi)(A) 366A)						
				20.4061	a)(1)(v)	-		50.73(a)	-	1000		80.73(a)(2)(x)							
NAME					-	-	- 4	ICENSEE (CONTACT	FOR THIS	LER (12)			TEL	EPHONE NUM	AFR			
								ENCIN	650				AREA CODE						
W. VERNE CHILDS, SENIOR LICENSING EN														3 1 1 5 3 4 9 - 6 3 0					
			-	-	COMPLETE	ONE	LINE FOR	EACH CO	MPONEN'	TFAILURE	DESCRIBE	O IN THIS REPOR	17 (13)	-					
CAUSE	SYSTEM	сом	CHENT	,	MANUFAC. TURER		PORTABLE O NPROS			CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC TURER		EPORTABLE TO NPRDS				
D	BJ	M 10		P	12,9,6	5	Y						111						
			11										1111	T					
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												Evacore	EXPECTED MONTH DAY			YEAR			
YES III yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE!											SUBMISSI	SUBMISSION DATE (15)							

EIIS codes are in []

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

During normal operation at 100% rated power on 3/10/88 when required to be operable by Technical Specification 3.5.C, High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) (BJ) was made inoperable when steam supply valve 23-MOV-14 failed to open during surveillance testing.

Automatic Depressurization System [AD], Low Pressure Coolant Injection [BO], Low Pressure Core Spray [BM], and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling [BN] systems were demonstrated operable. These systems are redundant to or back up HPCI, resulting in operation of the plant within the range of accident analyses in the Final Safety Analysis Report.

The motor on 23-MOV-14 was destroyed by excessive current as a result of a procedure deficiency which did not require inspection and lubrication of the threads of the valve stem and stem nut when valves are repacked.

Immediate corrective action was to replace the failed motor and return HPCI to service on 3/11/88 within approximately 23 hours. Long-term corrective action is to revise the valve repacking procedure to require inspection, cleaning, and lubrication of the threads of the valve stem and stem nut.

LER-85-025, 86-014, 86-011, and 86-003 are related events in which safety-related valve motors failed tue to procedure deficiencies.

NRC Form 366A 19-83

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

US NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104 EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)

JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

								LEN NUMBER (6)									PAGE 131				
								*1	AR		860	MEE	AL		NEV	SION BER					
0	5	0	0	0	3	3	3	8	8	_	0	0	1	_	0	1	0	2	OF	0	4

TEXT /# more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's/ (17)

EIIS codes are in []

Event Description

During normal full power (100% rated) operation at 1230 hours on 3/10/88, High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) [BJ] turbine steam supply valve 23-MOV-14 failed to open in response to an open signal. The HPCI [BJ] system automatic initiation logic was being tested by performance of Surveillance Test ST-4E, titled "HPCI Subsystem Logic Functional Test".

Failure of valve 23-MOV-14 to open resulted in HPCI [8J] being declared inoperable when the system was required to be operable by Technical Specification 3.5.C. Surveillance to demonstrate the operability of Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) [AD], Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) [BO], Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) [BM], and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) [BN] as required by Technical Specification 4.5.C.l.a was initiated.

At 1415 hours on 3/10/88 during the surveillance testing required by Technical Specification 4.5.C.l.a, RCIC [BN] was also made inoperable for approximately one minute due to a personnel error which resulted in isolation of the RCIC [BN] steam supply (refer to LER-88-002 for details of this event). Personnel performing the surveillance recognized the RCIC [BN] isolation as a personnel error, immediately corrected the error, and restored RCIC [BN] to service.

Following repair of valve 23-MOV-14 and testing to demonstrate operability of HPCI [BJ], the system was returned to service at 1131 hours on 3/11/88, approximately 23 hours after failure.

Cause of Event

Valve 23-MOV-14 failed to open when an open signal was provided by the logic system due to motor failure. Examination of the DC motor revealed destruction of the commutator due to excessive current.

As part of post-work testing following replacement of the motor on valve 23-MOV-14, it was found that peak motor current for unseating the valve in the open direction with a differential pressure of approximately 1,000 psi was unacceptably high.

NRC Form 366A

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO 3150-0104 EXPIRES 8:31:85

JAMES A. FITZPATRICK

NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER (8)

PAGE (3)

VEAR | SEQUENTIAL | REVISION | NUMBER |

NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER |

NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER | NUMBER |

TEXT Iff more specir is required, use additional NRC Form 3664's) (17)

Investigation of the high current revealed that the valve stem threads and stem nut threads did not have adequate lubrication. Following lubrication, the valve motor current tests were repeated during opening of the valve with a differential pressure of 1,000 psi. A comparison of pre-lubrication and post-lubrication data revealed a peak valve motor unseating current reduction of approximately 50%.

Examination of maintenance records and maintenance procedures reveals that the valve stem of 23-MOV-14 had been repacked to correct a packing leak on 2/24/88. The valve was tested on 2/25/88 with satisfactory results. Review of Maintenance Procedure MP-59.9, titled "Valve Repacking", revealed that the procedure did not include instructions to determine if the valve stem threads and stem nut threads were adequately lubricated. Packing leaks can wash the lubricants off of the valve stem threads and stem nut thread surfaces.

In consideration of the above, the cause of the event was determined to be a result of a procedural inadequacy which did not include evaluation of relubrication of the threads of the valve stem and stem nut.

Analysis of Event

HPCI [BJ] is designed to provide makeup water to the reactor in the event of a small Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) at a rate of 4,250 gpm with reactor pressure between 150 and 1,120 psig. In the event of failure of the system (or the system being made unavailable for maintenance), the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) [AD] provides protection for a small break LOCA. ADS is designed to depressurize the reactor so that Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) [BO] and/or Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) [BM] can provide flow to the core for adequate core cooling.

LPCI [BO], LPCS [BM], and ADS [AD] were demonstrated to be fully operable as required by Technical Specification 4.5,C.l.a. RCIC [BN] was also demonstrated to be fully operable except for the short time period noted in the event description above and in LER-88-002. Accordingly, operation of the plant was within the limits of the Technical Specifications and Final Safety Analysis Report.

NAC FORM 386A
19-831

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO 3150--0104
EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)

0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 8 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 4

TEXT If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 3864 s.l. (17)

IAMES A FITZPATRICK

NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

Corrective Action

Immediate corrective action was to replace the failed motor and lubricate the valve stem and stem nut threads.

Long-term corrective action is to revise Maintenance Procedure MP-59.9 to require inspection, cleaning, and lubrication of the threads of the valve stem and stem nut during repacking of manual and power operated valves.

Additional Information

Failed component identification:

- Valve Motor Manufacturer: Peerless-Porter

- Motor Model Number: DS224B - Manufacturer NPRD Code: P269

LER-85-025, 86-014, 86-011, and 86-003 are related events in which safety-related valve motors failed due to procedure deficiencies.

Revision l is submitted to provide clarification that the lubrication discussed refers to the threads of the valve stem and stem nut rather than the stem packing.

James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant PO. Box 41 Lycoming, New York 13093 315 342 3840

> Radford J. Converse Resident Manager



May 13, 1988 JAFP-88-0455

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

REFERENCE: DOCKET NO. 50-333

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT: 88-001-01

Dear Sir:

Enclosed please find referenced Licensee Event Report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73.

If there are any questions concerning this report, please contact Mr. W. Verne Childs at (315) 349-6305.

Very truly yours,

RADFORD J. CONVERSE

RJC: WVC: Nar

cc: USNRC, Region I (1)
INPO Records Center, Atlanta, GA (1)
American Nuclear Insurers (1)
Internal Power Authority Distribution
NRC Resident Inspector
Document Control Center
LER/OR File

JEZZ